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FOREWORD 
This essay is an attempt to rescue that agonizing North/South 
diQlogue which for a while, has succeeded to attract the 
international audience . The dialogue is a continuous one though it 
is pursued more in a GlaU!2lWi~tan way i.e. through military 
intervention, aggression and use of force rather than through 
peaceful means by way of talks and negociations . 
., 
I believe in peaceful dialogue and in "man's reasonablness. That 
is why, I intend· to contribute to that dialogue by exposing the 
hopes, aspirations and willingness of my community toward such 
ideals as peaceful co-existence, humanitarian brotherhood, world 
peace and International cooperation. 
I may need to alert my colleagues that my argument, quite 
often, is going to take a "metajuridical" sense. Hence, instead of 
.. 
using concepts such as "nations-states" treaties, etc... as my 
colleagues would expect me to . I will be using terms and 
concepts such as " Arabo- islamic community - cultural self 
determination , etc ... which a certain orthodoxy deems as "non-
legal". 
The point is, being an Arabo:lslamic. lawyer, requires me to 
take, the term now being in vogue, a slightly unorthodox approach 
to the study of International Law. Let us say, I tend to be critical 
vis-a-vis the discipline. I do not see how things could be 
otherwise. 
,. 
The Arabo-islami.c world's interpellation of the contemporary 
2 
International Order has been a groHVing trend since its OtI4r;~ 
establishment back during the fourteenth,. It is now more and more 
1\ 
taking violent forms as the Gulf war would attest. The outlook 
seems even darker if one is to "lend an ear" to the frightening 
growls which islamic- fundamentalism is raising here and there . 
The Horth South debate has concentrated mainly on the 
economical dimension urging for the elaboration of a new 
international economic order. Many have argued that the weakness 
of this frame resides in its being oblivious of the cultural 
dimension which is determinant in such a civilizational debate. In 
the early seventies) a french colleague expressed a hope saying : 
"After pOlitical decolonization, we have come to what is 
economical Sovereignty, after juridical equality. We have 
grown conscious of the necessity to achieve equality of 
opportunity in regard to development. There remains a 
third dimension which we are begining to foresee and this 
consists in something which touches deeply into the 
substance of people. Some have talked about a cultural 
resourcefulness, of the right of every state to recover 
its personality. A fruitful dialogue passes through this 
dimension if the third world states continue to send back 
to the northern hemisphere only a distorted image of 
itself, there would be but an illusion of dialogue and the 
result will be further disputes ."( 1) 
Hence , it is our aim to answer that hope by providing the 
missing dimension. We believe as does F.lory, that such a dimension 
is necessary in order to erUlence our knowledge of each other as a 
first step, toward mutual understanding and comprehension. 
Philosophical dictionaries tell us that the term "Culture" has a 
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double meaning, (one of them is too) narrow; confined to the 
definition of the creative expression in the field of arts, 
literature, painting and so on ... , the other (is too wide) and open to 
include the creative expressions of man in all fields of human 
behavior.ln our study, without neglecting either of these senses, 
we will focus on the later. There are important methodological 
issues which need to be examined before going any further 
The Mean: Globalism versus Fragmentation 
As we all know, there is a certain dichotomy perceptible in 
every aspect of man's nature: individual versus society, objective 
versus subjective, theory versus practice or the "homosapien vs 
homofaber", etc ... One can infinetly draw parallelisms of this sort 
at all levels of human knowledge and activity. 
An important dichotomy is that which opposes globality or 
holism to fragmentation. This is relevant to our study because it 
is reflected nowadays at the international level by the opposition 
between third world advocacy of a global negotiation of 
international problems, to the case-by-case policy supported by 
the industrialized nations. Both approaches (views, methods) could 
well be said to have qualities and weaknesses (advantages and 
disadvantages) . 
A global view of any "Phenomenon" gives you certainly a better 
understanding of the nature, cause, and the dynamics of 
interaction between the different parts or fragments of that 
phenomenon as a whole. Hence, it allows you to draw a general 
synthesis, that is for the qualities. As to the weaknesses, a global 
approach does not allow you a clear understanding of the role each 
small fragment or "unit" per-se, plays within the whole. Thus, it 
hinders your detailed analysis and makes your global vision of the 
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phenomenon in question too vague and weak at the level of 
"generalisability". The same applies to the fragmented approach. It 
allows you a better understanding of each fragment taken apart 
but hinders your global vision. Hence, the best way to avoid the 
weaknesses of both "methods" is to try a combination of the 
qualities of both. An assembling of fragmented precision and 
global outlook is the best of all. Yet, you may argue that in running 
"two rabbits at once", one may lose them both and endJ up empty 
handed. That is true, and that is a risk which you have to take in 
order to avoid the arrogance of fragmentation as well as the 
vagueness of globalism. 
The combination of both is known as the method of the mean. A 
middle-way between two extremes, that is, in legal thought, what 
M. Bas .. would call "Analytical Conceptualism"(2); the notion of the 
mean~ one could also call it "the balance", is an ~ge~ human 
synthesis. Aristotle has called it "Moral Virtue" in his 
Nichomachean ethic (Book II). Religions have advocated it. Islam 
has made it a central theme. In contemporary philosophy and social 
p 
science; U is the cherished method through which, modern critical 
thought strives for a reconciliation between theory and praxis, 
subjectivism and objectivism, etc ... 
I therefore, entirely agree with those who call for a knowledge 
beyond objectivism and subjectivism, I furthermore, agree with 
those who believe that truth lies beyond prejudice, somewhere in 
the human linguistic community. For all these reasons, I have 
strived to broaden my horizon as much as possible so that I 
succeed in "transcending" myself and my prejudices to the utmost 
possible limit, as well as, the prejudices of the "other" and 
search beyond that for a common and shared value and that is our 
"humanity". I believe understanding at that level is possible 
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The level of Discourse: realism versus utopianism 
Man is a political animal. That is what the most knowledgeable 
of our species have been repeating since earliest times. Man is a 
combination of a multitude of animal instincts with a natural gift 
distinguishing him from the rest of animals and that is "reason". 
Man endowed with "Reason", is man entrusted with a mission to do 
good (virtue) and forbid bad (evil). Reason allows man to 
distinguish between good and bad. Therefore, it is a tool, an 
instrument, a means. Man's conception of his own reason is 
twofold, he either uses it as a tool and in that case he is able to 
discern between good and bad, or he sees it as an end and in that 
case, Reason Mirrors to man his gift and talent i.e. his distinctive 
faculty of being a thinking animal, a knowing intellect, a self 
conscious "I". This discovery increases man's self love and egoism 
and turns him to a mortal god. 
Through out history man has been shifting from one conception 
to another. Religions were revealed and Messengers came to preach 
"virtue" but in vain. "Virtue being a bite requiring for the taste of 
man." Reason was turned to an end. Man conquered it and has since 
lost it as a means. Today, man is either all spirit or all matter, 
two extremes and a perpetual conflict source of all the trouble in 
the world. 
International Law: between Realism and Utopia 
In the legal sphere, this dichotomy is reflected in the 
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opposition between morality and law (understood in a positive 
sense). In other terms, it is the all very known paradox between 
what "is" and what "ought to be", i.e.between realism and utopia, 
between present and future. 
International Public Law, we are told by classical as well as 
contemporary lawyers, is the sum of juridical rules (norms) 
regulating the complexes relations between sovereign states. 
Classical writers used to call it the "Law of War and Peace" 
(Grotius). 
Nowadays, conflicts, violations and use of force, have 
become "Monnaie-Courante" in the mainstream of international 
activity. Many have imp uted th is "i nstabi I ity" to th e "i n-
effectiveness" of international law, which is supposed to ensure 
stability and provides for order and peace. Hence, international law 
has become the target of severe criticism both from outside and 
from within. 
From outside, it is the politicians (theoreticians and 
practitioners) who are the most vociferous in criticizing 
International Law. What mainly arouse their criticism is what they 
perceive as the pretentiousness, the utopianism of International 
Law. Its lack of realism and its irrelevant aspiration. Of course, 
politicians also are sometimes "idealists". Yet, they are only a 
minority and very often, mainly because of that, they do not 
succeed in politics. Politics throughout human history has 
relegated law to a lower rank in the social sphere. Today even 
more than before and it will probably continue to do so for ever. 
From within, International Law is criticized by lawyers 
theoreticians and practitioners ClJike .Among the later, as among 
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their political pairs. there are utopians and realists. The first 
refuse to consider law as only a technical tool denied of all 
aspirations. they always seek to reach "virtue" and convert it into 
legal rules. Yet, they often if not always fail in their task. '"the 
Realists, on the other hand, use law as a technical tool, mainly to 
ensure political stability, very often they do so at the cost of 
justice and equity. Unlike the former,the realists neglect minor 
problems when they emerge and as long as the whole juridical 
machinery is functioning they worry little if not at all about what 
one may call "Les accidents de Parcours". \Vhile the former are 
initiators, imaginatit',t? and perfectionists, the later are 
conservatives, specialists or "professionals" and pragmatists. 
Both, of course, are extremists in their validity claims .. 'the best 
way to avoid the drawbacks of both is to aim at a synthesis .. From 
what precedes then, follows the fact that our discourse will move 
constantly and di alectically fro m 0 ne extre me to an othe r 
emphasizing always the possibilities for synthesis and 
compromises. It is our belief that beyond extremes lies the saIV~-r~ 
of the specieS It is also our belief that beyond prejudices, there IS 
room for reason. Yet, unless "Divine inspiration" intervenes in a 
way or another, reason will not be able to cross the Edge of 
prejudice.1herefore, it is high time for man to give up his 
relentless pursuit of the illusion of thought, that is not the aim of 
reason. Reason's aim is man's education and emancipation. Reason 
would not achieve that by revealing to man the mysteries of the 
universe but rather by teaching him how to avoid false premises 
and extremists assumptions. 
Bibliographical References & 
The Work's Outline 
To prepare this essay, I have read widely textbooks and 
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articles from all disciplines of social sciences available in 
Arabic, French and English. I have combined data from various 
fields of social sciences to reach this synthesis. 
There has been much talk in legal circles about professional 
humility. The saying goes that a succesful lawyer should not make 
as his own, the task of explaining rules. Juristic humility requires 
him to content himself with the endeavour of interpreting rules 
within the boundaries set to them by the discipline. The extra 
legal aspects of the rule are of no concern to him. As .jJolanyLwould 
put it :" this is no humility but rather an arrogant and arbitrary 
division of labour. (3) 
The aim of this essay, is to provide an Arabo-Islamic reading 
of contemporary International Law and elaborate on the Arabo-
Islamic understanding of what the contemporary International 
Legal order is about. Concerned as every student of International 
affairs is, with the level of military escalation, the use of force 
and violence reached in every sphere and on every occasion of our 
life, national as well international. undertake this theoretical 
project with the hope of succeeding in introducing the Arabo-
Islamic society to the internationql community; facilitating thus, 
its integration and contributing by such an effort to the 
appeasment of the tension reached so far. It is propably 
impossible to avoid polemics altogether in a theoretical essay like 
our~ Yet, I will do my best to keep argumentation within an 
acceptable tone. 
I will begin with an introductory chapter,in which I think it is 
necessary to provide a historical survey of the concept " 
sovereignty" and traces its historical evolution taking the 
opportunity to outline the Islamic theory of the state, once this is 
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done, I will move on to the hard core of the study . i .e , the 
.." 
notion of the right of people (states) to self-determination in 
contemporary International Law. 
Following our methodology we will dissect the right to self-
determination into three sub-rights : 
1) the Right to Political Self-Determination. 
2) the Right to Economical Self-Determination. 
3) the Right to Cultural Self-Determination. 
Each of these sub-rights involves a key concept. R.P.S.D 
involves sovereignty and requires research and investigations an 
how to keep sovereignty within the law? R. E.S. D involves 
. development and requires an analysis of the different~ 
developmental paradigms as well as their interaction. R.C.S. D 
involves question of identity and poses the challenge of modernity 
and univJ1alism. 
In concluding my essay, I will recover the global perspective 
and from there on draw a final panorama on the world scene,:,: 
exposing theoritical schemes which I believe enhance dialogue and 
reenforce the rule of law~ How, in other terms, International Law 
could contribute to the promotion of the right to self-' 
determination as well as how self-determined entities could 
reciprocate 
Notes 
~ / ~/ / (1) M.Flory, "Sauver~ainte' Des Etats et Cooperation Pour Ie Developpement", 
R.C.A.D.I 1974 I, Vol. 41, (p. 326). 
(2) M. Bos, a methodology of internatfhal law N. Holland. 1984, (p.35). 
(3)Polanyi.M, "Science,Faith and Society".University Chicago press,1964 
(p.14). 
.. 
;'/ ,~ 
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An Introductory Chapter 
A. Historical Survey of the Concept of Sovereignty 
Section one: Sovereignty in the western tradition 
I. The Medieval Scholastic: 
Most writers on International Law and politics consider the 
concept of sovereignty as a relatively recent intellectual 
acquisition which has emerged from enlightenment. Yet, some 
scholars have sought to establish deeper historical roots to the 
concept of sovereignty and have linked it with the "Greeko-Roman" 
heritage. Phillipson, for instance, tells us that "the division of 
Greece into dependent states rendered possible the 
evolution of the law governing relations among them in 
their capacity of sovereig n powers". (1 ) 
Kleffens links the Concept of Sovereignty with the first 
century definition of PROCULUS: " liber populus externus is 
qui nullius alterius populi potestati est subjectus". An 
independent foreign power is that which is subject to the power of 
none. (2)lt is nevertheless, generally admitted that sovereignty is 
a recent notion which has burst along with the positivistic trend 
that has been dominating the European Arena since the 16t h 
century. Sovereignty hence, is a secular concept purified from all 
metaphysical cor~lations. It is the attribute of supreme legal 
authority. This synthesis has evolved as a result of a long 
historical rivalry between spiritual power (church) and temporal 
(King). 
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At the beginning, the Christian scriptures had set a balance 
between the two: " Render unto Caesar the things that are 
Caesar's ".(3) St. Augustine, has emphasized the need for a 
balanced relationship between spiritual and temporal powers. 
"Grace and Free will, he said, are complementary and both 
necessary in order to succeed in life". Invoking prophet 
Jeremiah's Malediction"Cursed is the man who has hope in 
man and maketh strong the flesh of his arm and whose 
heart departeth from the Lord ,,( 4), he strong Iy advocated a 
mid-way in between. This is very important and we shall later on 
compare it to the position of medieval Muslim Doctors. In the fifth 
century, Pope Gelasuis, in a letter to the Emperor Anastasuis (494 
AD) is reported to develop what since, has become known as the 
theory of the two swords. There are, he says, two systems under 
which chiefly this world is governed, the sacred authority of the 
priests and the royal power. Of these, the greater weight is with 
the priest$ is so far as he will answer to the Lord even for Kings 
in the last judgement.(5) 
This balance of power, was first shaken during the medieval 
era which confronted the problem of interpretation of the Supreme 
Law. The main controversy was provoked by the historical struggle 
between Pope Gregory VII and the Emperor Henry IV, at the end of 
eleventh century, over the rival claims of both spiritual and 
temporal powers as to supremacy. 1hrough the Pope, as the head of 
the church and guardian of religion, spiritual power claimed not 
only the right of investiture of bishops but also supremacy over 
the emperor. The latter, on the other hand, claimed the right of 
heriditary succession and the right to appoint the clergy, as 
uncontested aspects of imperial power. 
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8t. Thomas Acquinas came and attempted to solve the conflict 
by restoring the old Augustinian balance. He argued "that the 
human will can by common consent, attribute juridical 
value to anything which is not in itself contrary to 
natural (divine) justice and this is positive Law, but if a 
thing is in itself contrary to natural justice, it cannot be 
made just by human volition"(6). What 8t. Thomas attempted 
is a re-conciliation of Greek Rationalism with the spirit of 
Christianity. As Prof Dunning has observed : "What St.Thomas 
did, was an attempt to reconciliate ~ristotelis with 
Christ __ .ianity". (7)lt is worth mentioning in here, that Greek 
philosophy was then transmitted to Europe by Arabo-Muslim 
philosophers such as "Avicenna - Ibn-Tufail - el Farabi and 
Averroes ll • We will see later on how the later particularly has 
influenced 8t. Thomas. 
Right now, let us come back to Europe where the struggle for 
power was renewed under Pope Boniface VIII and King Phillip the 
fair of France (1296-1303). The following is extracted from Prof. 
Dunning's book (8). 
PopeBoniface:1I We wish you to understand that you are subject 
to us in spiritual and temporal matters" . 
King Phillip :" Let your most distinguished fatuousness be 
assured that in temporals we are subject to no oneil . 
This conflict developed on theoretical grounds in the works of 
scholars and theologians. The most important theoretical work 
written in the support of the church's claim was "D e 
Ecciesiatico Potestate" by Egiduis Colonna (1302), who 
maintained that from the intrinsic moral superiority of the Pope 
follows the right of the church to judge all temporal authorities. 
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John De Paris(1302) defended the autonomy of the temporal power 
in his "De Potestate Regia et Popali" and argued strongly for a 
separation of the two powers. The synthesis so much advocated by 
St. Augustine was thus shaken apart and in the words of a scholar : 
"One by one, the various spheres of life, successively 
managed to wrest themselves out from under the control 
of the church"(9). It was Marsiluis De Padua, who launched a 
decisive and almost final attack on the church's claim for 
temporal powers, in his "Defensor Pacis". The defender of peace, 
Marsiluis, denied to the church and the papacy any political 
competence and elevated the "st ate" to a position of supreme 
power to which everything else is subordinated. Hence, he argued : 
"According to truth and Aristotle, the legislator is the 
people,or a majority of them commanding or determining 
that something be done or refrained from the field of 
social human action, under pain of some temporal 
punishment"(10). Hence, the secular trend was already well 
under way. Giovanni Pico, (1463-1494) emphasized more deeply 
the notion of the free will in his: "De hominis dignatate"-
Man's Dignity- "Only man, he argued, is able to develop him 
- self according to his own free will, he can rise to become 
'God's equal' or fall to the level of beast"(11). 
All the enlightenment movement appears from then on, as a 
progressively growing secular trend in which man disc.overs his 
powers to control and design freely his own existence. The 
exclusion of the church from temporal power was consumed. 
Francisco De Vittoria (1485-1546) a Spanish theologian and 
Publicist, asserts in his "Law of Nations"( that civil power is 
not subject to the Pope because of any temporal sovereignty on his 
part, since as already proven, the Pope himself is not a secular 
sovereign, he cannot bestow secular sovereignty upon others and 
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consequently cannot make temporal kings or princes.(12) 
By all means, it is Machievelli who gave the "Coup De Grace" 
to the old Augustinian synthesis. The author of the "Prince" is 
unanimously regarded as the founder of "real politics" and the 
notion of "Raison . D'etat" .AII means are justified for the purpose 
of upholding the state's supremacy "Those or him who wants to 
perform the good no matter what the circumstances, will 
succumb in the midst of the many who are not good". (13) 
Therefore, a ruler ought to maintain his position and must learn 
not to be good at times. In fact St. Augustine was well aware of 
this outcome; w~~~ot him who wrote :"The lust of sovereignty 
disturbs and consumes the human race with frightful 
i IIs"{ 14). Machievelli paved the road for the modern and secular 
notion of the nation-state. We will examine his influence later on 
when comparing him to Ibn Khaldun and his theory of State-Power. 
After Machievelli, it was left to Grotius, Hobbes and later on 
German idealists to raise the nation-state notion to its highest 
extremes. 
Jean Bodin : (1530-1576) Bodin is considered by the majority 
of scholars as the father of the concept "Sovereig nty". In his 
"Les Six Livres De La Republique", he reserved a whole 
chapter of his book I, to the analysis of sovereignty. With him is 
also linked the theory of state absolutism. Bodin was deeply 
concerned by what was going then in his country. A France of 
turmoil, threatened by dissolution from within and attacks from 
OlJ/side.; The historical backdrop of Bodin's work is the 
development of France into a unified nation under powerful 
monarchs such as : Charles VII or Louis XI. Bodin introduces in an 
early work "The Methodus ad facilem historiarum 
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cog n it ion em". Method for an easy comprehension of history -
1566- the Principle of sovereignty but not in its absolute version. 
It is later on, in his major work (cited above) that he shifted 
to Absolutism which he derived from the political context of that 
times. His reasoning could be resumed as follow : Sovereign 
authority is absolute, the King of France is sovereign. Hence, the 
King has absolute power. The idea of absolute power was widely 
accepted by then. The language of the jurists and commentators of 
that time would seem today shockingly immoderate.(15) 
In the opening chapter of book I, Bodin, informs us that 
sovereignty is that absolute power vested in a common wealth, 
which in Latin is termed "Majestas". Absolute power means 
exemption from all law and the distinguishing mark of sovereignty 
is that it cannot in any way be subject to the command of another, 
for it is he who makes Law (the sovereign) who at the same time 
abrogates and amends them. This is why in the Civil Law, it is laid 
down that the prince is above the law(16), For Bodin, then, 
sovereignty is absolute, inalienable, indivisible and perpetual, and 
is only limited by (divine law) natural law. All the princes of the 
earth are subject to divine and natural laws and cannot contravene 
them without treason and rebellion against god. Other than these 
laws, there are none to bind the supreme power of the prince. 
There was by Bodin's time, a well spread opinion that the king is 
bound by the popular command(17). Yet this opinion Bodin thinks 
must be disregarded because it furnishes seditious men with 
material for revolutionary plots with the consequence that there 
would arise disturbance in the commonwealth. 
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1\ .The Social Contract Theory And Sovereignty 
The idea of the social contract is an old syncretism reached by 
early Greek philosophers. Plato, in the republic, has concluded : 
"Therefore, when men act unjustly . towardS one another, 
and thus experience both the doing and suffering harm. 
Those among them who are well unable to compass the 
one and escape the other, come to this conclusion; that it 
is more profitable that they should mutually agree 
neither to inflict injustice, nor to suffer it. Hence, men 
began to establish Laws and covenants with one another 
and they called what the laws prescribed lawful and 
just".(18) 
During the late sixteenth and early seventeeth centuries, the 
social covenant theory was revived and used to legitimate the 
social order.. Many scholars resorted to it. Grotius, Hobbes, Locke 
and Rousseau are among the most notable scholars who have 
elaborated on this idea. It is true, however, that everyone among 
them has given it a different interpretation. This is mainly 
because of the different political context in which everyone lived. 
Hugo Grotius: (1583-1645) Huig De Groot, who is much better 
known under his Latin name is unanimously regarded as the Father 
of International Law "Jus gentium". He applied the noti'on of the 
social covenant to explain that of sovereignty. If every individual 
may engage himself in private servitude as he pleases, why not a 
group of people? In order to gain protection, they could well 
transfer their sovereign rights to one or more persons without 
reserving any portion to themselves. Grotius defines theR 
sovereign as the power whose actions are not subject to the 
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control of any other person, so as to' b~ (a"ctlleJat the pleasure of 
any other human will.(19) 
The state, he sees as the perfect body of the free men, united 
together in order to enjoy common rights and advantages. The law 
of nations he defines, as that extensive right deriving its 
authority from "Pacta Sunt Servanda", the consent of all 
nations or at least the majority of them. The sovereign, according 
to Grotius has the supreme power which cannot be superseded by 
any other will. Yet, it remains bound to Natural Law and the Law of 
Nations. The influence of St. Thomas is very apparent when he 
as se rts: "Positive Law can never enjoin what natural law 
forbids, nor forbid what Natural Law 
permits"(20)·However, Grotius seems to allow for a 
transgression of natural law when the general interest of the 
state is at stake. The Monarch then, determines alone the content 
of "Utilitas Publica" regardless of anything else. Grotius does 
recognize to the people the right to resist the power in some few 
cases.(21) For him Natural Law is a dictate of reason (right 
reason) which points out that an act according as it is or is not in 
conformity with rational nature has in it, a quality of moral 
baseness or moral necessity. This holds even if we are to concede 
that which cannot be conceded without the utmost wickedness, 
that there is no god; or that the affairs of men are of no concern to 
him (22). Grotius, thus appear to be the first to have admitted the 
alternative possibility of an atheist -secular and positive-
foundation of the world Natural Law grounded on reason.(23) 
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) : with Hobbes, Absolutism of the 
civil power is taken to its highest level. Unlike Bodin, Hobbes no 
longer considers the sovereign to be juridically bounds to Laws 
whether natural or others. His absolutist construction of the state 
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allows of no fundamental Legal Liberties proper to human beings. 
Hobbes starts with assumption that human beings in their natural 
state live in anarchy and are moved by desires and aversions which 
generate a state of perpetual restlessness. Human beings asserts, 
Ho bbes, are p rofou nd Iy se If-inte rested, see ki ng a Iways to 
maximize pleasure and fulfill their desires. The human being seeks 
power and because the power gained by one is lost by another, 
conflict of interests are inevitable. They are a fact of nature. The 
struggle for power defines the human condition and power can only 
be gained by war. So, Natural Society is a permanent state of war. 
It is the war of all men against men : bellum omnium in 
om n e s. (24) Human beings are wolves to each others : homo-
homini-Iupus. So, those who are unable to resist the intensity of 
this anarchical state, reach the conclusion that it is more 
profitable for all to establish some kind of stable authority by 
surrendering their rights and transferring them to a powerful 
authority which can force them to keep their promises and 
covenants. Then, an effective and stable state can be formed.So 
men agree mutually on the establishment of a common power to 
which they all accept to be bound. Hence, they will be prevented 
from inflicting harm and injustice or suffering from it. 
The commonwealth is thus achieved and in every city that man 
to whose will, each particular man hath subjected his will is said 
to have the supreme power or chief command or dom'inion.(25) 
Hobbes further makes it clear that the will of who has the 
supreme power given to him IS the will of all. Therefore, it 
contains the will of all citizens and as a result, the ruler is not 
bound to them nor to the Civil Law, because if that is so, then the 
ruler would be bound to himself. Therefore, Hobbes' ruler is the 
supreme monarch superior to everyone and to all and nobody could 
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be compared to him since he is a mortal god. As in the presence of 
the Master, the servants are equal and without any honor of all, so 
are the subjects in the presence of the sovereign and though they 
shine some more, some less, when they are out of his sight. In his 
presence they shine no more than the stars in the presence of the 
sun(26). In Hobbes' opinion, sovereignty is perpetual,Undivided and 
ultimately absolute. It is conferred by the people and their consent 
but only because they were defeated in the first place by the 
biggest wolf of all. ~flecting the political atmosphere of his own 
times) Hobbes commonwealth aims at the abolition of anarchy. The 
only alternative for that is to rely on a powerful authority which 
is able of imposing order and assuring social safety. The Hobbishan 
political structure is of much relevance to our dictatorial military 
regimes based on naked brutal force. As Professor Friedman once 
noted :"From Hobbes J political and legal theory emerges 
modern men, self centered,individualistic, 
materialistic,irreligious, in pursuit of organized 
power.(27) 
John Locke (1632 - 1704) : with Locke, the concept of 
sovereignty is going to change hands and goes from the monarch to 
the people.Sovereignty is no more the mark of the sovereign. 
Absolutism is inconsistent with civil society and the only 
sovereign is the people, the sole legislator. All power in the 
society are derived from the people's will, the commonwealth is 
made by the consent of every individual and the power of the 
community' to act as one body enhanced by the will and 
dete rmi n atio n of the majo rity. (28) Locke's treatise of civil 
government is often looked upon as a defense of the 1688 
revolution and a justification of the "W hi g" principles which 
dominated ,English politics during the eighteenth century. In any 
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case, it is a strong reaction to the Hobbishan Absolutism, the 
argument of Locke is directed against the arbitrariness of 
individual power. Locke starts from the assumption that the state 
of nature is a state of peace and good will. (29) It is worth 
recalling in here the ambivalent evolution of thought and its 
jumping from one extremi: to another. Hence, from the state of 
war, described by Hobbes, we move to the opposite with Locke. The 
Wolf becomes suddenly a Lamb. If the nature of man is all good, 
why then do we need a commonwealth ? Locke answers: because of 
the fact that in nature, every man has the executive power, self-
love, which despite the good nature, sometimes prevails in man ~ 
will carrying him far in punishing others. Hence, nothing but 
confusion and disorder will follow. The remedy to this therefore, 
is the establishment of a civil government. Wherever any number 
of men unite into one society as to quit everyone his power of the 
law of nature and to resign it to the public. There and there only is 
a civil society and this put men out of the state of nature and into 
that of commonwealth.(30) Unlike Hobbes, Locke does not urge for 
a complete and unconditional surrender of individual rights, at the 
opposite, he makes it clear that the transfer of right from the 
citizen to the commonwealth is conditioned upon the state 
adhesion to its essential function and that is : the protection of 
the citizens lives, liberties and estates. All of which, Locke 
includes under the label of property. 
J.J. Rousseau (1712 - 1788) : Sovereignty with Rousseau 
becomes "volante genera Ie" . General will as expressed by the 
majority.lf the state or the city is only a moral person whose life 
consists in the union of its members. If the most vital function is 
self-preservation, it must have a compulsive force to move and 
control each part in the way most suitable to the whole. As nature 
gives each man absolute power over its limbs, the social covenant 
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gives the political body absolute power over all its members. This 
power directed by the general will bear the name sovereignty(31). 
Each man in giving himself to all gives himself to nobody because 
in the Civil Society, no man is subject to other man. The sovereign 
is the general will. Hence, it can never have interest contrary to 
those of its members. Sovereignty j that of the general ;-will, is 
absolute, inviolable and integral."Man is born free but every 
where he is in chainj'".(32)This stirring cry is the key note to 
the social covenant. Rousseau strives through his work to free man 
from his chains. The best way being that of giving the people the 
right to be their own masters. This explains the tremendous 
influence of Rousseau and the impact of his thought on the 
political life of Europe and the French revolution. Rousseau rejects 
at first hand the Grotian construction which denies to the people 
their freedom. Sovereignty, he asserts, cannot be represented for 
the same reason that it cannot be alienated, The people deputies 
are not and could not be its representatives. They are merely its 
agents and they cannot decide anything. Any law which the people 
has not ratified is void and not law at all(33). Further, Rousseau 
observes that liberty consists less in acting according to one's 
pleasure than in not being subject to the will and pleasure of 
others. Whom ever is the master over the others is not himself 
free, for to reign is to obey(34), 
, .' 
In trying to explain why sovereignty or "volonte generale" is 
indivisible t Rousseau uses a humoristic metaphor," 0 u r 
publicists, he says, being unable to divide sovereignty in 
its principle, divide it in its object". They divide it into 
force and will, into legislative 
power. Into rights of taxation, 
internal administration and 
power 
justice 
power 
and executive 
and war. Into 
treating with 
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foreigners. Sometimes confounding all these departments 
and sometimes separating them. They make the sovereign 
a fantastic being formed of connected parts. It is as if 
they compose a man of several bodies, one with eyes, 
another with arms, another with feet and nothing else. 
The Japanese conjurers, it is said, cut up a child before 
the eyes of the spectators. Then, throwing all its parts 
into the air, they make the child come down alive and 
whole. Such almost are the juggle tricks of our 
publicists, after dismembering the social body by a 
deception worthy of the fair, they recombine its parts 
nobody knows how(35). 
Rousseau is the real extreme opposite to Hobbes. Locke seems 
to be a middle-way between both. Hence, if Hobes could be said to 
argue for a despotic type of monarchism, Locke for an enlightened 
parliamentary monarchy. Rousseau would then be the one arguing 
for a democratic republic with direct access to political decision. 
This insistence on self managed individuals through "volonte De 
tous" renders his "social contrat" almost utopian. 
III. German idealism and the theory of the state. 
German idealism is that current of thought which swept 
through Germany during the eighteenth century up to world war II 
and which attributes an autonomous existence to ideals in the 
society and ascribes a central role to the human intellect in 
achieving these ideals. 
* E.Kant (1724 - 1804) adopts Rousseau's theory of the general 
will and proclaims that the will of the legislator is the joint will 
of all citizens. As such the general will cannot do wrong." W hen 
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the sovereign limits himself to his power task of 
maintaining the state as an institution of the 
administration of justice and interferes with the welfare 
and well being of the citizens only so far as necessary 
to secure this end. When on the other hand, the citizen is 
allowed freely to criticise acts of government but never 
seeks to resists it then,. we have this union of the spirit 
of freedom with obedience to law"(36). 
Kant believed International Coexistence possible between 
states. A universal and ongoing institution of peace is not simply a 
&1 
part, but final purpose of legal theory within the limit of pure 
reason; for the state of peace is only the situation of "m in e" and 
"thine" secured under law. 
F.Hegel: (1770 -1831). With Hegel, idealism is taken to the 
extreme. History and the evolution of the human society through 
Dialectic,aj·\m.s at the achievement of freedom. The state is the 
actuality of concrete freedom.(37) It is a substantial essence to 
the spirit of being. The individual tells us, Hegel, is his own end in 
the civil society. Nothing else matters to him. But since he cannot 
attain the "se If-rea lizat ion" aim, except among others, then his 
particular end assume the form of universality in the society. The 
welfare state;, Hegel, dismisses as accidental in History because 
it . is not the achievement of the first needs (animal)'· and the 
satisfaction of the biological instincts which constitute freedom. 
It is rather work. Man is a matter, he makes things and through 
them makes himself. Self-realization is the end of work. In the 
state, the personal individuality and its particular interests not 
only achieve their complete development and gain explicit 
recognition for their rights but they also pass over of their 
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own into the interest of the universal. Hence, the Principle of the 
modern-state has prodigious strength and depth because it allows 
the principle of subjectivity to progress to .its culmination in the 
extreme of self subsistent personal particularity and yet at the 
same time brings it back to the substantive unity and so maintains 
this unity in the principle of subjectivity itself.(38) 
IV. The Absolute Theory and the Abuse of Sovereignty. 
Later German writers in order to justify and attenuate 
somehow the unlimited power of the state have developed what 
has been called the voluntarist theory or the theory of "A uto-
Li m itat ion" of the state. Among those who have contributed to 
the elaboration of this theory are scholars such as Treit~hke, 
Ihering and Jellinek in Germany, Bosanquet and Austin in England, 
Willoughby in the U.S.A and Carre' De Malberg' in France. 
Treit§h~ke, tells us that the test of sovereignty is the right to 
determine itself independently. The international agreement which 
limits the power of the state is an act of voluntary self-
restriction(39), 
Jellinek interprets the treaty as a characteristic of the state 
so v e re i g n ty" If the rig hts and duties of ind ivid uals receive 
their potency and authority from grounds set ,forth in 
objective law, t)1e state finds the ground for its own 
rights and duties in itself"(40), 
For the voluntarist, the supreme power of the state is not only 
th a tIts u prem a potestate" over which there is no other authority, 
but also what "Plenitudo Potestatis", full power which means 
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that the state possesses the competence of its own competence, 
"Kompetenz' Kompetenz". In England, Bosanquet introduces the 
state "H e gel ian -w i s e" and liberates it from all obligations in 
the field of foreign affairs.( 41) But it 'is J.Austin, with his 
analytical school of jurisprudence who will exercises much more 
influence. Austin though defending the absolute power of the state, 
conceives sovereignty as that of the British Parliament. He 
provides us with a substantial analysis of the concept of 
sove re i g nty. (42) It is, he says, an ambiguous and polemical 
concept. The student who invades that dread domain finds himself 
in a world where differences of opinion are numerous. One moment, 
he learns that sovereignty is absolute, the next, he learns that it 
is limited. Now, he is told that in the nature of things, sovereignty 
must be indivisible and inalienable then, he is confronted with 
definite illustrations of sovereignties. If he seeks to inquire what 
sovereignty is based on, he is told by some that it is based on 
force; by others, on will, and by still others on reason. If he is so 
rash as to ask, where sovereignty resides ? He is referred to 
person and bodies of all kinds.(43) 
Austin defines sovereignty as" The habit of obedience or 
submission to a determinate human superior, who is not 
in a habit of obedience to a human superior"(44 L He also 
defines an independent political society that which is composed of 
sovereign and subjects as opposed to the subordinated society. 
Sovereign powers, asserts Austin, is incapable of legal limitation, 
because supreme power limited by positive law is a flat 
contradiction in terms. We cannot speak of law set by a man to 
himself, a law of that kind amounts, at the most, to a rule of 
positive morality.(45) Sovereignty, notes Austin, is something 
well worth fighting for. It belongs, if not to the things which men 
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hold sacred, at least, to the things which they hold dear. It is a 
concept which is progressive and changes as communities grow, 
any account of it which affects to be universal is almost certain 
to be misleading. Sovereignty is at the end a multi-dimensional 
concept and everyone will conceive it as he wants.(46) 
In France, Carre' De Malberg has developed the theory of auto-
limitation in his "Contribution a La Theorie Generale D e 
L'etat"(47), He confirms that all laws emanate from the state 
and derive their binding force from it. The state has the power by 
which it can determine itself, that is why we consider justified 
and conform to the reality the sovereignty of the state. What has 
been the consequence of this theory of the state absolutism was 
left to the proponents of totalitarianism. Hence, extremist 
policies of power (Fascism and Nazism) were elaborated on the 
basis of state Absolutism with no regard for International 
obligations. The notion of the "volkisher staat" was raised as 
the ultimate of self-realization, heading the International 
Community to a dramatic war whose damage is still apparent 
today. 
V. The Theory of Relative Sovereignty. 
Augusts Compte in his course on positive philosophy, asserts 
that humanity had passed through three successive stages of 
knowledge:Metaphysical- Theological-Positivistic. Today according 
to Compte, we have reached the third stage and what 
characterises it is the non-acceptance of abstract metaphysical 
. ,I 
or theological assumptions. We will see later on how this 
happened. In the field of legal philosophy, positivism was 
introduced with the aim of purifying the Science of Law. From all 
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such assumptions, two distinguished scholars among others, have 
strived to accomplish this task.( 48) 
L.Duguit: He is the elaborator of sociological positivism. Duguit 
denies the idea of sovereignty at first glance. It is, he affirms, a 
dangerous fiction which should be banished because it can only 
lead to despotisr;n and the negation of public law.(49) History was 
,tum 
going to proveY'right on this point. Duguit believes that the rule of 
law is above the individual and the state, above the rulers and the 
ruled. A rule which is binding on both of them and we hold that if 
there is such a thing as sovereignty of the state, then it is 
juridically limited by this rule of Law(50). Sovereignty according 
to Duguit, should be replaced by the notion of "Public Service" 
which is the purpose of social life and the genuine expression of 
"social solidarity". Other scholars such as G. Scelle, N. Politis 
and Krabbe were to follow Duguit and elaborate on this teachings. 
Yet juridical positivism was to culminate to its paroxism with H. 
Kelsen and the Vienna School. 
H. Kelsen : Kelsen rejects "S 0 ve re i g n ty" as a judgement of 
value and a pure assumption. Only the "ground norm" which is the 
basis of the whole legal pyramidal system could be said to be 
sovereign(51), To admit sovereignty is to deny the existence of 
International Law(52). Kelsen elaborates a twofold approach to 
the study of International Law;" subjective versus obj~ctive or 
monistic versus dualistic' approaches. The science of law, 
according to Kelsen, describes both approaches but does not side 
with either one because that is beyond its scope(53), In any case, 
tells us Kelsen, sovereignty remains a dogma which cannot be 
contrad icted scie ntifica Ily( 54), 
Other scholars have emphasized the need for a relative 
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conception of sovereignty. World War II demonstrated 
unequivocally the fictuous dimension of Absolute Sovereignty. Ch 
De Visher for instance, argues that doctrine has long tried to come 
to terms with the idea of sovereignty(55). It has attempted to 
domesticate it, to bend it towards a conception of prerogatives 
that could submit to imperative of law. The vague and equivocal 
terms "Limited or Relative" sovereignty, he asserts, are 
indicative of these efforts. Yet, the relation of sovereignty to law 
depends on the degree in which the political power has been 
historically integrated in the legal order. The further this 
integration goes, the more does sovereignty, losing its character 
of domination and becoming a legal authority.(56) 
VI. The Marxist School and Sovereignty. 
For Marx and F. Engels, the state is a "bourgeois" creation set 
by the capitalists in order to protect their privileges. It is by no 
mean the aim of the workers who have got ride of the narrow 
mentality of humble subjects to set the state free. Freedom 
consists in converting the state from an organ superimposed upon 
the society into one completely subordinated to it. Between the 
capitalist and communist societies lie~ the period of revolutionary 
transformation of the one into the other. During that period, the 
state can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the 
Proletariat(57). Engels in his "Anti-Du[,ring" tells us that the 
proletariat seizes political power and turns the means of 
production in the first instance into state property. In doing this, 
it abolishes itself as a directorate of the Proletariat and at the 
same time it abolishes all class distinctions and the state as such. 
Or vV,.(.~ 
The first act by virtue Y,. the state constitutes itself as the 
representative of the whole society; the taking possession of the 
means of production, is at the same time its last independent act 
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as a state. The government of the persons is replaced by the 
administration of things and by the conduct of the process of 
production. The state is not abolished, it withers away(58). 
<1S ctF) 
In Marxist theory, the state is seen v"apparatus" which 
permits the class that owns the means of production, the 
transformation of its economical power into a political one, that 
is, the state is the superstructure determined by the economical 
infrastructure. Yet, since the state, even in socialist and Marxist 
countries instead of withering away has been constantly growing 
in stature and dimension, Marxist theoreticians have adopted the 
concept of sovereignty and they have given it to a new 
substance,that of self-determination(59). In marxist doctrine, the 
principle of the right- to self-determination means the right of 
the workers to protect the revolution and its achievement. Hence, 
Marxist Jurists reject the theory of relative sovereignty, because 
they see in it/ an attempt of the capitalists to undermine the 
emerging new revolutionary states in the third world. In the field 
of political theory, also, Marxism has to adopt to the new context. 
Hence, the orthodox Marxist Dogmas were called into question in 
all European Communist currents and parties. We will see what 
will happen to the Marxist theory in Germany with the Frankfurt 
school later on. In Italy, Gramsci was to invert the dialectical 
relationship in his own version of the functioning of the Civil 
Society. Thus, according to Bobbio(60), Gamsci emphasized the 
primacy of the superstructure over the infrastructure. It is the 
former which is seen as the active and positive factor in the 
historical development of societies. Borrowing from Marx the 
concept of "Hegemony", Gramsci made it a central theme in the 
functioning of the Civil Society. He thus defines it as the attempt 
to construct a successful leadership by establishing a political 
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consensus where interests and needs of all social groups are met. 
The chief constructors of such a consensus should be the 
intellectuals. 
In France, Althusser, though recognizing a certain (relative) 
autonomy to the state did not question the orthodox-Marxist 
Leninist version "DIAMAT". He describes ideology as a relation of a 
second degree based on the first degree relations "The relations of 
production,,(61) . 
It is N. Poulantzas, who under the influence of Gramsci and 
Ingrao, ' has made notable efforts to elaborate on the notion of 
relative autonomy of the state. Poulantzas has sought first to 
define the Crisis of the State ,as the crisis of structure. (62) 
However, ,n his last work(63), he has come to see the state as an 
autonomous political body which incorporates into its heart the 
class struggle and becomes as that "Abnormal" state of Marx, 
where no class has enough power to dominate .-the state, thus, 
according to Poulantzas; acts positively and attempts to isolate 
the workers from their class consciousness. How ? through a 
complex process which Poulantzas divides into four parts : 
1 )-Division between manual and intellectual labour force 
throug h the expertise device, 
2)-lndividualization of work through atomization and 
specialization, 
3)- Law and the monopoly of legitimate violence, 
4)- The international division of labour. 
Poulantzas concludes by stating that the state is not a 
monolithic unit, rather, it is a strategic battle field of class 
struggle where only representative democracy based on Mass 
movement could lead to freedom and real democracy.(64) 
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Much time passed since and today with the coming into power 
of Gorbatchev,a new policy seems to sprang out under the name of 
Glassndtlt consists in a restructuring "Perestroika" of the whole 
Soviet policy In the field of International law. Tunkin has recently 
observed that the new thinking has softened the positivism of the 
Soviet approach to international law and represents another step 
in the international accomodation and "detente".(65) 
Notes 
(1 )-Ph.Colleman,"the International Law & Customs of Ancient Greece and 
Rome".London 1919, VOI.I(p.29) 
(2)-V.Kleffens. sovereingty in Intr.Law RCADI - 1953 A(p.11) 
(3)-Mathews, XXII,17 
(4)-OTES Witney,Basic Writings of St.Augustine.Random House- New York 1948, 
pp.738-739 
(S)-Dunning.W.A, "A History of Political Theories 'Ancient and Medieval".New York. 
MacMillan. 1923,p.166 
(6)-D'antreves.A.P,"Selected Writing of SThomas".tran:J.Dawson. Oxford 1948, 
p.165 
(7)-Dunning,opcit , p.126. 
(8)-opcit, p.216. 
(9)-H.J.V.Eikema Hommes,Major Trends in the History of Legal Philosophy. 
Amsterdam 1979, p.60. 
(10)-Dunning, opcit, p.239 
(11 )-Eikema Hommes, opcit,p.69 
(12)-Vittoria.F,"De Potestate Ecclesia",Appendix,D, XCVI trans:J.B.Scott 
Clarendon-Oxford 1934. 
(13)-Machiavelli.N,"The Prince", Chp.15. 
(14)-St.Augustine,"De Civitate Dei",Chp.III,Part XIV 
(1S)-See,in that respect,J.H.Franklin,"Jean Bodin and Absolute theory. Cambridge 
Uni.Press 1973,p.68. 
(16)-Bodin.J,"Six Books of the Commonwealth",Book I Chp. VIII,trans.M.J.Tooley 
pp.25-35 Oxford, 
(17)-Bodin, opcit. p.29 
(18)-Plato, "The Republic" Book II 
(19)-Grotius.H,"De Jure BELLI AC PACIS",Book I,Chp Vll.trans. Campbell, 
Washington-1901. 
(20)-Grotius, opcit,Book I, Chp.1 X. 
(21 )-Opcit,Book I,Chp.IV, X 
(22)-Opcit,Book I,Chp.I.X5 
32 
(23)-This seems to be the reason why H. Morgenthau has 
oF' 
accused him blasphemy. _--See SeCnOf) I;;r(!~ _ sVIU".:7 
(24)Hobbes.T,"De Cive",Chp.V,part XI 
(25)-Opcit,Chp.V,part XI 
(26)-Opcit,Chp.V,part XIII 
(27)-Hobbes.T,"The Leviatho.n", Chp. XVIII, part II. 
(28)-Friedman.W, "Legal Theory",5 th ed,London,1967p.122 
(29)-Locke.J,"A Treatise of Civil Government",ed:J.W. 
Cough Chp.llI,p.95,Oxford, 1946. 
(30)-Opcit,Chp.lIl,part 19. 
(31 )-Opcit,Chp.VII part 89. 
(32)-Rousseau.J.J,"Contrat Social"Book I,Chp. VI. 
(33)-Rousseau,"Oeuvres Completes"Paris 1911,p.227. 
(34)-Rousseau, "Le Contrat Social" Book III.Chp.XV. 
(35)-Opcit,Book III.Chp. XV. 
(36)-Opcit,Book II.Chp.lI. 
(37)-E.Kant,"Phiiosophy of Law" trans: E.Hastie p.189. 
(38)-F .Hegel, "Philosophy of Right"trans:Knox.Oxford 1962 p.160. 
(39)-Hegel, opcit,p.161. 
(40)-Treitschke," Politics", trans:J .A.Balfou r, London. 
(41)-Jellinek quotation is from, W. Willoughby,"The Fundamental Concepts of 
InLLaw", New York1924,p.193.See also,R.lhering,"Law as a Mean to an 
End", trans: I.Husik - Boston 1913,p.233 
(42)-BoBosanquet,"The Philosophical Theory of the State." MacMillan-London 1926. 
(43)-JETHRO.B,"The Austinian Theory of Law" ,London-1926 
(44 )-Austin, in"Jetro" ,ibid,p.271 
(45)-Austin, opcit,p.97 
(46)-Austin, opcit,p.98 
(47)-Austin, opcit,p.274 
(48)-Carre'De Malberg,"Contribution a la Theorie Gle De L'etat".Paris 1920, (pp. 
233. 237). 
(49)-See,particularly,H.Kelsen,"The Pure Theory of Law".Berkeley,1967. 
(50) DuguiLL"Droit Constitutional",Paris,1923 Vi, P 102 
(51 )Duguit, ibid, pp. 344-345. 
(52)Kelsen.H,"Principles of Int.Law".Berkeley, 1952, p.582. 
(53)Kelsen.,"Theorie Du Droit International" .ReADI, 1953 III, p.79. 
(54)-H.Kelsen,"Sovereignty and Int.Law".in:ln Defence of 
Sovereignty.ed.by:Stankiewiekz. Oxford 1969,p.155. 
(55)-H.Kelsen,"What is Justice?",Berkeley 1957,p.275. 
(56)-Visher.Ch.De,"Theory and Reality in Int. Law",trans.:P. Corbett, Princeton, 
1968. 
(57)-Op.cit,p.104 
(58)-Marx.M,"Critique of the Ghotta Programme" ,p.163. 
(59)-Engels.F,quoted from,M.Caine,Marx & Engels on Law, 
33 
A.Hunt,London 1979 
(60)-Tunkin.G,"lnternational Law in the International 
System",RCADI 1975 IV,p.30. 
(61 )-Bobblo.N,"Gramsci & the Conception of the Civil 
Society" ,in Ch.Mouffe,Gramsei & Marxist Theory, London, Routledge & 
Keagan,ed:1979. 
(62)-Althusser.L,For Marx, Penguin 1969,p.240. 
(63)-Poulantzas.N,"La Crise De l'Etat",2ed.,PUF1977, p.21 
(64)-Poulantzas,"I'Etat,le Pouvoir,le Socialisme",PUF 
Quadrige, 2nded.,1981 
.(65)Tunkin.G," Adresse to the annual meeting of the American society of 
international law" April,21.1988.see alsoJ.Quigley."Perestroika and interational 
law" .A.J .I.L. ,vol,82.1988.(pp. 788-797) 
34 
Section Two: Sovereignty in the Islamic Tradition. 
Litera~y speaking, the term sovereignty in its meaning of 
I 
absolute power is in Arabic a divine attribute or more 
precisely, a name of God. The strong" EI-Kawi", the Merciless 
"EI-Djabar", the dominant "EI-Muhaimin", the invincible "EI-
Kahar", and the powerful "EI-Kadir", are all god's names which 
bear the meaning of sovereignty. God is the only sovereign, 
tells us the Koran :"Knowest thou, that it is God unto whom 
belongeth the sovereignty of heavens and earth"? (1) "S a y 
Oh God, Lord of sovereignty l thou givest sovereignty to 
whom thou pleasest and takest away from whom thou 
pleasest".(2) 
We have shown earlier that sovereignty is a pure western 
concept. Hence, we are not going to find the same concept in the 
Islamic tradition. But, we certainly are going to find many terms 
which are its equivalents. Thus "E s s i y a d a" which means 
"supreme authority" is a term used in modern manuals of 
international law and could be said the closest term to the 
~ ~ 
western concept of sovereignty. We have also, Esolta el-Amma, 
public authority "el-Mulk" Kingship or political power, "Al-
Imama AI-Kubra" or "EI-Khilafa" is a more technical term, 
which is derived from "I st i k h I at", the action of designating a 
political successor, refers to the highest political author,ity in the 
Islamic society. The term is derived from the Koranic verse 
"Where God says to the angels : I am placing on earth a 
Khalifat"(3), When the Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him) died, Abu 
Bakr was elected Khalif to replace him as the head of the 
community. AI-Imama, means in Arabic, leadership and is usually 
used to designate the men who lead the congregational prayers. !t 
is also used, particularly among the "S h iH" to designate the 
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political head of the community. In Islamic political theory 
however, the term "I m am" has been used interchangeably with 
that of "Caliph". 
The Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him) revealed Islam to the Arabs 
of Koraish in Mecca. At first, he faced a strong opposition from his 
fellow tribesmen, he nevertheless succeeded in propagating his 
message and ressembled around him the first nucleus of what 
later on was to develop~to an Islamic society. Many authors have 
pointed out that the covenant concluded between Mohammed (Peace 
be Upon Him) and his followers is the first constitution of the 
islamic commonwealth. It is known as the oath "EI-Bay'a" of 
Akaba. The compact was written in Ana's house, in the first year 
of the exile of Mohammed (Peace Be Upon Him). It opens as follow 
:"In the name of God the Merciful. This is a text by 
Mohammed, between the faithful Muslims of Koraish and 
Yatrib and those who follow them and fight with them. 
They all form one community "Umma" in distinction of all 
other people ... ''(4)' 
The text is considered as the first written constitution. It sets 
up a state in its modern sense, based on people, territory and 
political authority.(5) What interest us here, is political 
authority in the Islamic community. Who holds it ? and how is it 
attributed ? and exercised ? This, we intend to go through the 
examination of the basis of political authority in Islam as derived 
from the authentic sources of law "Usu 1- Ed din e" : The Koran, the 
Hadith "Sun nail and the Ijma "consensus" of the Islamic community 
as well as through the analysis of the classical Islamic theory of 
"AI-Khilafa" as elaborated by AI-Mawerdi, AI Ghazali, Ibn 
Taymiya and Ibn Khaldun. 
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Before that however, it is necessary to sketch a brief 
preliminary outline of what are the basic sources of law "Sharia". 
Islamic jurisprudence "Fikh" is a combined doctrine on religious 
and legal thought. To Moslems, the "Sharia" or "Echar'e" is the sum 
of religious rules which God has promulgated through his prophet 
(Peace Be Upon Him). Thus, the Koran says: "He Hath ordained 
for you, that religion which he commended unto "Noah" 
and that which we inspire in thee (Mohammed) and that 
which we commended unto "Abraham" and "Moses" and 
"Jesus". For each, we have appointed a divine law and 
traced a way"(6), Hence, Islamic Law is divine. The legal system 
as a whole is divided into two parts : AI-Ibadat, religious 
observances in regard to the affairs of the hereafter, such as, 
beliefs, prayers and fasting and EI-Muamalat, the affairs of this 
world, social life etc .... 
The Koran is admitted by all Muslims as the word of God and is 
.,.-
therefore the basis of all laws. 'the second legal source is the 
"Sunna" the Hadith which comprises what the Prophet (Peace Be 
Upon Him) did, said or approved. The compilation of the Hadith was 
done during the Abbasid era and the most trusted compilations of 
Hadith are those of EI-Bokhari and Muslim, called the "Sa h i h a in" 
authentic. The Sunna explains the Koran and interprets its general 
provisions. Adherence to it I is obligatory for all MLjslims by 
authority of the Koranic verse : "And whatsoever the prophet 
giveth you, take it and whatsoever he forbideth, abstain 
from it"(7). Because of its importance, Muslim scholars began to 
study the Hadith critically according to a method known as "E I 
Jarh wa Ta'adil") the researcher in this field was the expert who 
declares the Hadith valid or invalid, according to the degree of 
their authenticity. The "Ahl-Essuna" or Sunnis are the majority 
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of Islamic community. Four schools of jurisprudence have 
flourished among them, these are : The Malekit, the Hanafit, the 
Shafiit and the Hanbalit. Next to the Sunnite, are the Shiites or 
"Shia" called so because of the support they manifested to the 
Caliph Ali Ibn Abi Talib in his struggle against Muawiya. The 
Shiites are divided to many sub-branches, Ismaelits, Twelvers, 
etc .... 
The third sou rce of Islamic Law is the "Ij m a" consensus. It is 
defined as the unanimous agreement of Muslim jurisconsults in any 
particular age on a juridical case not already covered by a holly 
enactment, This agreement may be explicit or tacit, i.e by 
acquiescence and silence.(8) Ijma has been derived from the 
prophet. saying : "My community will never agree upon an 
error". Much has been said about this Hadith and Ijma,(9) and we 
will deal with that later on. Let us just mention that a good 
example of "Ijma" has been the establishment of the Institution of 
"EI-Khilafat". 
The fourth source of Islamic Law is doctrinal interpretation 
"EI-Ijtihad" or the action of deploying all the intellectual 
potential of one's mind in order to grasp the profound wisdom of 
the holly texture "Koran and Sunna" and derive from it 
applicable rules to concrete cases. The "E 1- Mu jta hid" is the one 
who exercise "Ijtihad". Ijtihad is derived from the prophet (Peace 
Be Upon Him) ordinance to Muadh Ibn Jabal/when he sent him to 
Yemen as a judge, he asked him : how will you decide the cases 
which will be brought to you ? Muadll replied : I shall decide them 
according to the book of God. How if you find nothing in the book of 
God? asked the Prophet (PBUH). I then shall decide them according 
to the Sunna of God's apostle. How if you find nothing in the Sunna 
? Added the Prophet (PBUH). Then, replied Muadh, I shall exercise 
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my own judgement without hesitation. There upon, the prophet 
(PBUH) slapped him upon the chest and said : "Praised be God 
who has guided the Messenger of God's messenger to what 
pleases God and his messenger" .(10) 
EI-Ijtihad may take many forms, the most known is "A 1-
Qiyass" analogy, which means the extension of the applicability 
of a certain legal rule prescribed for a given case to a new case on 
the ground of a common effective cause ",lIat" which is identical 
in both cases,' example : the drinking of wine is prohibited on the 
ground of the intoxicating property of Alcohol. The rule is extended 
by analogy to all other drinks which have the same property. Other 
forms of Ijtihad are "Massalih EI Mursala" public interest, 
Istilah and Istihsan, Preference etc ... we will see elsewhere what 
are the necessary qualifications for EI-Ijtihad. At a given 
historical age, Islamic political authority has judged EI-Ijtihad to 
be threatening the Religion of Islam and has on the basis of the 
consensus of those in power "Awli AI-Amr" decided to close the 
gate of EI-Ijtihad. The gate remained closed since(11). 
I. The Basis of Government in Islam. 
There are two key institutions in the political structure of the 
Islamic policy, these are:the Caliph and the advisory council. 
The Caliph : when the prophet (PBUH) died in 632 A.D. the 
Islamic society found itself faced with the issue of political 
organization. So long as the prophet (PBUH) was alive, the Muslims 
whenever on disagreement reported to him and he decided. After 
his death, the Muslims gathered on the "Banu Saida's terrace" 
and invoked the issue of succession, the meeting was reported to 
Abu Bakr, he summoned Omar and Abu Obeida and hurried to the 
meeting. There he made a speech and emphasized the need for unity 
and the preservation of the Islamic bound. He then proposed either 
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Omar or Abu Obeida to be elected Caliph. Omar promptly reacted, 
took the hand of Abu Bakr and made his pledge to him" 8aya". He 
was followed by the rest of the Muslims and Abu Bakr was elected 
C a lip h (12). Once this is done, people started calling him "t h e 
Caliph of God". He is reported as having replied "I am not God's 
Caliph, I am only the Caliph of God's Messenger"(13). 
All the Islamic community owes obedience to the Caliph 
according to the Koranic verse : "Oh you faithful, obey God and 
obey the apostle and those in command among you"(14). 
The Hadith also orders:"He who obeys me,obeys God, and he 
who disobeys me, disobeys God. And he who obeys the 
Emir, obeys me and he who disobeys the Emir,disobeys 
me"(15). Obedience to the Caliph however, is due only in so far as 
he himself obeys God's commands. When Abu Bakr was elected 
Caliph, he pronounced the following :"You have elected me 
"Khalif" but I claim no superiority over you, the strongest 
among you shall be the weakest with me until I get the 
right of others from him and the weakest among you shall 
be the strongest with me until I get all his right. Help me 
if I am correct and oppose me if I take a wrong course. 
Obey me as long as I obey God and his Messenger. In case I 
disobey God and his Messenger I have no right to 
obedience from you"(16). 
The advisory council: "Majlis Esh'uraa", sides the Caliph and 
assists him in his function, the council include those referred to 
as "Ahl el Hall wa el Akd" or the people of binding and loosing. 
The expression itself reflects strongly the power held by its 
members. We will examine later on the different definitions given 
by the Doctors to this expression. For now, we will content 
ourselves with what the holly texture says in this respect: "Their 
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communal business is to be transacted in consultation 
among themselves"(17) ,and also "Take council with them in 
all communal business and when you have decided on a 
course of action, place your trust in God"( 18). This last 
verse was revealed to the prophet (PBUH) just before the battle of 
"U h u d" i.e. on an occasion when the prophet felt constrained 
against his own better judgement, to defer to the advice of the 
majority of h is companions. The prophet is also reported to have 
said to Omar and Abu Bakr : "If you two agree on a coun~el, I 
shall not dissent from you"(19). 
II. Political Authority in Islamic Doctrine. 
AI Mawerdi : Abu-el Hassen Ali Ibn Mohammed Ibn Habib (991-
1031 A.D.)ln his "EI'Ahkam-Essoltania"(20) governmental 
ordinances, EI mawerdi tells us that the "I m a m a" is established 
to replace prophecy in the defense of the Islamic faith and 
the administration of worldly life according to God's 
commandment. He then asks, whether EI-Imama is a legal duty 
derived from the Sharia or a temporal matter reached by reasoning 
and opts in his answer for the first option.(21) EI-Imama, tells us 
AI Mawerdi", is also required by consensus of the companions and is 
set up through a contract between the community and the Imam. 
The community is represented by a group of delegates called "The 
Ahl el-Hall wa el Akd" whose function is to select a 'candidate 
for the community's leadership. 
The members of the advisory council should fulfill three 
conditions : First, they should be just an~lequitable in their choice. 
Second, they must be learned and possess the knowledge required 
about the qualifications necessary to the function involved, and 
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last, they must have the ability to judge and make independent 
de ci s ion s. (22) The candidate for the I mama should fulfill seven 
conditions,(23) these are: 1) equity and justice, 2) Knowledge 
and the ability to interpret the ho~y text~, 3) mental fitness, 4) 
physical fitness, 5) competence in administration, 6) courage and 
determination to protect the community, 7) a descendant of 
Korashit lineage. This seventh condition is added on the basis of a 
Hadith ordering that the Imams should be from Koraish 
(Mohammed's Tribe). 
Next, AI Mawerdi tells us that there are two ways of 
concluding the Imama contract. The first one is through election 
first, that of "Ahl el Hall wa el Akd". Doctors have divergent 
opinions about the number required of "Ahl el Hall" in order to 
select an Imam. The standard number is five as in the case of 
"Othman" the third Caliph. The second way is by designation as has 
" done Abu Bakr with Omar. Once the choice of the candidate IS 
made and once the candidate has accepted the charge, the Imama is 
set up and the whole Islamic community is required to give 
allegiance to the new Caliph, "Mubayaa". Once the Imam is chosen, 
he cannot be replaced even by more worthy than him. If the choice 
is stuck on two equal candidates, factors such as age and the 
political circumstances of the moment should be taken into 
consideration in the selection of the Imam~- for example, if the 
community is in a state of war, it will certainly need a courageous 
Imam capable of organizing and winning the war. Thus, among the 
two candidates it has to pick up the most courageous. If on the 
contrary, the community is at peace, then it certainly needs a 
learned and competent Caliph and so on ... Two Imams could not be 
appointed at once, which means that the "Imama" is indivisible. If 
the Imam is designated as in the case of Omar, the "Ulema" have 
divergent opinions, on whether the public "Bay'a" allegiance is 
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necessary to. validate "Khilafat" or only formally required. AI 
Mawerdi is of the later opinion. He thinks that the designation of 
the precedent Caliph is sufficient in itself, the duties of the Imam 
are according to him ten, these are :(24) 
1) The protection of the religion and its authentic sources. 
2)The administration of justice and the settlement of disputes. 
3) The application of religious ordinances. 
4) The establishment of peace and social order. 
5) The defense and protection of the community. 
6) The EI-Djihad.(Holly war). 
7) The collection of taxes.(EI-Zakat). 
8) The administration of the public treasury. 
9) The administration and nomination of qualified officials. 
10) The direct exercising of control and inspections. 
This last duty is derived from the Koranic verse :"Oh Daoud, 
We have make thee Khalifa on earth, command justice 
among people and do not submit to pleasure for you will 
be deflected from God's path" .AI Mawerdi then goes on to show 
the cases on which the Imama loses its validity because of 
physical and mental deficiencies. 
EI-Ghazali : Abu Hamed Mohammed Ibn Mohammed (Died 1111 
A.D.) has elaborated the theory of AI Imama in his treatises on the 
sources of religion "EI Mustasfa Min ilm el-Ussul". And" E I 
Iqtissad Fi AI-itiqad". Like Mawerdi, he starts by clearly 
rejecting the idea that the Imama is an institution required by 
reason. This is the claim of the philosophers and their adepts. We 
know how Ghazali had refuted their assumptions in his "t h e 
incoherence of philosophers". 
The Imama, EI Ghazali tells us is required by the Sharia for God 
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has created man and will take him back again, so this world is only 
a farm on which ground the harvest is made for the hereafter. 
Since man submitS by nature to his instincts and passions, he is in 
need of guidance and sociability which can be achieved only 
through power "Essoltane". Power and Religion are twins. 
Religion is the foundation and power is a guardian,' that which has 
no foundation is easily destroyed while that which has no guardian 
is easily lost(25). The EI-Imama, is an indispensable institution 
of life required by the consensus of the community. It is necessary 
that good order and social harmony are assured so that the faithful 
could strive to gain access to God's Mercy and eternal blessing. 
Ghazali enumerates the qualifications of the candidate to el-
Imama, they are the same as those listed by Mawerdi, yet, they are 
tempered by much more realism and designed to accommodate the 
political circumstances prevailing then. Courage and military 
competence are required if not as intrinsic qualifications of the 
Caliph, at least, as qualities derived from a powerful "S 0 It a n e" 
Army commander. The same applies to knowledgei the Caliph if 
lacking the required knowledge could rely on the Doctors "T h e 
Fukahas" to guide and advise him. Ghazali main goal seems the 
reinforcement of the Caliph position as the holder of the unity of 
the "Umma". Even his competence in administration and daily 
supervision of the community matters is entrusted to an able 
"Vizir", minister.1he chief criterion for EI Ghazali in defining 
political authority is the public interest. "There are, he .. tells us, 
those who hold that the Imama is dead, lacking as it does the 
required qualifications, but no substitute can be found for it, what 
then ? are we going to give up obeying the law ? or shall we 
continue as we are recognizing that the Imama really exists and 
that acts of the administration are valid ? given the 
circumstances and the necessities of the moment, the concessions 
made by us are not spontaneous but necessity makes lawful what 
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is forbidden. We know it is not allowed to feed on a dead animal, 
still, it would be worse to die of hunger, of those who contend that 
the Imama is dead forever, we would like to ask : What is to be 
preferred ? anarchy because of the lack of properly constituted 
authority or acknowledgement of the existing power whatever it 
be ? Of these two alternatives, the jurist cannot but chose the 
la te r .. (2 6) To compensate for th is prag matic interpretation, EI 
Ghazali puts the emphasis on "E 1-W a ra 'e" piety, and the fear of 
God and urges the Imam not to forget that he is responsible before 
God of his people according to the Hadith : "Verily each of you 
is a shepherd and each of you is responsible for his flock, 
the Imam is a shepherd and he is responsible for his 
flock"(27), 
Among the duties of the Caliph, EI Ghazali mentions that of 
securing material welfare for the community at large and the 
satisfaction of the basic needs, EI Ghazali believes that the right 
ordering of religion is only accomplished when the right ordering 
of the mundane world is ensured. By a right ordering of the 
mundane world, we mean the preservation of a healthy body, the 
satisfaction of the basic needs such as clothing, shelter and food 
and security. In truth says, EI Ghazali, he who is secure in his 
heart, is sound in body, and has his daily bread, may as well have 
the whole world given to him... faith could not be firmly 
established without the attainment of security in these . essential 
necessities. Elsewhere, AI Ghazali quotes a poet describing as 
astonishing people who strive for worldly life and neglect their 
religion but more astonishing are certainly those who abandon 
their religion to run after the worldly life and at the end miss both 
of them(28). 
Ibn Taymiyya :Taqie Eddin Abu el Abbas Ahmad (1263-1328 
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A.D.),for Ibn Taymiyya, the Sharia is the supreme authority at 
once ,the exclusive and unique guide of the "Umma". With him, 
the centre of gravity . is shifted from the Imam to the 
community.ln his treatise "legal policy"(29),he recognizes 
the necessity of a temporal power but as his predecessors, he 
sees it only as a mean to an end. The political power has the 
duty of preserving peace and assuring good order so that all the 
Muslims may worship the Creator and devote their attention 
to the praise of God the Almighty. It is the duty of the temporal 
power to improve the material conditions of the people. Politics 
and religion are one and the same thing and they cannot be 
dissociated. The essential principle of a just government is the 
ordering of good and the forbidding of wrong. The exercise 
of public authority "EI Imama" is a religious function and a 
good work which brings closer to God. All legal matters are 
related to the Koran and the Sunna.Here,he invokes the 
Hadith :"Obey God, his Messenger and those with authority 
among you". 
With Ibn Taymiyya, religion is purified and sought as authentic 
"H a n if", The doctors of law are the guardians and interpreters of 
the Sharia. The Muslims are the nation of the middle" EI-Wassat". 
Although showing much orthodoxy in his fight of innovations 
"B i d ae" and "Taq lid" sterile imitations" Ibn Taymiyya encourages 
reasoning and subtleness in the interpretation of the Sharia rules. 
The form of government does not matter much to him.(30) What 
matters is the Sharia. Whenever the Sharia rules are truthfully 
applied, we have an islamic state. The ordering of good is the main 
duty of the Imam. It includes the organizing of congregational 
prayers and religious duties such as taxes and pilgrimage. 
Everyone should get his due, people should be loyal and respectful 
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towards each other, kind to their parents and neighbors and must 
fear God's wrath. 
* Ibn Khaldun : Abderrahman Ibn Mohammed (1332-1406 
A.D.).With Ibn Khaldun, the theory of the Khilafa receives its 
"titles of Noblesse". In a rigorously elaborated analysis, (31 ) 
Ibn Khaldun combining Philosophy, History and sociology, provides 
us with a fascinating theory of power and state craft. He starts 
with the traditional assumption about human nature. Man, he tells 
us, is a social animal. In order to survive, he associates and thus 
forms societies. Mutual help is necessary to satisfy man~ needs for 
food, clothing, shelter, etc ... The provision of the necessities of 
life is followed by a desire for material comfort and so the stage 
of food gathering and cattle raising is supplemented by a stage of 
crafts and arts. This is the transition from rural to urban spheres 
of life.Urban life, Ibn Khaldun calls "EI-Umran", the action of 
fu Ifi II i ng earth with life, a state of urban prospe rity and 
civilization. EI-Umran connotes the same narrative meaning that 
today is given to the concept of "Development". 
What is the engine of social life ? Ibn Khaldun replies : It is 
the cohesion of the social group, its solidarity and "Esprit De 
Corp". He calls it "EI-Assabia" a literally word meaning "nerve". 
It is the "Assabia" which is the source of power. Whomever has 
it, has power. Social solidarity is what hold men together and 
make them strong. How does "EI-assabia" develope? In the first 
place, the ties of blood and family lineage create a sense of 
solidarity and mutual responsibility, a common outlook which 
expresses itself in unified action. Then at the tribe level "EI-
as sabia" becomes mature. The more solidary is the tribe, the more 
strong it is and the more likely it is to achieve power and rule 
over other tribes.(32) Hence, the strong tribe becomes a strong 
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monarchy and then a strong and flourishing Dynasty ruling over the 
empire. After developing his theory of the EI-Assabia,lbn Khaldun, 
moves in a section entitled "0 n the nature of power and its 
types", to enumerate for us three types of power.(33) Natural 
sovereignty, temporal sovereignty and religious sovereignty. The 
first two are in the nature of man and his sociability, that is, in 
his instincts of (self-love and self-interest) "Ettaghalub wa EI 
Kah r". When man seeks power in order to satisfy his own desires 
and achieve glory for him self by subjugating others to his rule, he 
becomes a despot and his rule is dictatorial. That) according to Ibn 
Khaldun ~ is the lowest form of power. The second natural type of 
power is "rational power", that is, power which aims at the 
satisfaction of all the society's needs. Not only those of the ruler 
but the needs of all the members of the society. This "rational 
power" is generally conducted according to rules established by 
the wise men in the society and its learned members. Religious 
power "sovereigntylt is however, the best form of power among all. 
Essiyassa Eddiniya consists in ruling the society according to 
divine laws revealed by God to his people through prophets. 
Mankind is intended for religion. Divine laws have been issued to 
guide mankind in all circumstances, for devotion as well as 
transaction. Power resting on force is reprehensible in the eyes of 
God and power based on reason though better is also reprehensible. 
Since it is conceived other than by the light of God and "w hom 
ever God has not enlightened, what light has he" ? 
Religious politics mean ruling man in accordance with the 
dictate of divine law, securing thereby both the interest of the 
hereafter and those of this world. It is by far, the best form of 
political grouping for it combines "Assabiya" with the religious 
motivation "EI wazie Eddinni" and allows for its blossoming 
into a civilizational syncretism. It is true, notes Ibn Khaldun, that 
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religion attacks EI Assabiya; tribal chauvinism and el-ghadab (34) 
:the bad usage it is put to. EI Assabiya is not deemed in itself 
because without it there can be no promotion of religion. EI 
Assabiya for the cause of God is good. 
Ibn Khaldun moves from then on, to enumerate the conditions 
required for the function of the "Khalifa" and endorse almost the 
same version of AI Mawerdi, which we have already reviewed. 
Among the ruler's duties, Ibn Khaldun emphasizes the need for 
him to be considerate of people's affairs. He advises him not to 
harm the community by exaggerated severity because severity 
harms and ruins the state. Arbitrariness and dictatorship are 
indicators of the state's decline. Assabiya should be maintained by 
an efficient administration of the community affairs. The 
satisfaction of people's temporal needs is very important and 
reinforces the ruler's authority. The reason being that the state 
and the ruler constitute the largest market in the life of the 
community. If therefore, the ruler keeps back the goods and 
revenues and he abstain from spending them) the expenditure of 
people will decrease, the market will be deserted and profits will 
fall down and so will taxes. The bad effects of this recoil on the 
state through the decrease in the wealth of the ruler's. Money 
Hence, must flow from the ruler to the community and vice-
versa.(35) 
EI Assabia, tells us, Ibn Khaldun, comes to an end when the 
state enters in mundanities and luxuries; states like human beings 
have ages. The standard age for a state is that of three generations 
of forty years each. During which time, the state passes over five 
stages :(36) the first is that of the emergence of EI Assabiya at 
the tribal level. The second is the achievement of power monopoly 
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by that Assabiya. The third is the transition from rural to urban 
based power. The forth is that of 
consumption and mundain life "EI-Taraf" stage where EI 
Assabiya starts losing its tribal fervor and hence, starts 
declining. The last and fifth stage is that of the collapse. This is 
what happened to the "Kalifa" when in later years, it was emptied 
from its religious motivation. This also has happened to all the 
dynasties that have succeeded each other in Arabo-Muslim history 
and this applies as well to all human societies. Our author; puzzled 
by the inability of the Arabo-Islamic society to regain its ideal 
Khalifa, Concludes by stressing : that, we strive hard to adopt to 
our temporal needs by destroying our spirituality so that at the 
end, we lose them both.(37) 
III. The Sallafiya School 
"Salaf" means past generations of ancestors and is opposite 
to "Khalaf" which is derived from Khalifa and means succeeding 
generations. The Salafiya movement is mainly an intellectual 
reaction of Muslim thinkers and reformers against Nationalism and 
the spread of western secular thought to the Arabo-Islamic world 
via the levant. ~gures such as those of Djamal-eddine el-Afghani, 
M ed Abduh and Rachid Reda, rose to revive Islam and advocate an 
Islamic reassertion at the image of the earliest dedicated Muslims 
"The Salaf Essalih", the well guided early generations of the 
faithful. It is an attempt to purify the religion of Islam from all 
the vicissitudes of imitation and stagnation. The basic principle on 
which is based the whole movement is that Islam is able to stand 
up the challenge of modern times and that education and science 
are necessary to the Islamic community in order to develop and 
regain its lost glory. 
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AI-Afghani (1839-1897) An ardent defender of Islamic 
renewal and unity. In an Essay entitled : The cause for the 
preservation of "e 1- m u I k", AI-Afghani wrote, " the first 
requirement of good social order is that men should 
seek consensus in common matters and hold to the ties of 
religion,.fortunate is the umma,every member of which 
works for the good of everybody aiming at nothing but the 
"I.;/t~r 
common good. They are like a firm band, shaken v by 
tempests nor by earthquakes. It is from the strength of 
everybody that the umma gathers its strength"(38). AI-
Alfghani has devoted his life to the task of unifying the ranks of 
the Islamic people by speech as well as by action(39)~ he has 
strived to make the dream of Islamic unity come true. Travelling 
during his life all around the Arabo-Islamic world, he urged the 
Muslims to react to their decadent state and fought heresies and 
imitation. "Sleepers ... wake up" that is how he addressed the 
Muslims wherever he went. He stood against British colonialism in 
India and Sudan, established himself in France, and with Abduh, 
edited the "Firmnest bo.und""EI urwa el wuthga". He has also 
written a reply to the atheist thesis propagated by then in Eu rope 
by atheists 'communists etc .... 
M ed Abduh : (1849-1905) All along his entire life, Abduh will 
strive to revive the Islamic heritage. He was an outstanding 
spokesman :" I spoke out on behalf of two great causes. The 
first is the liberation of Islamic taught from the chain of 
imitation and the understanding of religious faith as the 
members of the early community understood it before 
discussion arose. The second, I made an appeal on behalf 
of a political reform aiming at the distinction between 
the government's right to obedience, and the people's 
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right to justice on the part of the government"(40). In his 
"Rissalat-Etawhid" letter on the Unity of God, he concentrates 
on the need for "Ijtihad" and the reconciliation between Religion 
and Reason \ "the authority of reason, says Abduh, is 
enhanced by Islamic teachings. Islam is against "EI-
Jumud", stagnation and imitation and advocates the use of 
reason as a mean to the distinction between what is good 
and what is bad and harmful".( 41) He has gone so far in his 
defense of reason that many regard him as a new "M u at az iii t" ~ 
others, at the opposite, may regard his religious favour and his 
defense of the orthodox Islamic theory of political authority as 
conservative.(42) In fact, he has strived to elaborate a 
compromise between both currents and devoted his energy to prove 
that Islam can stand the challenge of modern times. He has argued 
for women's emancipation and for the right of people to freedom, 
education and social security. His influence on the "N a h d a" 
movement is tremendous.(43) 
R. Reda : (1865 - 1935) Reda has reconstituted the biography of 
his master "Abd u h" and his works in his "Tarikh EI Ustad EI 
Imam". He has also made an important contribution to the theory 
of "AI Khilafa"(44)'''The Muslims say that it is religion that was 
the cause of their glory and sovereignty and that turning away 
from it was what led them to misery and caused their misfortune. 
They say this without understanding I imagining that th~re is an 
irrational secret which enables the believers to attain victory and 
power and gives them success by miracles. On the other hand, 
students of human behavior think that the greatest obstacle in the 
path of Muslim progress is religion itself and that if they abandon 
it, they can hope to follow the footsteps of Europe. 
The time has come then, for the Muslims to understand that It1 
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transforming the law of necessity as a applied to the Khalifa of 
"AL-Ist'ila "usurpation", into a firm and permanent principle,) 
They have destroyed the structure of the Imama and done away 
with the sovereignty of the community of AI-Djama'a"(45). He 
then goes on to list the qualification of the Khalif and enumerates 
his duties as they were listed by the medieval "Fukahas", to the 
council of "Ahl el Hall wa el Akd" he gives a subtle definition. This 
council, tells us Reda, includes the Ulema, the army officers and 
all other distinguished and influent members of the society. 
Deputies from all social classes; constitute the "Council of 
Advice" and that council is the true holder of the community's 
sovereignty. The "Ahl el Hall" are not the community at large and 
they are not a small minority of previle~ged members. They are the 
influent(aJ" Ahl Eshoura" members of the community, those whose 
consenting implies the consent of the community at large.(46) The 
impact of the Sallafya movement on the Arabo-Islamic world is 
without precedent. The movement has spread allover the Arabo-
Islamic world from east to west. It has generated disciples and 
adepts who continuing the efforts of EI Afghani, Abduh and Reda, 
are still striving for the triumph of Islam( 47), 
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The Right To Self-determination 
Globalism versus Fragmentation 
One wonders, how today we can still discourse and write about 
the so-called right to self-determination after all what has been 
said and written on that intractable"right", which Prof. Verzijl 
describes as: "a political phenomenon with slogan like 
quality and intractable yet indefinable legal 
claim"(1).Verzijl notes further on, that the R.S.O. has always been 
the sport of national and international politics. It has never been 
recognized as a genuine "positive right" nor will it ever be in the 
future. People and states, may fight for it,win or lose but for the 
sake of the law itself. It is better that it should remain so.(2) 
Why is (R.S.O) so intractable is a question we will answer, 
but before that we would like to say a few words on the historical 
origin of (R.S.O).Western textbooks on International Law and 
International Relations have it that (R.S.O) goes back to President 
W. Wilson's fourteen points declarations. Of course, one could 
easily expand the historical roots of (R.S.O) to the notion of popular 
sovereignty and the French revolution or even back to the notion of 
freedom in classical Greek and Islamic philosophy. 
Today, the (R.S.O) is a key-idea "une idee-force" around 
which evolve the entire international life. There are two ways 
to approach that idea either from a globalist perspective or a 
fragmented one.Prof. C.A.Colliard has provided a similar quality of 
international principles: the Principles of Globality and the 
Principles of Novation(3) (R.S.O) as a principal of globality is that 
/' 
"idee-force" which is behind every international novation. We now 
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talk of novations such as (R.P.S.D). the Right to political Self-
Determination which is referred to also as the right to political 
sovereignty or of (R.E.S.D) the Right to Economical (Self-
Determination) also known as economical sovereignty or as the 
Right to Development. We intend to argue about a (R.C.S.D), the Right 
to Cultural Self-Determination or the right to be modern.etc ... In 
this chapter we intend to concentrate of (R.P.S.D) 
I. The Right to Political Self-Determination 
or The Right to Sovereignty 
When Pr.W.Wilson put forward the claim of the state's right to 
Self-Determination, he was fully aware of the conflictual nature of 
the right in question(4).lndeed, the expression (R.S.D) is loaded 
with dynamite. It carries a self perpetuating dichotomy. It is a 
self-claimed, unilateral conception of a "Law" which by essence is 
multilateral. 
Prof. Ch.Chaumont has noticed this contradictory nature in 
(R.S.D) between being a law "right" and at the same time a negation 
to that law. (5) It is the eve rlasti ng dichotomy betwee n the 
mon istic versus pi u ralistic inte rpretatio n of I nte rnatio na~ Law 
which we have already met with Kelsen when dealing with 
sovereignty. Kelsen attempts not to take side openly on this issue 
in order to serve his pure theory of law. Yet it is all obviol,Js that in 
fact he favors the monistic option which is in harmony with his 
own logical co nstruction. (6) 
In the case of Pr.Chaumont, we are offered the other side of 
the coin. He believes that (R.S.D) is the torrent which will destroy 
the dam incarnated by classical international law.(7). Yet he is 
aware of the inner contradiction of sovereignty and he himself 
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divides that so-called indivisible concept into: a sovereignty of 
preservation and a sovereignty of conquest.(8), It is then for him 
easy to side with the former and against the later. But if we are to 
put his division within a dialectical frame to which he himself was 
so keen, we will end up with the following dialectical reasoning : 
what begins as a sovereignty of preservation ends as a sovereignty 
of conquest in turn giving rise to a new sovereignty of preservation 
which engenders a new sovereignty of a conquest and so on. This 
would be like saying that torrent which will destroy the dam will 
eventually become a dam itself giving rise to a new torrent and so 
on ... Hence, the dialectical perspective perpetuates the dichotomy 
within the "R.S.D" in the same way ~s the monistic Kelsenian 
perspective. Both fail to solve the internal contradiction and that 
is why we need to out-pass both of them and search beyond for a 
compromise. The mean alternative hence, imposes itself as the only 
possible solution to the dichotomy where sovereignty is neither 
0/ 
looked upon as one of preservation nor as thatvconquest but simply 
as a sovereignty of existence. A recognised and secured right of 
existence and self-realization to all competitive claims. This is 
the aspiration all legal thought is about and it is only at this level 
that a possibility of dialogue is perceptible. 
Another seductive definition of sovereignty is that provided 
by V.Kleffens in his course at the Hague Academy in 1953. He 
defines sovereignty as :"a potential energy which" resides 
within the social group and is either released as a 
reaction to some causes or as a conscious idea"(9) This 
energetical sovereignty coincides with that dynamite-loaded(R.S.D) 
which we have already met. Indeed what is sovereignty if not the 
release of the cultural potential of social groups and the 
expression of that potential in a creative and constructive way 
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.s 
which Kleffens terms as the "concious idea'. Sovereignty as an 
Energy released in reaction to some causes can only happen within 
the monistic or the dialectical schemes where there is a thesis and 
its negation. As a conscious idea, sovereignty or (R.S.O) is more 
easy to emancipate and its energy instead of being orientated 
toward destructive and conflictual "egocentric" a'ims, will be 
orientated toward competitive but constructive and complementary 
aims which are of common benefits to all.lt is true that Kleffens, 
as a citizen of a small nation (Holland) resorted to an ener~itical 
definition of sovereignty in order to match the growing uneasiness 
of the small states "vis-a-vis" the great powers and their 
willing ness to resist their hegemony. 
The right of states (people) to political self-determination, at 
the legal level, has been sufficiently endorsed by the international 
co m m u n i ty . (10) It figures in good place at the U.N .Charter and 
there is not a single resolution from the G.A. which does not refer 
to it in a way or another.Theoretically at least, it is admired by all 
as a legal principle. The problem which the international 
community is facing is one of interpretation: where does my right 
begin and where ends yours? 
Resolution 1514 (XV) of Dec 1960 has marked the end of the 
colonial era and opened wide the doors of the U.N. organisation to 
the new states(11). What followed is what some have I~belled as 
the "orgy" of sovereignties.(12) The fren®lsy is comprehensible 
given the long period of frustration. Finally, everyone was declared 
to be the equal of everyone else and the flag of Panama sided with 
that of the U.S.A at the U.N. headquarters. 
The right to political sovereignty was assured. The eestasy of 
independence induced many of the new states to the belief that the 
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war for sovereignty was over, while in fact, they had only won a 
battle that of (R.P.S.D) lhe war, as they were going to discover, was 
far from over yet. The Ex-Colonial power having lost the battle over 
(R.P.S.D) are today holding firmly the ground in order to prevent any 
further losses. Hence, their insistence on the relativity of 
sovereignty.As M. 8edjaoui has observed: "Yesterday, we were 
denied sovereignty under the prete~t that we were not as 
yet fully mature. Today we are still denied that 
sovereignty because, we are told it is not any more in 
"fashion" since we live in the era of interdependency. In 
sum, it is never the right time for us to exercise our 
sovereignty"(13L 
The new battles still to be won by the third world states are 
those of (R.E.S.D) and the (R.C.S.D). While the global battle to be won 
by the entire international community is still the juridical 
conquest of the right to self-determination in its globality. 
So far, we have followed the historical evolution of the 
concept of sovereignty, in both western and Islamic tradition. We 
have listed the opinions of legal and political philosophers in both 
societies. 
It is time for us, to start comparing notes and ideas and see 
where that would lead us. However, before doing that, we should 
say few words from a global perspective, on the evolution of the 
concept of sovereignty in the western tradition. 
In our historical survey, we have established that the western 
conception of sovereignty has gone through successive stages from 
divine "Plenitudo-Potestatis" of the King, to the nation-state in 
the Hegelian sense and from there on, to popular sovereignty to the 
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actual democratic state.This has occurred as a result of an 
overwhelming global revolution which has shaken and transformed 
entirely the western society in every aspect : political, economical, 
social, cultural, etc ... 
The old western socio-political structure based on the 
"E eel e s i a" and Feudalism was swept away and a new socio-
political structure has emerged. This is the capitalist structure 
4ifh . , 
with all that goes Y it, a whole series of philosophical and socio-
political currents evolving around the central notion of "Profit". 
To mention but the principles Utilitarianism, Positivism, 
Pragmatism, Socialism and Secularism. All these currents could be 
resumed in the broader scheme which is referred to as the Era of 
Enlightenment. 
The rising of the west to tWe prominent international 
leadership has been interpreted by various schools of thought. Yet. 
the interpretation provided by M. Weber remains one of the most 
co nv inc i ng (14). Weber tells us that it is the Protestant ethic which 
has led Europe to capitalism.(15) It has liberated European man 
from all ascetic irrationalsWland has driven him from the passive 
attitude of contemplation to a dynamic state of readiness for gain 
and material acquisition. It has promulgated a new code of conduct 
dictated by the "8 E R U F S" callings, and has defined man's new 
vocation to satisfy his "Appetitus Divitiarum Infinitum'" , 
unlimited lust for gain(16). 
Hence, the frantic search or, race for wealth has started 
almost immediately; huge cities were erected, scientists were 
mobilized, discoveries made one after the other, inventions 
multiplied and in no time, we find ourselves facing a new secular 
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and scientistic European society.Under the spell of the scientific 
achievement in physics and natural sciences, social scientists 
'" ~ 
assumed the social-field reducible to the scientistic method and 
thus emerges the dictum of "Rationalism", which is the reliance on 
reason to find 7 through a series of logical deductions from either 
postulated or empirical premises, the ultimate truth. 
Grotuis, according to Morgenthau, was the first to express the 
blasphemous thought that laws exist even if we are to assume that 
God does not exist and it is on this assumption that he developed 
his system of international law where the world is governed by 
objective laws whose existence is rational and independent from 
any divine will(17). 
This trend, was also later on, to lead A. Compte to interpret his 
own era as that in which mankind, after successive failures to 
explain the world by magic and theology, succeeded in explaining it 
by positive knowledge derived from reason. Even Freud, marked by 
the assumption that all mental phenomenons. were produced 
according to laws of cause and effect, has strived to establish a 
scientific method of psycho-analysis. 
Among the currents characterizing the era of "R at ion a lis it 
en I i 9 h ten men t" is uti litarianism wh ich positively assumes the 
maximization of pleasure and negatively, the minimization of pain. 
Hence, the rationalist utilitarian bases his interpretation upon the 
following assumptions 
1) that the rationally right action and the ethically good are 
identical. 
2) that the rationally right action is of necessity a successful 
one. 
3) that reason's law is universal. 
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For the "Enlightened Rationalist", the door of learning and 
understanding lies not in religion and revelation but in Mathematics 
and Logic as G. Brinton, has observed : "Reason will clear up the 
"mess" that superstition, revelation and faith (the devil 
of rationalists) have piled up here on Earth"(18)'Today, the 
enthusiasm for "enlightened rationalism" is declining in Europe. The 
blindness of the rationalists is reflected in their inability to deal 
adequately and rightly with International realities. 
Habermas\tells us "that science as a productive force can work 
in a salutary way only when it is suffused by science as an 
emancipatory force to the same extent as it become disastrous as 
soon as it seeks to subject the domain of Practice."(19) Habermas 
has theoretically demonstrated how human interest distorts the 
relationship between theory and practice and how positivism, 
because of its attachment to a particular self-formative process) 
"Buildung", has erect€;ld scientism and its absolutism and failed to 
stand up to the test of generalisability(20). 
Morgenthau, on his part, has, in his later days, discovered how 
pretentious Rationalism can be; he has concluded that Rationalism 
has misunderstood the nature of man, that of the social world and 
the nature of reason itself(21). Reason, Morgenthau believes, far 
from following its own interest impulses,is driven towards its 
goal by the irrational forces and ends of which it serves. Even 
though man is dominated by interest and driven by emotional 
impulses as well as motivated by reason, he likes to see himself 
primarily in the light of reason. Hence, he gives his irrationalsvl\the 
earmark of reason. Vet, concludes Morgenthau, Reason uncorrected 
by instinct is as bad as instinct uncorrected by reason(22). 
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II. Duality in the International Order Right "Vs" Might 
Article 2 (1) of the U.N. charter states that: "The organization 
is based on the principle of sovereign equality of all its members." 
The Rapporteur of the committee 1/1 at the San Francisco's 
conference admitted that the wording was novel and needed 
clarification~ ~e thereby provided the following interpretation:(23) 
Sovereign equality is constituted upon the four essential 
elements which are : 
1) The legal equality of states. 
2) Each state enjoy the rights which are inherent to its 
sovereignty. 
3) Each owes respect to the personality of the state, its 
territorial integrity and political independence. 
4) States should carry out in good faith all their international 
duties and obligations. 
Before that, the Charter of the 1)lrganization of American 
states, had established more clearly the principle of sovereign 
equality. Its article, six, reads as follows: "States are eq ual 
before the law. Enjoy equal rights and have equal capacity 
toe x ere i set hem. The rig h t5 0 f e a c h s tat ear e not 
dependent upon the power it possesses to ensure the 
exercise of them, but solely upon the fact of their 
existence as a person of international law," Thus, the 
contemporary International legal order is based on the sovereign 
equality of all states. Scholars have reacted in a variety of ways to 
this coupling of sovereignty and equality. It is Vattel, who the 
first, had emphasized the equality of states:"Since m@n, he said, 
are by nature equal and their individual rights and 
obligations the same as coming equally from nature; 
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nations which are composed of men and may be regarded as 
so many free persons living together in a state of nature, 
are by nature equal and hold from nature the same rights 
and the same obligations. Strength or weakness in this 
case count for nothing. A dwarf is as much a man as a 
giant is; a small republic is no less a sovereign state than 
the most powerful kingdom.,,(24) Since then, the concept of 
equality has entertained an intense polemic between those who 
believe in the coherence of a legal system based on the principle of 
sovereign equality and those who denounce such a theoretical 
idealism as pure juridical fantasies. 
At the beginning, when the covenant of the league of nations 
was drafted, lawyers contented themselves with the establishment 
of a legal equality restricted to the membership of the league. 
Hence Basdevant(25), Corner(26) and Verdross(27) all contented 
that sovereign equality should be taken to imply only legal equality. 
Brierly(28) went further and denounced the principle of equality as 
an obstruction to peace and progress, but with the increase in the 
volume of international trade and economical cooperation, the urge 
to translate "Legal Equality" into a more concrete and 
substantial form has grown stronger and hence, emerged notions 
such as functional equal capacity for rights and equal opportunity 
in the management of international affairs, In this respect the 
U.N. Charter does not go beyond formal equality. It is no more than a 
preservation of the old colonial status. As H. Bull, had observed : .. 
The U.N. Charter written primarily by the western\powe?; 
its preamble drafted in part by the prime minister of 
South-Africa, was basically similar to the covenant of the 
league of nations in the protection it afforded to the old 
colonial order"(29). What the charter has established is a 
functional inequality reflected in the unequal distribution of power 
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between the great powers and the small states. As a scholar has 
put it :"What we have in the security council is inequality 
in the renunciation to sovereignty, a certain impairment 
of the sovereignty of those at whose expense$ this 
inequality has been established"(30), 
We cannot accept this inequality on legal grounds, even if we 
are to invoke (article 24) of the charter by virtue of which, the 
members of the U.N. are said to confer upon those of the security 
council the responsibility of maintaining peace and security at the 
international level.The fm~~~ of the security council are not 
elected, therefore when they exercise their "Veto" power, they do 
not act as representatives of all the U.N. members but rather as 
sovereign powers and in doing so, they exclude themselves from the 
binding effect of international decisions with the consequence that 
there is no equality before the law. 
If we are to hold the view that the U.N. is the main legal 
institution of the prevailing international order, Its different 
organs should also be seen as legal organs which in their decisions 
are led by legal considerations. The "Veto" clause destroys the legal 
construction.lt is a fact that the "majority" of small states during 
the San-Fransisco conference recognized in their memorandums the 
privi leges of the great powe rs (31), Yet, this was a po litica I 
qualification which does not count as long as we accept that peace 
and security in the world can only be guaranteed on the basis of 
Law and Justice, Eresid~ the small states were only a minority by 
then and the majority of today's nations were not present at the 
San-Fransisco conference. 
Now, if we dismiss this legal construction of world order, we 
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are left with the political construction, that derived from 
Machiavelli and Hobbes. Within such a frame, the U.N. is merely 
interpreted as a political institution based on the inequality of 
nations. This is the dominant view held by so-called realist 
observers of the international scene. 
The political construction of world order is based upon the 
obvious primacy of national law over international law. The 
national interest or the principle of "self-help" determines the 
whole international structure. Most disciples of this current will 
start by quoting "Thycidides, that is to say~ The Athenians 
addressing the Melians : The powerful extract what they can 
and the weak grant what they must"(32)'Power is the corner 
stone of the whole structure. What ensures stability in such a 
system is inequality because equality is linked to either idealism 
or instability(33). In order to maintain stability you need power or 
more correctly, you need a certain balance of power which you can 
keep functioning only by the use of force. This constant intrusion of 
power renders almost meaningless any conception of equality 
between the members of the international community(34). That is 
why Morgenthau believes that sovereignty is incompatible with a 
centralized hence effective international law. In fact, he argues, 
sovereignty is the source of international de-centralization. It is 
relative and depends on the political situation of the time(35). 
Within the U.N, the great powers enjoy a central position. They 
dictate the rules of the political game, they are at the top of Aron's 
"anarchical oligarchy"(36), There is not much left for the small 
states within such a frame,either they grant what they must, or 
they rebel and fight a desperate struggle for survival. 
Tucker provides us with the latest version of real-politics. 
Here is how he depicts the international community(37) : 
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"Nations , he tells us, are unequal by Ii ~tu~'e. In their 
existence, they are moved by the motive of self-help, 
which he defines as the "right" of the state to determine 
when its legitimate interests are threatened or violated 
and to employ coercive means and measures as it may 
deem necessary to vindicate those interests"(38}. 
Since nations are moved by self-help then, pursues Tucker, 
what characterizes the international community is a struggle for 
power, the egJIalitarianism of the third world today is part of this 
struggle. It does not constitute a real challenge to the prevailing 
order because it does not aim at its destruction or tts replacement 
by a new one. The aim of the third world nations; mainly to the 
prevailing international hierarchy where it seeks a better position 
"a place in the sun".(39) Invoking Heilbroner's(40) comparison,Of 
the world to a gigantesc train in which few passengers mainly from 
the capitalist world ride in the first class coaches in conditions of 
comfort unimaginable to the enormously greater number crammed 
into cattle cars that makes up the bulk of the train carriage and 
returning the argument put forward by the author of the "H u tTl an 
Prospect"* about an eventual suicidary action by the poor, he 
replies stating that in case the threat from the poor becomes 
imminent, some of the first class passengers may no longer resist 
to the blandishment of the poor" 
Tucker then, goes on to examine the new emerging currents of 
e~alitarianism and interdependency among western circles such as 
thos8 championed by Macnamara, Myrdal, Farer etc ... and 
disqualifies them for being idealistic fantasies and concludes his 
analysis by stating boldly that the aim of the challenge to 
inequality is one of decreasing control over the international 
system by those who are its present guardians( 41). 
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Section Four: comparative analysis between western and 
islamic concepts of sovereignty 
Now, that we have shed some light on the background from 
which has emerged the western concept of sovereignty) We can 
move on to compare it with the islamic concept .The classical 
Islamic theory of public authority as developed by EI-Mawerdi, and 
the earliest "Fukahas") constitute a theoretical consensus among 
Muslims on how the political structure in the Islamic society is to 
be constructed. Whether, now, this political structure is 
democratical in the western sense is of no relevance here. What 
would be relevant is to ask ourselves the question : "ls this theory 
a viable and a practical instrument for our social ordering today 7" 
If the answer to this question is "yes" as we believe it to be, then, 
why should we care about the compatibility lor the incompatibility 
of our politics with western canons 7 
When L. Gadet defines the Islamic political structure as an 
"equalitarian secular theocracy"(1), he may be right within a 
western terminological frame. Yet, he is certainly unfair to our 
criteria of evaluation for we hold our political structure as the 
best which any human society would aspire to. In western 
terminology, theocracy, even when softened with eralitarianisnl, 
l .Connot(3?_ inferiority vis-a-vis democracy which is the prevailing 
political structure in the west today. Therefore, although dealing 
with the same issues, Western and Muslim scholars speak different 
languages and the relationship between the two can hardly be 
termed as a dialogue. It is a conversation between deaf, where 
arguments are raised to sustain existing prejudices rather than to 
emancipate them. As the author of orientalism has observed :"N ote 
that there is no question of an exchange between !slam's 
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view and an outsider, no dialogue, no discussion, no 
mutual recognition. All there is, is a flat assertion of 
quality which the western policy maker, or his faithful 
servant possesses by virtue of his being white and non-
Muslim. This is neither science, nor knowledge, nor 
understanding, it is a statement of power and a claim for 
absolute authority. It is constituted out of racism and is 
made acceptable to an audience prepared in advance to 
listen to its muscular truths".(2) 
This, of course, is not intended to deny the good faith of at 
least orientalists such as Gadet. Yet, if there is no doubt that you 
can learn a great deal about yourself from outsiders, there is also 
no doubt that an outsider in trying to describe my feelings is only 
asking me How do You do ? There is no way he could pretend to 
answer that question in my place. 
One of the most insisted upon issueS' opposing both is that of 
the separation between politics and religion. Open any book on 
"Oriental studies" or what in academic circles is known as 
"0 r ie n t al ism" and you will find this issue of separation a central 
theme in it( 3 >. It has become the favorite battle g round for 
theoretical discourse between scholars of both worlds. 
In Christianity, as we have seen, this issue was reso,lved from 
the s tart " R end e r sun toe a e s a r , the t h in g s t hat are 
Caesar's". In Islam, at the opposite, the union of religion and 
politics has been confirmed from the start. The Islamic religion 
orders both this world and the hereafter. Hence, the separation 
between the two is inconceivable in Islam. Religion and power, as 
AI Ghazali, has said, are twins, religion is the foundation and power 
is the guardian. While that which has no foundation is easily 
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destroyed, that which has no guardian is easily lost. 
This issue <H separation between religion and politic has 
already aroused a scandal in Muslim academic circles when in the 
twenties, Ali Abderrazik, a member of the -, Azhar council," published 
a book: "Islam and the Rules of Power", in which he argued 
that Islam does separate between religion and politics(4). Ali has 
attempted to prove that the prophet was only a messenger carrying 
a religious duty and not a political ruler. In this respect,he wonders 
why, if the prophet was a political ruler as most Islamic doctors 
assume,he has not left us with strong political institutions and a 
clear cut political theory? Ali explains the lack of such a theory in 
Islamic thought in favour of his argument.He argued that the 
prophet had a leadership of prophecy "Za'ama Diniyya",as opposed 
to political leadership 'Za'ama Siyassiyya".Ali's argument on the 
whole however, is bot convincing. His historical examples are ill 
chosen, for instance / his interpretation of the "opostacy war"as 
power politics on the part of the first Caliph Abu Bakr,is 
incredible. One of the main reasonS why Ali has written his book 
seems to be his mistrust of islamic political rulers who have been 
using Islam as a legitimizing device,subject VC' which he reserves 
the last four pages of his book. Ali believed; possible to free the 
islamic community from tyranny and despotism and to allow the 
Muslim masses to participate in the political decision as was the 
case in Europe. There is no doubt that his aim was sirwere and 
honest as far as the islamic community was conserned.ln any case, 
he has exercized"ljtihad"and failed,yet that should not prevent us 
from accrediting him with a good mark following the hadith which 
commands two or a double mark for "EI-Mujtahid" who succeeds and 
only a single mark for the one who fails. 
When asked about this issue, R. Reda replied "The assertion 
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that the government and the state should be separated 
from religion is one that necessitates the blotting of 
Islamic authority out of existence and the abrogation of 
the Islamic Sharia. Were MuslimS to adopt the western 
position on the matter, we should have laid aside half of 
our religion; that very half which forms a protecting 
fence around the other half(5), 
We have seen, how in the western world, this issue has 
dominated the middle ages. The Augustinian synthesis did not 
resist the secular trend and at the end, politics were to triumph 
with Pico, Machiavelli,(6) etc ... 
In Islam, from the start, that is the prophet's era, there was no 
separation between the two. The prophet (PBUH) acted both as a 
religious guide and a temporal ruler at the same time. This was 
also the conduct adopted by his earlier successors, the four "well 
guided caliphs". Meanwhile, beginning with "Muawiyya", the 
first ruler of the Ommeyyad Dynasty; the political function 
(temporal power) was distinguished from the (spiritual power) 
religious function. Hence, Muawiyya, was the political ruler of the 
Arabo-Islamic community but he was not,by any mean; the religious 
leader of that same community. The religious function was fulfilled 
by the advisory council composed as we have seen of the learned 
and the early companions .. Hence, if one can affirm that beginning 
with "Muawiyya", there has been a distinction between temporal 
and spiritual powers in the Arabo-Islamic society. One also ought 
to precise, that distinction is not separation and we will see why. 
To make the whole issue of separation clearer to the reader, 
we may need to invite him to the study of the theory of power in 
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the Arabo-Islamic society as it has been elaborated by Ibn Khaldun. 
A. Laroui has recently provided us with a deep sighted reading 
of Ibn Khaldun's theory of power.(7) According to him, Ibn Khaldun, 
long before Machiavelli, has established that "a disarmed 
prophet is always a loser" without arousing scandal.(8) It is 
evident, tells us Laroui, that both men have m~ in common then 
may seem at first glance.lndeed, both authors lived in the same era, 
in similar histo-political contexts. An Italy divided in city-states 
for the later, and a Maghrib (North Africa) no less divided for the 
former. Both men have practiced politics before turning to 
scholarship. 
Ibn Khaldun, tells us Laroui, like Machiavelli, knew that power 
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is a matter of force (bare naked force).' the religious factor in Ibn 
Khaldun's theory does not create power, it reinforces it and so in 
Machiavelli's theory. Power emerges in Ibn Khaldun's theory from EI 
Assabiya. Therefore, argues Laroui, Ibn Khaldun, was aware that the 
combination of spiritual and temporal powers in the Islamic state 
of the Khalifa is an utopia almost impossible without some divine 
inspiration. The first four Khalifs, have succeeded in maintaining 
that combination. because "divine inspiration" through the 
prophet, was fresh by then. In fact, it did not last long (30 years). 
Hence, argues Laroui, temporal power as Ibn Khaldun has defined it 
is of two types : despotic or democratid9). To make his ,argument 
clearer, Laroui goes back to the pre-Islamic period, that of "E I 
J a hi I iyy a")' &rk ages and establishes that the Arab state 
(political power) by then had a mundain finality; that is, had no 
other aim but to achieve the temporal well being of either the one 
(despotic) or the many (democratic). Hence, the state in the pre-
Islamic period was a state of necessity, a state of (nature) of bare 
mundain necessity with no other aspiration but that of 
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su rvival. (10) 
Islam, tells us Laroui, is considered to be a social revolution 
because it has succeeded in ascribing a highest and idealistic 
aspiration to the state. This aspiration goes well beyond the 
satisfaction of mere necessities. The state in Islam, becomes a 
mere (instrument) for the achievement of an ethical ideal which is 
known as "Makarim el-Akhlaq" that is a state of virtue and that 
is what the orthodox Islamic Khalifa is about( 11). 
It is interesting to note here that Hegel has perceived a 
similar task to the state. The state of necessities is according to 
him, only an accident in history because the real aim of the state is 
to achieve the harmonization of the one and the many. It is no 
wonder that Hegel admired the Islamic spirit,that "revolution of the 
orient" which destroyed all particularity and perfectly cleared up 
and purified, making the abstract one,the absolute object of 
attention and to the same extent,pure subjective consciousness,the 
knowledge of the one alone,the only aim of reality(12).The 
philosopher of history could not fail to seize the ethical Islamic 
ideal· as that which is capable of the greatest elevation while yet 
remaining tied to the vulgarity of petty interest]. But let us remain 
with Laroui's reading of Ibn Khaldun. Having established that Islam 
has elevated the state from a social necessity to an ethical ideal; 
Laroui goes on to show that the seizure of political power by 
"Muawiya" had dropped the Islamic ethical ideal, and taken back 
the state to its original substance of the pre-Islamic period.( 13) 
From that time on, the Arabo -Islamic has never known any other 
form but temporal power. The ideal Islamic state of the Khilafa has 
remained alive as a model to be implemented but has never been 
achieved (except during the short reign of Omar Ibn Abdelaziz,:2 
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years).Laroui, therefore, concludes that the Khalifa as an aim of 
political power in the Arabo-Islamic world cannot be denied, but as 
a reality. It cannot be affirmed either. (14) 
That Ibn Khaldun was aware of the requiring and almost 
"extra-human" aspect of the Khalifa~ nobody could contest that. 
Ibn Khaldunhimself emphasizes the role of the religious factor 
which he labels as "EI wazie eddini" in elevating "EI Assabiya" 
to the highest possible forms of power .,"the Khalifa". Laroui bears 
fact to Ibn Khaldun's faith as a Muslim who believed in miracles and 
divine inspiration.(15) What Laroui does not seem to take in 
consideration is the fact that all Muslims believe in the possibility 
of the Khalifa and that is why Ibn Khaldun has not dismissed the 
Khalifa as an "Utopia". In fact the term "utopia" used by Laroui, 
seems to us a bit strong. After all the Khalifa has existed for more 
than 30 years in Arabo-Islamic history and it has been kept alive 
till today: "Khomeiny's Iran" but we will come to that in a 
moment. 
Laroui having established the distinction between, the 
historical) yet, utopian Islamic state of the Khalifa and the 
temporal historicist Arabo-Islamic state which exist until now, 
concludes : "every thing in the history of Islamic thought 
tells us, that the state is distinct from religion (the 
value) yet everybody keeps saying that Islam is, at the 
same time state and religion" (Din wa Dawla) what does this 
mean ? Wonders Laroui(16) 
He replies by distinguishing between religion as a legal codet 
"Sharia" in which case the statement above is correct and religion 
as an ethical ideal "Maqqasid Sharia" in which case the 
statement is incorrect since that ethical ideal has never been 
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ach ieved(17). It is an utopia conscious of being one, asserts Laroui. 
Of course one could reply to him that an utopia conscious of being 
one is not utopia anymore. It becomes a faith but that is not the 
point. The point which Laroui rises is crucial to the structure of 
political power in the Arabo-Islamic society today. The antinomy 
between temporal versus religious state, is reflected in the 
dilemma of today's Arabo-Islamic state. When the later applies the 
Sharia as in the case of "'Saudi -Arabia", -the state is legal from an 
Islamic point of view but is not legitimate because it remains 
inferior to its Islamic aspiration (the ethical ideal). Now, if the 
state attempts to go beyond its natural aim and achieve its ethical 
finality, then it turns against itself because the state value is a 
perfection and as such does not need a state. This antinomy is not 
exclusive to the Arabo-Islamic society~ notes Laroui(18), all human 
societies confront this antinomy. The Hellenistic ideal versus the 
Greek Polis, state versus communism in Marxist thought, etc ... 
The consequences of this antinomy in the Arabo-Islamic 
society could be resumed in what Laroui sees as a "d i v 0 r c e 
between the state and the community"(19). From this divorce 
has emerged Suffism and a certain form of internal exile. There is 
retreat of the community from the state. This is an obvious feature 
of the contemporary Arab state. No wonder, therefore, if today, 
there is no single Arab state which can claim to have popular 
adhesion and support. 
Felicity, Laroui says, deserted the state, and as a result, 
became the property of one man or one group. Internal exile became 
necessary in order to escape the dictatorship of the state. The 
citizen turns to his family and clan to enjoy a certain freedom 
which he does not find in the socio-political sphere. Everything in 
Arab life, asserts Laroui, reflects this antimony between the state 
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and the community, even in architecture~ the Arab house stands 
with its back to the street and its wide open court inside(20). Gtn 
extreme form of that internal exile is Suffism "M Y s tic ism" , 
indeed, what is Suffism if not an individual seclusion and a total 
abdication to social life ? 
This explains, says Laroui, why we do not find any clear theory 
of the state in Arab thought. The actual Arabo-Islamic state, is a 
state of Muslims, but hardly an Islamic state(21). 
Assessements 
There is in Laroui/s reading of Ibn Khaldun an erudition 
reminiscent of the later. Yet, there seems to be some over 
reactions here and there in Laroui's analysis of Ibn Khaldun's theory 
of power. That a distinction between the ideal Islamic state, "the 
Khalifa", and the real i.e. contemporary Arab state is necessary 
today in Arab critical thought, is a conclusion to which we 
heartedly subscribe. In fact, we intend all along this study to 
examine the implications that such a conclusion will require in 
Arab society.Yet, to play-down one aspect in Ibn Khaldun's thought 
in order to emphasize its opposite, is somehow to read him in an 
unbalanced way and that seems to be Laroui's weakness. Indeed, all 
throughout his analysis, Laroui strives to keep away, not to say 
hide, the theological aspect in Ibn Khaldun, in order to e'mphasize 
the theoretician at the opposite of what he believes Ibn Khaldun's 
critics have done so far. 
In trying to make us believe that the Islamic "Khalifa" is an 
"Utopia", Laroui seems to be telling us that Ibn Khaldun also thought 
so. That is simply not proven. Ibn Khaldun and Laroui complies to 
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this , is an orthodox Muslim faithful and as any faithful Muslim 
believes in "divine inspiration" and holds'ltto be part of everyday 
life. 
As we have seen, he clearly states his preference for the 
"Khalifa" as the best form of power. Hence Laroui's word "Utopia" 
seems to be a bit strong. After all, the "Khalifa", as the ideal 
Islamic state, not only existed historically for over three decades 
(632 - 661 A.D.) but also has emerged here and there throughout 
Islamic history, for instance with Omar II, to a lesser extent 
perhaps; with H. Rachid, 785 A.D. and later on, in a different form 
with Salah-eddine EI-Ayoubi "SALADDIN".Even today, that ideal 
continues to be alive in the Islamic society and maintains its 
relevance : Iran's Khomeiny is a good example to that. 
Following Laroui's argument about a distinction between 
Religion and politics in Islam [one has to keep in mind the 
precedent case of Abderrazik, which strangely enough, Laroui 
seems to ignore], one has the feeling that the author is urging for a 
separation between the two. Of course Laroui does not say that 
openly but if we are to apply to him, what he did to Ibn Khaldun, 
that is [what Leo Strauss would call reading what is behind the 
lines], we may as well infer that Laroui is arguing for such a 
separation. It is, however, obvious that he is not and he makes that 
clear when at the end of his book he refuses to conclude, from the 
bankrupty of the Arab culture to the futility of the dogma(22), 
Nevertheless, one should not ignore totally that inference 
particularly when bearing in mind the aim to which Laroui is 
dedicated, that is, the resolution of the Arab crisis. 
Separation between politics and religion in Islam is simply 
inconceivable. Islam ( and this we will have the opportunity to 
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explain in: more detail) is a religion whose essential aim is to 
achieve human brotherhood and bring about that harmonization 
between the one and the many which automatically requires a 
certain fusion between politics and belief. Hence Ibn Khaldun 
states(23) textually in his section on the words : Pope, Patriarch 
and Kohen, that the "Khalifa" and royal authority are united in 
Islam, since the later, unlike other religions~ has a universal aim. 
Thus, if disti nctio n betwee n po I itics and re I ig io n is 
conceivable within a certain limit, a total separation between the 
two in Islam is out of question because in that case, you end up 
with no religion at all. This has nothing to do with the 
identification-,qmeaning~ that since Europe and the whole western 
world have adopted the separationf therefore, the Arabo-Islamic 
world is somehow obliged to adopt the opposite in order to be 
different from the other. I think the issue is much deeper than that, 
though the identification factor is part of it; more as a 
consequence than a cause. 
The separation between religion and politics is an amplified 
version of the separation between revelation and reason in human 
history. Muslim philosophers and theologians such as : EI-Ghazali, 
Ibn Ruchd, Ibn Khaldun, Abduh etc ... Have always rejected the one 
sided stand of the issue of separation between revelation and 
reason. One may argue that, in fact, they all have admitted the 
supremacy of revelation o\Jtireason, that is certainly true. Yet, they 
have not done that without "reason", that is to say, they have 
strived hard for a mid-way position between on the one hand 
"Mysticism and religious fanaticism" and on the other hand 
"positivism and atheism". 
We probably will have the opportunity later on to pursue this 
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point with some details. Let us meuflwh\~)just conclude that if an 
Islamic community is conceivable without a state, an Islamic state 
is not conceivable without religion. What do we mean by that? 
simply that religion as AI Ghazali has observed is the foundation on 
which the state is supposed to rest. It may happen and in fact it did 
happen that an Islamic community was governed by foreign states, 
that is non-Islamic ones as was the case during the colonial era. 
The Islamic community then, continued to exist under non-Islamic 
political control, but that is an "abnormal historical stage" which 
had to end, either by disintegration of the Islamic community or, as 
it happened, by the revolt of that community against the non-
Islamic state and its col~p$e .The conclusion to be drawn from all 
this is that the secularized western notion of sovereignty as a free 
will disposing of the competence of its own competence is far 
away from the Islamic notion of "Isti k hi af" vicegerency. 
The western notion expresses itself at the international level 
through the positivistic Kelsenian version of International Law, 
prevailing today at the International level. The Islamic notion, 
inherently, opposed to the Nationalist creed, faces tremendous 
pressure at the international level with repercussions extending to 
its internal tribalistic structure, causing political instability and a 
crisis of legitimacy, obstructing the ideological theme of Arabo-
Islamic unity and leading to international conflict'.' These 
implications are all the more obvious. We intend to examine them 
next. 
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Chapiter Two 
THE ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Orthodox Islamic legal doctrine conceives the world as a 
multitude of religious communities. Hence, alongside the people of 
book "Ahl el-kitab" which include mainly. Jews and Christians; are 
other communities such as Sabeans (EI-sabia), Magians Zoroas-
trians Budhists, etc. 
In order to understand the rules which govern the relationship 
between the Islamic Community and these other communities, we 
need to examine the early treatise written by classical Muslim 
scholars on the subject of the law of nations which are known in 
Arabic as the books of "Siyar". 
"Siyar" is the plural of "sirat". The term has two meanings. 
Literary, "sirat" means the way of conduct or behaviour, i.e, the way 
somebody lives and behaves. The most famous example in this 
sense is the book written by Ibn Hisham, called: the biography of 
the prophet "Essirat Ennabawi'yya,"(1) From this first meaning is 
der'ived the second which defines the rules of Islamic International 
Law according to the teachings of the Koran and the Sunna. Hence, 
AI-Sarakksi defines "siyar" as follows:"Siyar .... describes the 
, . 
conduct of the believers (Muslims) in their relations with 
the unbelievers of enemy territory as well as with people 
with whome the believers had made treaties".( 2) 
Hamidullah, who is the dean of contemporary writers in Islamic 
International Law, quotes Ibn Hisham, whereby the prophet 
addressing one of his commanders orders the following:"take the 
banner and fight in the path of God against unbelievers but 
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never commit breach of trust, nor treachery nor mutilate 
anybody nor kill any minor or woman. This is the pact of 
God and the behavior "sirat"of his messenger for your 
guidance. "(3)Hamidullah, insists strongly on the fact that Islamic 
doctrine has made of the study of international law under the 
subject matter of "siyar" an independent branch, separate from the 
corpus juris of the sharria as a whole.(4) 
Early "Siyyarists" have divided the Islamic "weltanschaung" 
worldview into three parts:"Dar el-islam"(the abode of Islam) or 
the territory governed by Islamic Law." Dar el-Harb"; The 
territory of war governed by non-islamic law and finally, The 
territory of peace "Dar el-sulh", territory or space under the 
jurisdiction of a peace treaty. "Dar el-islam" is an expression 
which has two meanings: one geographical and territorial, the 
other is a socio-ethical meaning referring to the community of 
islamic brotherhood "EI umma EI-Mohammedi'yya". Hence, a muslim 
may live in (Dar el Harb) and still be considered as a member of 
the islamic community. It is sometimes hard to maintain this 
distinction between the two meanings for they often converge and 
transcend each other.(5) 
The classical "siyyarists" would usually expose their doctrine 
on International Islamic Law under the following headings:(6) 
I. The Laws of War: this would generally include: 
A) The doctrine of the Just War "EI-jihad" and the rules 
defining the conduct of the Islamic army within enemy 
territory, etc. 
B) Enemy persons: the treatment of war prisoners;their right, 
duties and so forth. 
C) The spoils of war: rules prescribing the division of the 
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spoils of war and its distribution between warriors, etc. 
D) On apostasy: and how to deal with it. 
E)On Dissention:rules dealing with rebels, highway pirates, etc. 
II. Peaceful relations: and this would cover: 
A) peace treaties. 
B) diplomatic relations. 
C) commercial relations: mainly custom duties, "EI Kharaj" 
D) Aman (safe-conduct) 
E) Neutrality (Hiyad) rules and cases. 
There are several classical treatise on "siyar"(7) One can 
therefore consult them and seek ample information on these 
subject matters. What we will concentrate on here is how these 
early courses on Islamic International Law have come to be viewed 
by contemporary islamic legal doctrine and whether they are today 
of any use in the face of the complexities of international life. 
Thus, we intend to carryon a critical appraisal on their 
methodology and substance in order to revive the islamic legal 
tradition. To delimit our enquiry we will content ourselves by 
concentrating on two important issues which have aroused much 
polemic lately and these are:the antagonism between Dar el 
Islam and Dar el Harb on one hand, and the islamic doctrine of 
EI-jihad on the other. 
1) Dar el-Islam v. Dar el Harb:Contemporary ,western 
writers, whether lawyers or orientalists enjoy emphasi~ing the 
outdated features of the Islamic Law (Sharia) in general and the 
Siyar in particular. For the great majority of them, Sharia is no 
more than a corpus juris of archaic and barbaric rules which by no 
means could be called as law proper(8) The same goes for "siyar", 
seen as outdated rules irreconcilable with modern positive law, 
with the U.N.charter and the International Covenant of Human 
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Rig h ts.< 9) More severely, orientalists have gone as far as 
considering Islam as simply a barrier to progress( 10) As a 
converted western scholar has once remarked:"Ever since the 
Crusades, Islam has been mispresented in the west and a deeper 
distrust, almost hatred for all Islamic values has become part and 
parcel of Western cultural heritage,"(11) 
In regard to the islamic vision of the world, a scholar such as 
Khadduri has hastily affirmed that the islamic vision of the world 
is a bipolar outlook, opposing "Dar el-islam" to the rest of the 
world which fits into "Dar el Harb", He does mention "Dar el~ 
sui h", but only as an insignificant late shafiite addition, (12) To 
him, therefore, Siyar is no more than a law of war and division of 
bounty, (13) Communities seeking to maintain neutrality are non 
existent and have no place in the Islamic legal order,(14) Khadduri 
does not give its due importance to the versatility of juristic 
opinion between the various Muslim legal schools(15), He selects 
here and there, those which corroborate his own affirmations and 
ends up qualifying the Islamic world vision as an exclusively 
bipolar one without any nuance,A shrewd observer such as he, ought 
to have noted the pluralistic Islamic world vision which springs 
from the Koran (groundnorm of all Islamic rules):"We have made 
you people and tribes, so that you mix amongst yourselves 
and come to know each other. The most rewarded amongst 
you are yet to be the most pious." (16) 
The peace treaty which the prophet concluded with the 
Christian tribe of "Banu-Najran" stands still as an, eloquent 
testimony to the Islamic spirit of tolerance and its leanl10wards 
peacefu I reso lution of disputes, (17) Tho ug h 0 rthodox S iyyaris ts 
commonly agreed on "Jihad" as a community duty, they nevertheless 
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also consented to the normalcy of peaceful relations with the 
unbelievers. Hence the Mallekite AI-awzai declared:"peacefu I 
relations with the unbelievers ar~ legal,(18) the prophet has 
concluded peace with them without requiring a poll tax "jizya,\ He 
goes even further and asserts from a Hadith related to Abi-al-
Abbas, that the prophet has conceived of a lasting and permanent 
peace with the 8yzantinians."Abu Hanifa also agreed on this, as 
well as Shafii,who however objected in regard to the duration of 
peace(19). 
This however is not intended to deny the fact that orthodox 
siyyarists have generally over-emphasized the fighting spirit of 
the Islamic community, or, by opposition, that they have neglected 
and reduced the notion of "Dar el-sulh" to a strict type of peace 
treaty-territory as opposed to territory conquered by force: (8 ilad 
E 1- un w a). It is short sighted to believe that the t\;1uslims alone 
(out of the blue) determined the kind of relationship that was 
prevailing then. Romans and Greeks before them, had held similar 
if not worse visions. 
2. The Doctrine of Jihad. It is probably in regard to the E 1-
jihad notion, more than to any other, that western prejudice vis-a-
vis the Arabo-Islamic community reaches its fit. EI jihad has 
become for western media an Islamic cry for the destruction of the 
western world and its civilization(20), and here again" western 
scholars share a good deal of responsibility in propagating and 
perpetuating old prejudices and stereotyped consumptive images. 
"J i h ad" according to Khadduri, is the litigation between Islam and 
polytheism, i.e. a permanent war against unbelievers to be carried 
out by a continuous process, political and psychological, if not 
strictly military.(21) He quotes the sword verse from the Koran, 
stressing "slay the polytheists wherever you find them" and 
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the Hadith; "fig ht polytheists until they say: there is no god 
but God"? ~ence, leaving the reader with the impression that 
Muslim jurists reached a consensus on "J i had" as an all-out 
permanent war through which Islam is to be forced on the whole of 
humanity. This is in fact far from being the case. Khadduri then 
goes on to show that there exist other more subtle meanings of 
"jihad". Yet, one wonders of what use could these latter subtleties 
be to the reader ;once you have incrusted upon his mind that 
syndrome-like image of the Islamic War? Although the author in 
question has devoted most of his work and energy to the classical 
Islamic legal tradition, he has failed to g rasp its fineness and keen 
sense of detail. His enquiries vast as they are, will hence remain 
as those of a passer-by. 
EI-Jihad: which comes from "Jahada" which means to 
exercise, is defined legally as the exertion of one's effort and 
ability towards the achievement of that which is good by means of 
heart, tongue, hand or otherwise. (22) Only Jihad by hand is taken to 
mean - military activity. As such, it is a communal duty taken in 
charge by the head of state. There is a quiet distinction in Islamic 
// .-;. 
tradition between EI-Jihad EI-akbar the great which consists in 
fighting against the corruptive instincts which incite the soul 
towards evil, and "EI-J ihad EI-asg har" (the little) wh ich means 
participation in warfare. AI Bukhari and Muslim reported a Hadith 
whereby the prophet has replied to a man who wanted t6 join his 
troops for battle: "are your parents alive?" The man said ":Yes". 
Then the prophet urged him to go and strive for them and provide 
them with their needs(23). Hence EI-jihad al akbar is much more 
important since it is an individual duty. Every muslim is required 
to act with all his power and ability in order to enforce the good 
and fight the evil. (EI amr bi el marouf na nahy ani el monkar). 
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From this same meaning comes also the term "ljtihad "- which is 
a derivation of jihad and refers to intellectual prowess in the path 
of virtue. 
Orthodox siyyarists generally distinguish four types of 
military jihad: 
1 )Jihad in the path of god (Holy War - bellum justum) 
2)Jihad against apostacy ( converts to non-islamic belief) 
3)Jihad against dissenters (el Bughat ). 
4) Jihad against rebels and highway pirates and robbers. 
Hamiddulah has divided Jihad into four types :defensive, 
sympathetic, punitive, idealist(24). Ibn Khaldun before him has 
also distinguished four types. Jihad in the path of god) - tribal 
warfare? Feuds and raids, War against dissenters.Only the first and 
last types he considered as lawful because they are carried on with 
the intent of serving God(25). It is true that war against 
dissenters (last type) is often carried on with the intent of serving 
the regime rather than God and Ibn Khaldun knows that but he 
endorses the siyyarists stand on this issue in order to prevent the 
Islamic society from trial "f it n a" and we will see why, further 
on(26). 
The question that should be addressed now is why? since 
Islamic war"j i h ad" has different meanings, it has con:e to us 
pe rsiste ntly as mi litary co nq uest. Th is questio n requ i res a 
tremendous amount of deconstruction on the classical siyyarist 
legal conception as well as on the modern positive one because both 
suffer heavily from formal legal absolutism(27) and that is what 
we intend to do next, but first, let us review what contemporary 
islamic legal doctrine has to say about the Islamic conception of 
International Law. 
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Section One: Contemporary Islamic doctrine and 
International Law 
After World War II, with the establishment of the United 
Nations, the first wave of Muslim states entered the world scene. 
Muslim lawyers, as a result, attempted a reformulation of the 
classical siyyarist doctrine in the light of the prevailing new order. 
In 1945, Hamidullah published his second edition of "the 
Muslim conduct of state", whereby he emphasised the following: 
"there are two methods to deal with Islamic International 
Law.First, to treat it~a dead body ~ experts as well as 
amateurs indulge in anatomical operations and 
dissections, that is, the fate of our subject generally in 
the West. The second method is to treat it as a living 
organism. I have tried to do that to the best of my 
humble capacities. "(28) 
Hamidullah reasserted the basic tenents of the siyyarists 
urging here and there for a more rigorous understanding of Islam 
whose contribution to the development of international law and to 
the humanizing of the internal community is noteworthy. Islamic 
ethical ideals such as: tolerance, justice and equity are emphasized 
quoting the Koran:"we have sent thee (O'Mohammed) save as a 
mercy for all nations". The author devoted many parts of his 
work to peaceful relations, neutralitY,etc with the open aim of 
making Islam acceptable to the Western world. (29) 
In 1966, a Lebanese muslim lawyer gave a course at the Hague 
Academy under the title "the Principles of International Law in the 
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Light of Islamic Doctrine". Mahmassani opens his course stating 
that the meaning of the term: Islam is peace and he goes on all 
along to further show that Islamic Law is nothing but peace.(30) 
Almost during the same period of time, in Egypt, Cheikh M. Abu 
Zohra published his treatise on "International relations and Islam" 
in which he confirmed the Siyyarist doctrine and declared it to be 
totally compatible with positive International Law. Jihad argued 
the Cheickh should not be understood as offensive war but rather as 
defensive. This latter point is. backed with Lenient Koranic verses 
and Hadiths. (31) 
EI Ghunaimi's thesis brings a modernist tune like that of the 
liberal ) but his argument is much more muscular. He starts by 
declaring that "Siyar" is but a doctrinal exertion, not a rule of the 
Sharia. The legal opinions derived from the "Siyar" are 
interpretations delivered within a historical context devoid of any 
binding effect on today's Islamic society.(32). Islam is much more 
progressive than any so-called positive ethic."Adherence to the 
philosophy of humanitarian International Law is in Islam, a branch 
of the faith and after the five basic pillars, is the sixth."(33) EI 
Ghunaimi considers Islam's contribution to the development ot 
International Law to be unequalled neither by Greek or Roman Laws, 
whctkould not have been the historical sources of principles which 
they never knew and rules which they never applied. Thus, he 
elaborates: "Western jurists read the history of International 
relations beginning with Greeks and Romans, then going to the deep 
slumber of the dark middle ages and waking up to the knocks of the 
renaissance thinking that these knocks were the work of European 
hands and western efforts, while in fact, some of these rules were 
carried out by returning crusaders and some were studied at the 
Universities of Spain and Italy, from where have emerged the 
92 
fathers of modern International Law(34) 
The voices we have just heard are among the most prominent 
advocates of the contemporary Islamic legal theory in the field of 
International Law J ~IOngSide tP them stands a secular current 
whose proponents are either non-Muslim lawyers or Muslim 
scholars who have graduated from western universities and who in 
general espouse a secular western type of reasoning and would look 
at '8iyar' as Hamidullah has put it "as a dead body".(35) 
An Islamic Critical Legal Theory 
"THE CALL FOR IJTIHAD" 
What characterises contemporary Islamic thought in general is 
an amazing 
which an 
phenomenon of contradictory attitudes in the face of 
unfamiliar western scholar would stand totally puzzled. 
This comes simply from that double psychological complex 
(superiority/inferiority) which is so typical of the contemporary 
Arab mi nd. (36) I n the field of legal theory, the contemporary 
Arabo-Islamic lawyer finds himself trapped into a frustrating 
dilemma. He has no choice but to either hold to his Islamic credo 
as that which is irrepproachable, or else, espouse a secular 
western type of approach and as a consequence end$ up dismissing 
the whole 8iyyarist legacy as an outdated fabric. Hence, he is 
either emphatic and arrogant holding Islam to be far higher than 
western material trivialities or shy and apologetic trying his best 
to justify his belief. 
We will attempt to play these positions one against the other 
all along our study in order to reach a compromis~ ~ean between 
} 
them. We will adopt neither of Hamidullah's alternatives. Hence, 
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we consider International Islamic Law neither as a dead body nor as 
a living organism. We simply attempt to view it as in a "half-half" 
type of situation and from there, see what can be done to revive the 
Islamic legal tradition and its conception of world order. 
What are the results that one can derive from the study of the 
"Siyar" and contemporary Islamic doctrine on International Law? 
First: Orthodox islamic legal theory is heavily handicapped' at 
the historical level.. The corpus Juris known as "Siyar" has remained 
untouched for centuries with first the famous closing of the door 
of "EI-ijtihad" and second, the dislocation of the Islamic 
Community (Umma) into several principalities, and finally, the 
plunge of the whole muslim world into that chronic and long decay. 
All these factors have contributed to the preservation of the Siyar 
treatise, which no student has ever opened since. No wonder that 
they should appear today as 6lnachronhistic tables. Hence the need 
today for a critical appraisal of the "Siyar". Why on earth do we 
need today to know what the law says about what the horses of the 
Islamic cavalry should be eating: crops of corn, rye or oat? Or 
whether an unbeliever's slave could be purchased by a believer 
how, when and where? 
simply be thrown out. 
These and similar legal trivialities should 
Alongside there are Siyyarist rules which 
need to be more elaborated, for instance, rules showing good 
manners in dealing with foreigners, promoting neighbourhood and 
friendship etc ...... 
Se con d : Contemporary Islamic legal theory in the field of 
international law suffers heavily from the "Siyyarist legacy" and 
requires a serious revision of its failing methodology gnawed by 
zealous legalism, sterile imitation (Taqlid) and "Bricolage", i.e. 
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piecing together antagonistic rules (Talfiq). Muslim lawyers are 
requested nowadays to surmount the dialectic of negation and 
strive for a critical method in order to snatch the "sharia" Islamic 
Law from the hands of those politicians and their false 
turbans(37),whose art consists in piecing together contradictory 
norms in order to maintain a facade of concordance and disguise the 
"mess" inside. That way the Pseudo-doctors treat themselves and 
their masters to a tranquil consciousness. 
The task is enormous and requires at first hand, the 
elaboration of an Islamic critical legal theory and the conception of 
a rigorous methodology with which to proceed at the 
deconstruction of the prevailing system and accomplish the 
following: 
A. Definition of Islam, Islamic Law and Ijtihad: exertion of 
intellectual effort in order to provide theoretical and 
doctrinal guidance. 
B. Definition of the Arabo-Islamic national legal order 
(Nationalism) and its intimate connection with the 
International order. 
C. The elaboration of a universal pragmatism so as to enhance 
dialogue) communicative action and reach a genuine 
universalisation of the rules of International Law. 
Before indulging in these issues, let us first examine the 
doctrinal basis of the Islamic critical legal theory. The attempt to 
demythologise legal doctrine goes back to "Ibn Taymiyya" who as 
we have seen has fought against heresies both in the form of legal 
conservatism as well as enlightened rationalism. He was the first 
to elaborate a legal policy(38)"Essiyyassa Echariayya" 
Ibn el Qiyyam ( EL-JAWZIA) is Ibn taymiyya's disciple. He 
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continued the work of his teacher and argued strongly for a genuine 
understanding of the sharia. the rules of which are not immutable 
7 
commandments but simply changeable guidelines which have no 
other aim but to serve human beings in the best possible way.(39) 
He is accredited with a generous definition of the Sharia as: that 
which seeks to bring out the best of man and serves him well. 
Hence, whatever means leads to that is Sharia's own and whatever 
lead men to the opposite are not. Sharia is all about justice and 
mercy - it is indeed God's mercy.(40) 
sha'ttibi(41 ) sha'ttibi could well be considered as the 
founder of the Islamic analytical school of jurisprudence. Four 
centuries before Montesquieu he elaborated his theory - sur I'esprit 
des lois. "Maqassid Echaria" - in his work "EI-Muwa'faqat"-
(concordances) in which he advocates a new method for a better 
understanding of Islamic Law and a more sober realization of its 
intent, incarnated in the accomplishment of noble virtues 
(Makarim el-Akhlaq). sha'ttibi argues that the aim of Islamic 
Law (Sharia) is the fulfilment of social life and its preservation. 
This requires the satisfaction of the following: 
1) Basic necessities: there are five such 
human life; prosperity; property; 
prerequisites to social life. 
necessities: religion, 
sanity. These are 
2) Basic needs:institutional and social means to fullfil 
biological and natural needs such as food,schelter, etc 
3) Ornaments (Tahssinat): refinements and good manners 
sought by wise and rational people. (Makarim el-Akhlaq) 
These, then, are the hierarchical priorities which Law's task IS 
to regulate and organize in such a way as to ensure order, social 
harmony and stability.( 42) sha'ttibi distinguishes among legal 
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rules two categories; "EI-Kulliyyate" general rules and "EI-
Juz'iyyate" secondary rules or rules of detail. The first rules 
stand as "oughts" to which the second (is) comply. It is the 
jurist's task to preserve harmony between the two through 
(Ijtihad). Here sha~ttibi provides us with a technic called (E 1-
Muw'ama) meaning "harmony" and which consists in watching over 
the (is) so that it never goes beyond what the (ought) prescribes 
and at the same time, keeps an eye on the (ought) so that it does 
not become as a negation to the (is): in which case the (ought) is 
simply suspended for a while according to the rule of (Istihsan) 
juristic preference(43L 
To apply his theory on (Makassid Echaria) Esha'ttibi relies 
heavily on legal notions and technics such as: "EI-maslaha el-
amma", public utility; "sadd Edara'ih'j fulfilment of legal lacuna, 
"Dar'i el mafassid" repudiation of harms, abuse of authority and 
"I st i h san" . With a combination of these legal tools, Esh'attibi 
reaches a sound analytical insight in the depth of Islamic Law and 
concludes by stating that the Sharia's aim is to serve the human 
being and brings out the best of him.(44) 
It is our intent to apply sha'ttibi's technique of (Muw'ama) 
conciliatory communicative action to the Islamic understanding of 
International Law and contribute as much as possible to the 
reproachment of Islamic legal doctrine with that prevailing today 
at the international level. We move on now to consider the Arabo-
Islamic community and its place in the international order. 
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Section Two: The Arabo-Islamic Order 
Facing the challenges 
The Muslim world spans half of the globe. It reaches from 
Morocco to the mountains of Afghanistan; from the Muslim enclaves 
of South-Eastern Europe to the African sub-sahara. It constitutes 
one fourth of the world population. 
The Arabs, are the heart of this Muslim world, assembled in a 
regional organization : The Arab League (22 nation-states). The 
Arab world has through Islam reached its highest level of 
development. It has remained a prosperous entity for centuries. 
The Arabo-Islamic expression is a two-words phrase, 
ressembling "Arab", which is a racial and linguistic epithet 
attributed to the semitic inhabitants of the Arabian Peninsula, and 
"Islamic" derived from the religion of Islam. The expression would 
need no further comments were it not due to the misuse that has 
raised confusion around it. Scholars and students alike have come 
to use this combined expression without any advanced alertness to 
the various cO!)llotations that it ~tes.('Otf'~'(J 
The Arabs are the people who have received the religion of 
Islam through the Prophet Mohammed (PBUH). Islam has brought the 
Arabs together. Through it, the Arabs have founded their empire and 
have reached the highest levels of civilization. With the Arab 
'It\ 
conquests, Isalm has spread to cover areas unhabited by non-Arabs 
such as : Iran, Turkey, Pakistan and North-Africa, etc ... The Arabo-
Muslims have emigrated to these areas in large numbers as in the 
case of North-Africa and have Arabized it. Yet, countries such as 
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I ran, Tu rkey, Pakistan, Afghan istan, etc... have re mai ned no n-
Arabized though they have espoused Islam. Hence, they are parts of 
the "Dar el-Islam" i.e. the Islamic "Umma". 
So, the meaning today of the expression "Arabo-Islamic" is 
intended to refer to the original Arabs as well as to the people who 
have been Arabized such as the Berbers of North-Africa, and who 
today constitute the arab-world, but there is in here a small 
'problem because not all the arabs are Muslims. Indeed a small 
minority of arabs who were living along the borders of the 
Byzantinian and Sassanid empires had converted to Christiani~ 
and other religions and have remained citizens of the Islamic 
IIUmmall under the statut of "Ahl-Edhimma". 
When in the begirirng of this century, nationalism born in 
Europe has spread through colonial contact to the Arabo-Islamic 
" 
world and has given birth to the Arab Nationalist movement Pan-
Arabism; the non-Muslim Arabs played a leading role in propagating 
and reinforcing the Pan-Arabist movement so as to secure a better 
position within the Arabo-Muslim society. This is today admitted 
even by harsh critics of Islam such as B. Lewis(1). 
In the Arabo-Islamic world there has been since a polemical 
debate between Pro-Arabs and Pro-Muslims on which should be 
prior to which: IIUruba" Arabhood or Islam. In my opinion, the Arabs 
without Islam are as much a nonsense as Islam without the Arabs 
would be. Both are tied together to the extent that one is a synonym 
of the other .. 
Right now and before evaluating the position of the Arabo-
Islamic world at the international level. I believe it is necessary to ) 
examine the issues of Nationalism and Arab Unity which are indeed 
at the heart of Arab political life. 
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I. The Arab National Legal Order 
Among those who have theorized about Nationalism, one can 
distinguishes Gellner's book and E. Haas's article as two of the 
most elaborated theoretical attempts on the phenomenon of 
Nationalism. 
Gellner, considers Nationalism to be the historical outcome of 
the process of rationalization in the weberian sense. Rationalism 
he tells us(2), is vested in the capitalist division of labor, the 
history of mankind has gone, according to Gellner, through three 
different stages: (Pre-Agrarian, Agrarian, and Industrial). Mankind 
accordingly is somehow condemned to industrialization and as a 
consequence to nationalismct Gellner affirms, unlike E. Khedouri, 
another student of nationalism(3), that the phenomenon of 
nationalism does not impose homogeneity: it is rather, homogeneity 
which is imposed by objective and inescapable imperatives which 
appear$' on the surface in the form of nationalism(4). 
With nationalism, says Gellner, human society enters the age 
of high culture when men communicate by means of written 
impersonal context-free expressions such as : to whom it may 
concern; types etc ... (5) Gellner offers a typology of nationalism; 
four possibilities each with two sub-alternatives but does not 
quite succeed in bc~'king them with historical evidence. 
E. Haas, for his part, though mainly endorsing Gellner's thesis) 
sees in nationalism a convergence of political and territorial 
loyalties which he sums up as a civil religion(6). Like Gellner, he 
tries to elaborate a typology, seven types divided between 
revolutionary and syncretist ideo log ies. Yet his scheme is as vague 
as Gellner's. 
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We have in the earlie r part of th is study shown, how the 
rationalization process has been brought about in Europe. The 
Middle-East has not experienced a similar process. Hence, 
Nationalism in there was introduced in a "Prussian" manner, that 
is , it entered there as a conqueror and was imposed on the 
indigenous socio-political structure. 
The colonial era reinforced the nationalist creed and forced the 
tribal segmentary indigenous structure to adQpt itself to the 
nationalist imperative. Hence, Nationalism in the Arabo-Islamic 
world has not come as a result of a new division of labor but was 
more or less a reaction to colonialism championed by christian 
Arabs and connoted with anti-Ottoman feelings.There is no need in 
here to go over the endless debate between EI-Hussari and his 
o ppo n e nts (7), What we believe is of interest, is the examination of 
the socio-political impact of the idea of the modern nation-state 
on Arab political life. '1his is at the heart of today's Arab political 
discourse(8). 
After the glorious era of Pan-Arabism, comes today the 
reign of what an Arabo-Muslim scholar has labelled "little 
nationalism"(9), Arab politics have, since earliest times, been 
characterized by an ambivalent dual character stemming, as we 
have already seen) from the globality of the Islamic religiOn where 
the religious and the political are integrated. 
To this indigenous double nature, modern times have added a 
third component, that of modernity which in political terms is 
translated into nationalism. Hence, Arab politics have come today, 
to a noticeable tri-dimensional constituency where by Nationalism, 
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Arab Unity and revolution stand side by side in a dialectical 
relationship(1 0). 
Laroui in his "Contemporary Arab Ideology" has divided the 
historical evolution of the Arab political structure into three 
stages : (Colonial - liberal - national). He has extracted from this 
division, a triple Arab political personality represented by the 
politician, the clerk and the technocrat, this triple constituency 
could well be said to represent an an Arabo-Islamic cultural 
affinity(11) . 
The issue facing Arab political life today is how to dissolve 
these three constituents of Arab political life into a harmonious 
one. The national stage being) the latest historical stage of Arab 
political consciousness) is looked upon as the promising stage 
where such a reconstitution could be carried out successfully. Yet, 
as Laroui has noticed, it is not at all working that way, the national 
state is in fact doing the opposite. "It is imposing by force on 
its citizens a technical reason which to say the least is 
alien to them and while imposing it, the national state 
keeps criticizing the mutilations which this same 
technical reasonf' is said to have caused over the western 
citizen"(12). 
The Arab national state develops, hence, a paradoxical attitude. 
On one hand it advocates a certain policy while on the other hand it 
practices its opposite. It champions authenticity in discourse and 
seeks modernity in practice. 
How is all this "mess" translated into the "J uri d i co-
political" jargon ? In most cases, it is presented in a Mozaic 
theo-secular formulation(13), whereby the national constitution 
104 
would read in its article number one; that the state is a secular 
one, in its number two, that Islam is the official religion of the 
state and in its article number three ,that the national state is an 
integral part of the indivisible Arabo-Islamic "Umma"(14). 
In all three forms cited above, the Arab state embodies an 
alien western conception and remains an artificial "mimicry", that 
is why the Arab state, no matter what form it chooses and despite 
its permanently declared 99% popular adhesion )will always remain 
far away from th~ Arab masses to the extent, that it is today 
widely depicted by these masses as the funny state of 
"MICKEy"(15). 
II. The Arab State & Legitimacy 
Legitimacy has become today a vital issue in the entire world, 
every national state must stand the test of legitimacy in order to 
gain recognition as a genuine representative of its people. 
The Arab state has a serious weakness in that respect. We have 
already talked about the Divorce which separates the state and the 
community in the Arab society. Let us look now at the prevailing 
form of legitimacy in the Arab world today, that known as " De 
facto legitimacy" which rests on the hazardous and expedient 
device of "Pourvu que ca dure". 
Theorists consent that in order to be legitimate, a state has to 
fulfill certain basic conditions which are(16) 
1) a consensus about national identity, 
2) a consensus about national territory. 
3) a consensus about national priorities. 
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These$' are among the essential conditions that a state should 
meet in order that the ruled accept the rightness of the ruler's 
power~ none of these is met by the Arab state.At the level of 
identity ,nationalism is in a continuous and everlasting conflict 
with ethnic~ and religious factors. At the level of territoriality, 
the colonial legacy~ is the more visible source causing here and 
there fraticide wars of frontiers. Finally, at the level of national 
priorities, the situation is worse, since the race of power 
crystallizes every single political force and mobilizes it for a day-
to-day su rvival. 
M. Weber, has defined three types of legitimation 
pro c e sse s ( 1 7 ) : (t r a d it ion a I - c h a r ism at i c - rat ion a I)... Wh e nth is 
Weberian typology is applied to Arab politics, one sees clearly that 
the traditional and rational legitimacies compete fiercely against 
each other, while the charismatic legitimacy plays the role of the 
referee who) depending on the historico-political context J would 
side sometimes with the traditionalist, some other times with the 
rationalists; (Feisal v Nasser).Hence, though marginalized, the 
Charismatic tYPH>- remains very important in Arab politics to the 
extent that some observers would impute the actual Arab political 
crisis to a lack of charisma. 
There is however, an element which, though often neglected, is 
determinant and confers on the Arab political regime in general a 
legitimacy of its own through the ensurance of political stability. 
Indeed, despite its artificial character, the Arab state has gained 
after a short period of political instability, a certain regularity and 
political continuity which in fact many third world states might 
envy. (18) This relative stabitlity is reflected today through the 
prevailing legitimating process or what \('lay be called "De facto 
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leg it i mac y" This is due to the stability of the Islamic political 
structures. Islam, as we have seen is a globalistic ethic which 
provides enough room for the coalition of the political forces in the 
society. Hence, Islam is ideologically suitable for the Arab regime 
'" nonwithstand i ng the pol itical 'e t i que t t e" which it chooses; 
republic, monarchy .. etc .. Ali Merad has particularly emphasized this 
feature. He has noted that the most important constant in Arab 
ideological discourse is the reference to Islam(19), In each case, 
the regime tends to exhaust the Islamic argument which 
corresponds with its policy and goals. In the so-called traditional 
regimes, emphasis is placed on the values of piety and religious 
fervor, while in the revolutionary ones, emphasis is put on social 
values such as social justice, equitY,etc ... which provide legitimacy 
to the regime. 
So, there is the Arab regime, playing social forces one against 
the other and striving hard to maintain a workable balance 
between the heterogenous social demands. It is important to keep in 
mind that the contemporary Arab regime when criticised on the 
ground of legitimacy by its opponents is often criticised with 
reference to the "s ac ro- s a i n te" western notion of constitutional 
legitimacy. Very seldom, have we noticed. ' critics of the 
Arab regime show any consideration for the "De facto legitimacy" 
which despite all what could be said, remains the dominant form. 
The Arab regime centralizes "Legitimate Violence" for, the sake 
of political stability as a compromise and as a transitory stage to 
a more democratical political form. 
At the moment, no other option seems available. The Arab 
political opposition directed from outside, to the regime in place 
carries in most cases a personal touch and reflects tactical 
rivalries, rather than substantial political policies. That is why M. 
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Hudson believes that opposition leaders may be right, in labeling 
the incumbents as despotic rulers, but certainly wrong in ascribing 
their behavior to innate human evil because placed in the same 
position they invariably would do the same thing(20). This also 
explains in part the Arab popular resentment about political 
changes in leadership "EI Haj Moussa" or "Moussa EI Haj"; does not 
make much difference. 
Classical doctors such as EI Ghazali, Ibn Djamaa, etc... have 
legalized the "De facto legitimacy" not, as often assumed because 
of conservatism or an alleged political opportunism but simply 
because there was no other option available to them and that in 
order to avoid anarchy and chaos (EI Fitna wa el mihna) they had to 
submit to the reality and legalize the existing authority rather than 
stick to a formal legalism which in any case was not going to be 
met anyway.(21) 
In that sense, one may, as does Laroui(22) ,speak of an 
enlightened "Arab despotism" which today strives hard to reach an 
ambiguous and untractable legitimacy. Among the sources of Arab's 
state legitimacy, S.E. Ibrahim (23)lists five. These are: 
1)legitimacy by default ( de facto legitimacy) 
2)oppression. 
3)effective problem solving. 
4)d ream selli ng. 
5) crisis po I itics. 
Nobody would deny that (1,2,4,5) are the most frequent 
means through which the contemporary Arab regime strives to 
achieve its legitimacy (24). Yet one should not deny also that 
option number three is becoming more and more attractive (thanks 
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to oil money). Indeed, it would be vain to ignore the tremendous 
efforts deploye1p by some Arab states in that direction with the 
hope that by doing so they would succeed in securing popular 
adhesion and legitimacy. Hence, "every Arab regime seems to 
suggest to its citizens in Ol thousand and one ways that they are 
much better off with the present regime and that things would 
never be better, which implies that any consideration of a probable 
political alternative amounts to courting a calamity". This type of 
"Legitimacy of currencies"(25) is however on the verge of 
collapse. The golden age of oil has begun its withdrawal and the 
Arab regime will very soon face legitimacy single-handed. 
Genuine legitimacy is not something which can be purchased, 
nor is it something which bears the ruler'S stamp. A power is 
legitimate authority when it stands on a reciprocal communicative 
relationship between the rulers and the ruled. PoweJ. gains 
legitimacy only when through the vigour of its sociability;feaches 
wAen Lt' 
the people's concern and not v by brutal force; silences them. 
III. Arab unity 
Whenever an Arab meets his fellow from other Arab countries, 
they both start emphasizing how they are so close~ brothers and 
criticising the failure of their respective governments to translate 
their brotherhood into political unification. 
Hence, Arab unity is the theme of Arab discourse at all levels. 
Every six months or so, we hear about some Arab attempts toward 
political unification which of course ends in total failure. It has 
become almost a rule that when Arab unity is proclaimed soldnelly 
between two countrie;'rtmeans that it is forgO~n all about. Western 
journalists and orientalists enjoy this versatility in Arab politics, 
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they seldom miss the opportunity to make fun of it. 
The traditional emotional approach to Arab unity has today 
retreated behind political pragmatism. There is no more question of 
hazardous political involvment~ instead, our enlightened monarchs 
and supreme guides, under the inspiration of their foreign advisers, 
talk more today about "scientific political unity", that is, 
regional economic integration. Now that we have a respectable 
model "C.E.E", we are going to seek a viable regional integration of 
small geographical units as a first step toward the big historical 
project i.e. Arabo-Islamic unity. 
Meanwhile, we are going to unify the Arab Emirates under the 
auspices of S. Arabia. The brothers enft,smies, Irak and Syria, the Nil 
Valley, Egypt and Sudan, and finally the Maghrib. 
In order to prepare Arab people for the big historical project, 
our "supreme guides and enlightened monarchs"are going each 
on his own to start a campaign for Arab unity. So, they rule their 
respective population with an iron hand, fortify their frontiers and 
prevent Arab citizens from moving around in their so-called 
homeland and from meeting each other. Very often, they will start 
fighting each other and use their "state apparatus" to encourage 
their population to hate the neighbours. This is how Arab unity is 
prepared and it is no wonder that the Arab masses are fed up with 
it. 
It has also become one of our featureS to talk much wi#ltrut 
achieving none . You can hear this cry from the Gulf(26) to the 
Atlantic, (27hhat we have developed a complex of verbalism. Do we 
talk really too much ? or are we at the opposite j what a scholar has 
labelled as "silent societies"?(28) 
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There is a certain dichotomy in Arab politics between 
nationalism and Arab unity. It is of course wrong to assume that 
there are two distinct political forces; one in favour of the nation-
state and the other in favour of Arab unity.lt is one and the same 
political force which changes its order of priorities and hence, 
appears somtimes as pro-national, some other times a:Sl pro-unity. 
Following the Marxist dictum that one has to be nationalist in order 
to be a good internationalist, Our bureaucrats shift their sympathy 
from one issue to the other depending on the political context. That 
is why the so-called "enemies" of Arab unity are so hard to find and 
identify. Those who pass for one moment as the champion of Arab 
unity .. <Jr,'e those same persons, who a moment later would do their 
best to block any genuine move toward its implementation. They are 
the first to use the slogan and also the first to obstruct its coming 
into being.(29) While the slogan of Arab unity enhances their 
national position and acquires them some political prestige) any 
serious implementation of unity is a risk to that prestigious 
national position. As a scholar has observed :"if the political 
decision about Arab unity is an easy target to seek, it is 
all together another matter to seek the implementation of 
that decision" Hence, he concludes that "The future of the 
Arab world depends much more on Arab bureaucracy than 
on its alleged leaders"( 3 0). I n reality, notes another scholars 
:"It is an illusion to believe that Arab unity is going to be 
achieved by Arab people, equal to that other illusion 
which sees unity as the fruit of governments' 
arrangements and meetings. In order that the Arab unity 
succeeds 1 both are necessary and their co-operation and 
complementarity is required. leaders as well as people 
should strive together for Arab unity"(31), 
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Djamel Abdennasser has come close / "certainly the closest 
in recent history" to the achievement of Arab unity. His charisma 
has allowed him to cristalize the Arabo-Islamic aspiration to unity 
and though he has failed to bring the ideal to reality, Wobody could 
contest the fact that he had done much for an Arab political 
consiousness. There are sound reproaches to his "pan-Arabism 
Dream": he has certainly played the Arab card in a bad way. His 
theory of circles has given priority to the arab circle vis-a-vis the 
Islamic one and that I believe was his mistake. There are of course, 
historical and political factors which explains his political option : 
the emergence of socialism in the Arab world and "Hizb el Baath" 
as well as the incarnation of Islam by the Arab reactionary regimes 
etc ... , 
All in all, Djamel has failed to seize the Arabo-Islamic reality 
in its globality and was traped in the internal "Arab v Islam" 
dichotomy of that time. In his later days Ojamel realized his error. 
Standing before the "Kaaba" he thus declared: "I now fully 
realised the need for a greater Islamic Unity which will 
ensure power to the Islamic community"(3.2..). 
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Section Three: THE ARABO·ISLAMIC COMMUNITY IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL ORDER 
today 
The Arabo-Islamic Community is Yfar away from reflecting that 
unitarian spirit dreamed of by Nasser, The real question is 
how Arab unity is going to be achieved? This is the question that 
has found no answer so far. 
Western scholars object to our vision of Arab unity 
as a vag ue and abstract utopia. There is no doubt, that seen from a 
western like angle, the "Umma" is a thing of the past, irrelevant to 
nowadays realities. This positivistic blindness, as Morgenthau 
would call it, does not negate the Islamic community as such. It 
only tell us, that the western world does not want to hear or deal 
with such a united Arabo-Islamic entity because its emergency into 
the world scene will bring about changes within the International 
system that the western world will resist and fight with all its 
energy. 
This is a basic rule in western international policy. Don't they 
teach in western universities that among the six rules of the 
balance of power theory, rule number four requires the big powers 
to oppose any coalition of individual actors tending to assume a 
position of predominance within the international system?( 1) 
Lawyers have objected to Koplan's thesis about the political 
foundations of international law.(2) They have quoted Grotius 
stating: "quite untenable is the position, which has been 
maintained by some, that according to the law of nations, 
it is right to take up arms in order to weaken a growing 
power which, if it becomes too great, may become a 
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source of danger. This is abhorent to every principle of 
equity. The possibility of being attacked does not confer 
the rig ht to attack".( 3) 
Hence, legally speaking nothing opposes the coming into being 
of a united Arab-states (U.A.S.) as a major power in the world, yet, 
politically speaking this is altogether another story. Western 
hegemonical powers would have to outreach their strategical 
scheme and remodel their maps and zones of influence. That; they 
would do only if obliged. So, it is therefore, not exagerated to 
impute the actual dilemma of the Arabo-Islamic society to external 
facto rs. 
The Arabo-Islamic community has always been seen by 
western international lawyers as part of what they label "The 
Barbary powers".(4) With the '(reaty of Paris concluded on March 
1856, between the European nations and the Ottoman state, the 
door to the law of the 'so-called civilized nations" was cautiously 
opened to the first muslim state. Since then, the integration of the 
Arabo-Islamic society to the world order has taken a slow path and 
IS far from completed yet. 
Badr has distinguished three different stages in the evolution 
of the Islamic legal international conception(5), During the age of 
expansion, the first century of (Hijra), the Islamic world 'view was 
an offensive one, nourishing the aim of winning the whole world 
over. Then, came a stage of interaction during which the Islamic 
world view became rather defensive and this lasted till the middle 
ages. Then, starting as early as the thirteenth century, an era of 
coexistence began with the first treaty signed between the 
Mameluk sultan "AI ashraf Khalil" of Egypt and Don Jaimes \I (the 
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Just) King of Aragon on Behalf of Spanish and Portuguese kings in 
January (1292 AD). That treaty according to Badr ,was to seal the 
era of coexistence between the western and the muslim worlds. 
for our part, we believe that the era of coexistence between 
the two worlds has not yet started. The actual period would very 
well fit into that second stage, which Badr has described as an era 
of interaction because coexistence requires both parties to 
recognise the right for each other to freedom and dignity, and that 
is far from being recognised to the Islamic world. 
The Arabo-Islamic entrance into the world scene 
has historically taken two forms: the first, is what we may call a 
formal adhesion. This occurred right after World War II, when the 
by then few Arab states (six) joined the San Fransisco conference 
and adopted the United Nations platform. This was more of an 
absorption by the international status-quo of the Arab states 
rather than a genuine adhesion on their part. The United Nations' 
charter as Bull had remarked, was but a reformulation of the 
colonial legacy(6). The rather passive Arab attitude in regard to 
the United Nations partition plan of Palestine in 1948 is a further 
proof to that. 
The second form of adhesion by the Arab states came later on 
and was a genuine and effective adhesion. It came first in the form 
of a law of decolonisation: "the right of people to self-
determination" and was a decade later to blossom into the right to 
development and the need for a new International Economic order. 
This time, the Arabs paid a heavy price to win their place in the 
international stratum. They fought not only against Nazism but 
also against colonialism and earned their independence(7) 
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The formal adhesion has led someone like Khadduri to conclude 
hastily that "twentieth century Islam has reconciled itself with 
the secular international system".(8) While the second effective 
adhesion has led to the reasertion of Islam and its emergence into 
the world arena as a potential destabilising force,fhe international 
tension has risen to such extents that violence and terrorism have 
become "monnaie courante" in the mainstream of international life 
and this) in western public opinion I is in a way or another linked 
with Arabhood and Islam. 
We have seen how the territorial nation of the secular "nation-
state" is alien to the Arabo-Islamic culture. Arabo-Islamic lawyers 
as well as western lawyers have often emphasized how superficial 
Arab states are(9) Yet, the former have had no choice but to claim 
for those artificial states, the right to self determination at the 
international level. We will see later on, how they justified their 
contradictory position. The point that we are trying to make clear 
now, is that the Arab national legal order is intimately linked to 
the International legal order and that unless the Arabo-Muslims 
secure the legitimacy of their national order, they will continue to 
be a major potential for destabilization at the international level. 
How this is so, is obvious. Nationalism has not come as an 
accident in the history of the Arab world, as we have seen earlier; 
It has come within the broad scope of the capitalist international 
division of labour. The pure ·Iegal theory produced by western 
lawyers in the field of international law was but the logical 
outcome of that same process, since indeed, it proceeded to the 
division of the world into a multitude of territorial sovereignties. 
There is ample evidence also, that international lawyers relied on 
domestic law notions such as (property and contract) and 
transplanted them by analogy to the International order which in 
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their eyes was no more than a market for territories and 
sovereignties.(10) Thus, while in Europe, Nationalism has followed 
a sustained historical movement from within, in the rest of the 
world, .t was externally imposed by brutal force on the indigenous 
culturally harmonious units such as the Arabo-Islamic one causing 
thereby disintegration and fragmentation. 
Today's Arab rejection of that compartimentalisation at the 
international level and its insistence on a global approach to the 
solution of international problems is all the more natural. Indeed, 
of what help is the formal political sovereignty of Arab states if it 
is limited to trivial formalities such as a flag and a U.N 
membership? What does political freedom mean other than the 
ability to develop a prosperous and democratic~ society and to 
ensure a free existence to every citizen in honor and dignity? 
These are the concrete notions which matter in the eyes of Arab 
people and not the all abstract formalities which the international 
legal order prevailing today provides them with. 
Of course, this is not meant to say that the Arabo-Islamic 
society rejects nationalism as a fact, for it has an internal tribal 
structure which allows it to absorb nationalistic trends and 
patterns. This however should not be confused and interpreted as a 
voluntarist acceptance of nationalism but rather, should be looked 
upon as an externally imposed fragmentation which will obstruct 
any genuine indigenous buildup of democracy as long as the western 
powers continue to cultivate hegemonical schemes and entertain 
political clients and elites here and there in the Arab world. 
Isn't it amazing that the only Arab regime that had succeeded 
in gaining popular support and adhesion (Nasser's) .was staunchly 
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fought by all western powers? While it is obvious to everyone that 
the more an Arab regime is totalitarian and corrupt, the more it is 
supported by them. 
What does the Arabo-Islamic community want from the 
International order? Do Arabo-Muslims only seek a better place in 
the sun within the prevailing international hierarchy as has 
claimed Tucker, or do they aim at a more profound revision of that 
hierarchy altogether? 
It is obvious, that the Arabo-Muslims are seeking a better 
place inthe sun. What could be more normal? Yet, I believe that the 
long term goal of the Arabo-Islamic claim for self-determination 
is to open the way for a genuine mature anarchy and world order. 
Indeed, to seek a new world order is to forecast a global 
international system where multidimensional state interaction is 
based on a set of shared values accepted by all which would make it 
possible for every state to achieve its own self-determination 
without infringement upon the rights(11)0 I ofA~r.s . 
Our insistence on a more equal international distribution of 
political freedom, health and power, does not stem from our 
. envying the fate of others but simply from our basic need as human 
beings for justice and fairness. We want to secure our existance 
without threatening that of our next-door neighbor. We, want all 
nations to work mutually in order to defeat poverty and oppression 
and ensure that everyone gets his due with respect to that of 
others. We do not seek power for the sake of power, i.e. we do not 
strive to replace the USA or the USS R at the security cou ncil. We 
want every community to dispose of its right to self-determine its 
political, economical and cultural being without necessar~ negating 
that of others. 
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This is a realistic claim which without neglecting the 
overwhelming power element, strives to emancipate it. Power is 
not military might, has never been and will never be. Power in the 
legal :~Bn,s~is the ability to convert what is into what ought to be, 
achieving hence a genuine legitimacy of authority. The wife of the 
Abbassid Caliph EI-Muta-wakil (241.H) is reported to have said to 
her husband, the day when she watched the all of Baghdad taking 
part in the funeral of Ahmed Ibn Hanbal. "that is (EI-Mulk) 
power".(12) 
The international community, argues J.R. Dupuy, is an 
expression which recovers a conflictual reality(13) within which 
ever}j90e see ..ms to care only abo,ut. his own fate while in fact the \Jc{,\jv~ ..J<o",-_Ql S:;c.Jvovt{~ 
salidte of eve1..yG-Re is in the SEl-!-ttw ot all. The aspiration fights the 
reality. "He, who contemplates the international system, argues 
Dupuy, from a metajuridicial angle is shaken by the obvious 
contradictory behavior of states, which in their majority ignore if 
not violate human rights in daily routine business while at the 
same time they vote at the U.N resolutions which flagrantly outlaw' 
" 
their daily behavior. Everyone rejects the faults of others( 14) 
There is today a need for courage and a sense of initiative at' 
the international level. The North holds to the device of order and 
urges the rest of the world to accept the facto status-quo. The 
South contests the order which in fact it sees as a disorder and 
requires concessions from the north so that international justice 
prevails. Every camp anticipates the first step from the other. 
Both need to compromise and look ahead to an era of mature· 
coexistence, if not long ago. "Nobody dared to suggest that the 
equality of states in the general assembly of the U.N, implies the 
-'1 
, ' 
.}~"~ 
u 
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equal value of civilizations anymore than the equality of souls 
before God effaces the inequalities of persons with regard to 
intelligence and wisdom".(15) Today we Arabs ,dare to say so. All 
people on earth should find their way to freedom and dignity, to 
peace and prosperity. 
This may seem very idealistic, true, but isn't this aspiration, 
utopian as it may be) which is at the heart of international law? 
Isn't that, the real grotian quest for world order which refuses 
persistently to submit to the cold juristic logic of the realist? He 
may contend as did Ibn Khaldun: "that the human soul is ardently in 
love with praise and people go all out for this world and for the 
rank or wealth that belong to it. As a rule, they have no desire for 
virtue and they do not care for those who have it".(16) Yet, unless 
we agree that there ~s some kind of virtue that we all long to 
achieve, law will remain that illusory science of norms with which 
the human being will clothe his impulsive desires. 
The prevailing international hierarchy is a two-fold 
phenomenon. There are a few rich and powerful states and a 
majority of poor and weak ones. It is necessary for the benefit of 
all, that those states whose self-determination already occurred, 
refrain from obstructing the way, so that those left over achieve 
theirs. This is not to argue for a preferential treatment but only 
for fairness, because it is our opinion that by making that move 
toward accepting others, the established nations will secure their 
own right to self-determination.Through the establishment of a 
middle class of nations, the international community will achieve a 
viable pluralism and hence reenforces the legality of international 
order. 
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How could nations, while searching for consensus within their 
internal structure in order to achieve legitimacy, refuse to seek 
~ some consensus at the international level? It is obvious that 
nations will contribute to world prosperity and peace only insofar 
as world prosperity contributes to theirs. 
The Arabo-Islamic community does not request from the 
international legal order more than what the latter grants to 
everyone of its unit, i.e. the right to political, economic~ and 
cultural self-determination. The Arabo-Islamic community wants 
to l'trq be an accepted partner, not a sphere of influence, a pitch for 
power politics maneuvres. 
As a community, we are entitled to question the claims of 
positive international law. What kind of law is that which permits 
the spoiling of the Palestinian people from their homeland and 
convert them to eternal prosecuted refugees? What kind of law is 
that which gives the western powers every now and then the right 
to intervene military and otherwise on matters of exclusive 
concern to the Arabo-Islamic people(17)? What kind of law is that, 
which reduces us to a gathering of national identities denied over 
most basic rights and human dignity? 
These and similar questions, we are entitled to raise and seek 
an answer to with the help of the international co.mmunity. 
Scholars have asserted that Islam could contribute through its 
universal message of brotherhood and its personal law to 
international 'Detente" and cooperation. This is certainly what 
Islam stands for and the more so today, since it is in need for help 
to regain its human face. 
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Chapter Three 
The Right To Economic Self-determination. 
Section one: The Economic4D Dimension 
This is the nerve center of the International debate. It is 
variably referred to as the rig ht to economic "s elf-
determination"; the right to economic sovereignty; or in much 
more recent international literature, the right of people 
(state) to development. 
There should be no wonder,as to why the emphasis is today on 
the economic6t'l, factor.Do not we live in an economic~1 era? That of 
the one dimensional man? Therefore ,shall we be surprised if today 
nations as well as people want to measure how much right they 
have got?The over emphasized economic~1 dimension of the 
development issue has led to the emergence of an opposite current 
shifting the focus from economism to moral and legal 
grounds(1 ).Hence,the claim for the right to development.ln order to 
understand the whole international debate on the issue of 
development we need to examine both dimensions: the economic~1 
and the legal. 
Within the former,the assumption is that development is before 
everything else a question of economic "output". On this 
assumption 
development 
is constructed the whole western paradigm of 
with its two examples:The liberal and the 
socialist.Once having analysed the western paradigm on 
development,we will examine the Arabo-Islamic world's attitude 
to its vis-a-vis. 
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Within the later dimension,development becomes a question of 
legal rights:How this right is interpreted differs within the 
western legal paradigm from the Anglo-Saxon school to the French 
school and from both of them to the Arabo-Islamic school.These 
are some of the issues we intend to rise and deal with in this 
chapter. 
Development within the western paradigm(2) 
As we have shown in our first chapter,the rise of the west and 
its emergence as the dominant center of the world has come out as 
a result of a long lasting evolution with a successive chain of 
events and counter events. 
Now, whether one adopts a Web erian interpretation in regard 
to that phenomenon ,or a Marxist one, the end result is the 
same,whether through empiricism and rationalization or through 
historical materialism and class struggle,the end result is a 
common western attitude toward the meaning of development. 
This common attitude is embodied in the shared belief that 
development is linked casually to "economism". Hence, we will 
refer to this attitude as the western paradigm. 
T.Kuhn, in his book " The Structure of Scientific Revolution", 
tells us, that a paradigm is a world view,an accepted model or 
.. 
pattern shared by all members of a scientific community.lt is a 
way of viewing things, of understanding them. A paradigm is 
animated by normal science which when investigating the validity 
of the claim contained by the paradigm starts discovering 
anomalies.,. ·the paradigm enters then in a crisis which leads to a 
scientific revolution and the construction of a new paradigm. When 
the paradigm changes, the world itself changes with it.(3), Kuhn 
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used many examples, mostly drawn from various fields of natural 
sciences. In astronomy for instance, he tells us that prior to 
Galilea, we had a Plotemaic world view of the universe in which 
the earth was the center of the universe and the sun and all the 
planets rotated around the earth. That was the prevailing paradigm, 
the way people viewed the world and this affected their attitude in 
all aspects, religious psychological and so on .. GalileeV;1- started 
asking questions to which he could not find answers within the 
prevailing paradigm. A lot of anomalies occured and he come up 
with a new paradigm which resolved his questions in which he saw 
the earth as a minor planet rotating arou nd the sun in a small solar 
system, in an insignificant galaxy. The result was entirely a 
different world view, that was a scientific revolution. 
In the field of development, we have a dominant paradigm. It is 
undergoing a severe crisis,but nevertheless,is still considered as 
the only prevailing paradigm.This paradigm,we chose to call 
"Mecano-materialistic paradigm". It conceives development as the 
increase of the material power of man, in the form of GNP or 
technological mastery or pleasure. It if mechanical because it 
understands development as a mechanism i.e. as a process of 
accumulation and empiricism, set in motion by a historical force, 
the acquisitive spirit and it functions according to determined 
laws and rules.lt is also materialistic because it reduces the 
developmental process to matter and excludes all non-material 
factors.ln order to shed some light on the Mecano-materialistic 
nature of the western paradigm,let us examine how this world 
view has come into beingj how it answers the question of existence. 
The stars did not always exist, they were formed out of masses 
of dispersed gas. Once formed,the whole stellar system, with all 
the stars in it, goes through an evolutionary process stage by 
stage, like our sun.Some stars acquire planets and form solar 
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systems.Hence, the Earth was formed. As its surface cooled, so 
chemical-compounds were formed. Thus, matter began to manifest 
new properties non-existent before, the properties of chemical 
combination, then organic compound were formed out of the 
complex linking of atoms and the first bodies arose which began to 
man ifest prope rties of life. Livi ng 0 rgan isms went th roug h 
evolution leading to the emergence of the "A p e" our so-called 
ancestor from which man descends.Human society was thus 
formed.New processes with new laws have allowed and shaped 
social life and thought,{ 4) 
This Darwinian version of the origin of life has made the idea 
of religion and God redundant.Science has taken the place of God 
liberating humanity from the bondage of superstition and religion. 
Thus Feurfilbac~ could argue that "unbelief has taken the place 
of belief,reason the place of the bible, politics the place 
of religion, Earth the place of heaven, work the place of 
prayer, material wants the place of hell, Man the place of 
the Christian."(5), 
The Mecano-materlialistic paradig m has two scientific sub-
communities or examples~ the liberalist examplar and the socialist 
examplar. Many among western scholars have looked upon this two 
examplers as constituting two independant paradigms of 
development. Lately however,many have shifted to a mono-
paridigmatic attitude.An examplar, tells us, Kuhn, is a concrete 
technical problem solving procedure developed by scientifics 
within the paradigm(6). The examplars share, the basic features of 
the paradigm but they do not constitute paradigms by themselves. 
Thus capitalism and Marxism are examplars of the same mecano-
materialistic paradigm. They share ~ common basic features and 
assumptions on the development issue although they differ as 
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procedures on how to achieve development. 
The Materialistic paradigm of development is based upon pre-
supposed assumptions about human nature, good life and the good 
society. First the paradigm assumes that people are rational 
i.e.that people know what is in their best interest and will act to 
achieve it. Second, it assumes that a good life is maximization of 
pleasure and minimization of pain.What brings pleasure is assumed 
to be consumption and what brings pain is assumed to be work. 
Therefore, a good life is assumed to consist in a maximization of 
pleasure and minimization of work.l?st, the mecano-materialistic 
paradigm assumes a good society that which succeedS: in providing 
its hedonistic members with what they desire.But, because the 
desires are unlimited while the resources are limited,then, we 
h a vet h e pro b I e m 0 f " sea rei t y" w h i chi sat the he a rt 0 f the 
economic inquiry. Thus,the good society is the one which succeeds 
in tackling the problem of scarcity and providing its citizens with 
the maximum of pleasure with a minimum cost.ln both examplars of 
this paradigm Economics are the central issue and the substance of 
development. 
I. The Capitalist Examplar. 
Within the liberal framework,the problem of scarcity is tackled 
as follow:the development of the society is a function of its 
economic production. Every society has inputs i.e. resources (Iand-
labour, minerals, tools, etc.). These inputs . when wisely allocated 
raise the outputs whether in the form of goods or services. Thus, 
the more output you get, the more you develop. 
A.Smith defines the wealth of nations along this line. Among 
the society's resources,tells us Smith,labour is the most 
important of 
quality and 
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all,so he argues that the output is a function of the 
quantity of(J.labour force.To illustrate his points,he 
. /I 
gives us his famous example of the pin factory where through the 
division of labour and specialisation, production is multiplied(7). 
The second important resour~ is capital. You have got to have 
capital in order to develop your energy sources and your physical 
capital i.e.man made tools which are used to produce other goods. In 
order to do that, you have to build factories and transform energy. 
Industrialisation th us, beco mes the key.1 n orde r to accu m u late 
capital, you are obliged to save and not consume your output. Who 
will save? The capitalists, answers Smith. In doing so, the 
capitalist argues Smith, is seeking his own gain but all along, he 
promotes an end which was no part of his intention by pursuing his 
/. 
own interest(8), the capitalist frequently promotes that of the 
society more effectively than when he really intend to. Thus, the 
capitalist will save, invest, produce, re-invest and re-produce 
more and that is how wealth is acquired(9). 
Another important factor of production emphasized with in the 
liberal frame, is that of trade and international division of labour 
according to the comparative advantage policy. Because there are 
regions, we are told, which have advantages in producing certain 
specific products 1 tt, therefore make sense for country "A" to 
specialize in the production of wine for instance, while country "B" 
will specialise in the production of cotton.Then both countries 
will exchange wine for cotton and both will be better off.(10) 
Entrepreneurship and the spirit of intiative are also 
important, tells us J.Shumpeter. Entrepreneurs are the real engineers 
of growth(11). All these factors combined together will allow the 
society to develop and become rich.The liberal examplar as seen 
from Smith's earlier quotation derives the political strategy from 
the accumulation process itself. All you need to do is trust the 
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capitalist. In seeking his own interest, he will seek yours(12). He 
G1A 
is guided in his endeavour by;'invisible and magic hand"; the 
laws of the market. They are a neutral and objective device 
dedicated to growth. Thus, the policy required is that of "Laisser 
faire; les capitalist~"(13) which means that the state should 
only provide the convenient atmosphere conducive to business and 
that is social order and political stabiltiy.As Smith has put it "the 
state should protect the rich against the poor"{ 1 4) . 
Today.economists of the Chicago circle still argue along this 
line(15), 
Within the liberal frame,development is a linear process.The 
best illustration is that of Rostow's five stages growth model~16). 
It is like piloting an airplane, all you have to do is succeed your 
take-off~ if you do that, you are developed no matter what comes on 
,at the touch-down. 
Hence, within the liberal examplar, development is first of all 
a question of economic performance. This is confirmed by 
S.Kuznets who defines Economic growth as a long term rise in the 
capacity of the country to increase its supply of goods and services 
to its population(17), This growing capacity, he tells us, is based 
on advanced technology, institutional and ideological adjustments. 
There are notes Kuznets, six characteristics of Economic 
Development; these are:(18) 
1) The high rate of growth of per-capita product and of 
population. 
2) The high rate of productivity (of outputs per unit of all 
inputs) 
3) The high rate of structural transformation of the eQcnomy, 
moving from agrarian economy to industrialization and from 
there on to services. 
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4) Social restructuration and ideological changes. 
5) The universalization of the economic growth model due to 
the development of transport system and communications. 
6) Economic performances are accountable to modern 
technology. 
This has worked well for western Europe and since, it has been 
assumed of universal validity and relevance. In the post war 
period and following the emergence of the soviet union as a major 
Anti-Liberal power/Some economists in the liberal school began to 
suspect the efficiency of the "Iaisser faire" doctrine particularly 
for the newly independent nations, where state intervention under 
the spell of the Marxian ethic was very much in "vogue". They also 
were worried with what they labelled as neighbourhood effects or 
"externalities" on the market system and which they argued, were 
reflected as far as the economy of the third world nations were 
concerned in the following two vicious circles: 
First, you have a vicious circle on the demand side, the poor 
countries have a low capita income and this means that the market 
is very small which in other terms mean that investment is very 
low or what comes to the same, that capital· stock is very meager. 
Since without capital, you cannot have productivity, so your per 
capita is low. 
On the supply side, on the othe r hand there is a low rate of 
saving and as a consequence,a low investment level; therefore you 
have a low level of productivity and as a result, you have a low per 
capita income. Hence,you are caught in a poverty circle. How then 
are you going to break the vicious circle? 
The Neo-Liberals suggested planning and state intervention as a 
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regulator of the market economy. This is the only way out,argue> 
R.Rodan.The classical economists forecast proved wrong because 
they neglected "externalities" i.e.the deficiency of social overhead 
capital which caused diseconomies. Planning will allow a control 
of externalities, fills out the lack of social overhead capital and 
break5 the vicious circle of poverty .Hence, Rodan suggested his "big 
push theory" or the balanced growth model(19). The idea is to plan 
a wide range of investments so as to create demand for every 
product and establishes a balanced growth pattern. 
R.Nurkse another proponent of the Big push theory(20), argues 
that the theory's aim is to restore the balance between supply and 
demand because it is the" inelasticity "of the demand at low level 
income which cramps the inducement to invest in industry. 
Hirshman.A., conceived a solution to the poverty circle 
somehow differently. He argued for an unbalanced growth model 
whereby a system of backward and forward linkages would 
through induced investments resolve the supply/demand 
equilibrium(21), According to him, the linkage effect of a given 
product line is an investment generating force set in motion 
through input/output relationship. When productive facilities that 
supply inputs to the productive line, or utilise its outputs are, 
inadequate or non-existant, !ackward linkages lead to new 
inv~stments in inputs supplying facilities and forward linkages to 
investment in output using facilities. All you have to do. is select 
an economic~ area for the first investment in such a way that 
investments in complementary areas become compulsive rather 
than permissive(22). 
A. Lewis, on his part, has emphasized that the problem in the 
third world countries is first of all a problem of capital(2 3) I ~ince 
there are in these countries an unlimited supply of labour, then, all 
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you have to do is to transform the abundant labour force into 
capital.How? Simple, the capitalist sector which is the sector 
using reproducible capital has a higher level of production than the 
remaining parts of the economy which are at subsistence level. As 
production increases, the capital sector will expand and absorb 
progressively the subsistence sector under the form of labour 
capital. You have to keep income concentrated in the capitalist 
sector, so that you can reinvest and absorb' more labour intensive 
capital until you absorb completely the labour capital) abolishing 
henceforth unemployment and generating growth. This is the 
famous g row now , trickle-down later theory. 
Through these and other formulas, western economists sought 
to resolve the problem of underdevelopment.The third world 
countries which have applied these technical devices have 
succeeded in raising their growth rates but in spite of that, they 
did not seem to have achieved development,Unemployment is rising, 
inequality widening, malnutrition spreading, illitracy and lack of 
technical skill growing.As a result, new formulas were elaborated 
and suggested. This time, through the United Nations and its 
development frame. 
A direct attack on poverty and a policy of meeting basic needs, 
were thus, advocated. Growing inequality in income distribution, 
made urgent social justice and growth with 
equity(24). Since Agriculture is the dominant economic feature in 
the third world countries,appeals were made to integrate this vital 
sector and construct development along a balanced rural-urban 
strategy based on labour intensive technology so that employment 
could be assured as well as income distribution and social 
equity.Hence,we had all sorts of calls for growth with equity from 
Dr.Seers and his Sussex group, to M.el Haq at the BIRD to J.Grant at 
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the Overseas development center, Ted Owens at AID and so on .... 
The international commision for development ended during that 
period its report advocating: "that the objective of 
cooperation for international development is to help the 
poorer countries to move forward into the industrial age 
and establish a good partnership between the "haves" and 
the "have not".(25) 
This was the promethean outlook of the liberal economic 
thaught which realizing by then the weaknesses of its pre-
assumptions and facing tremendous pressure from the emerging 
consciousness of the third world countries, tried to cope 
haphazardly with the situation. The growth ethos was loosing its 
shine. It becomes suspected(26), limited(27), troublesome(28), 
destructive(29), almost a disease causing fever and anxiety{30L 
The continously evolving opinion of one of the brightest economists 
of the western liberal of that era, certainly reflects the point more 
eloquently. In 1969(31), Dr.Seers, conceived development as 
involving not only economic growth but also conditions in which 
people in a country have adequate food and jobs where income 
inequality is greatly reduced. Eight years later, in 1977(32), 
reviewing his conception, Dr. Seers discovers that he has left out 
one essential element and that is self-reliance. Development hence 
becomes for him, the realization of the potential of human ascent 
or personality. 
Western economic theory is unable to understand the meaning 
of development, because it is so intimately bound up with the 
special conditions, problems and pre-conceptions of the 
industrially advanced countries, that large portions of jt, have to 
be abandoned -!Jfore we can come to grip with the problems of the 
underdevelopffi&Ai- countries. Third world nations have fought for 
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independence. And independence, Seers tells us, is not merely the 
aim of development. It is also one of the means. It is a force of 
mobilising popular support and the force is blunted if a government 
is obviously far from independent(33), 
Development is a normative concept. If it has to be defined, 
then, no one can defines it better than those who are concerned 
with it. This, according to our own reading of Seers is the 
conclusion that he reached. The aim is therefore, as he pointed out, 
to change international attitudeS so that it becomes impossible for 
the political leaders and social scientists of Europe and North-
America to continue overlooking and aggravating often inadvertly 
the obscene inequalities that disfigure the world. 
II. The Marxist Examplar. 
Emerging as the historical development of the capitalist 
examplar,the Marxist or the socialist examplar did not requestion 
the pre-given assumptions of the capitalist system.The communist 
manifesto has praised the progressive historical role of the 
"bo u rg e 0 i s ie" and Engels, went as far as supporting and justifying 
French colonization of North-Africa(34). The goal of Marxism is 
the abolition of the private ownership of the means of production 
and the realization of a classless communist society.K. Marx is the 
father and engineer of this examplar. Later on, Lenine), Kautsky and 
Rosa were to elaborate the official version of his teachings and 
adopt it in the form of "Diamat"*. 
As we have said, Marx did not requestion the accumulative 
process.He took it as the basis of his historical materialism. We 
will come later on to that, to the Marxian Examplar.Development is 
a historical process on dialectical materialism, that is, a 
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historical process which expresses itself dialectically through 
labour and the relations of production.Human society, according to 
Marx, has gone through five stages and known five modes of 
pro duct ion (35). What characterises the capitalist mode is its 
internal contradiction, that is,the dialecticaly opposed 
relationship between, on one hand the capitalists,owners of the 
means of production and the "Proletariat" the workers, who, on the 
other hand are deprived by the former of their wage-labour, which 
is taken by the capitalists under the form of a "s u r p I u s-v a I u e" . 
The more the prole,tariat is exploited,the more it is likely to force 
a class consciousness and starts a revolutionary movement which 
will liberate the whole society from the capitalist 
strangulation.Hence, revolution will absorb the private ownership~of 
the means of production and will insta!1 8 socialist society \.'thiGh 
throunh collactive ownershio and sslf-r;ElilaC:3d econorrw wi!! ro;:.>,(:(: ~ j- v ~ 
the communist ideal. 
This is "arcsso·'illQQO" the Marxian schnme of how societios 
.-
develop. \Nith Engels and Leninsl,tilis theory will become a practi~3() 
an ~) ~Uirlp. the ~.J tJ i\""~-" dl 
Urdcn became 
Bolechevic revolution in Russia (18 '17). The Sovi:;t 
the Marxian Examplar of Development in the vliorlel 
and tho rival of the preva.iling capitalist examplar. 
The nevv nations of the third world, stili undor tl-l9 traUnlF!. of 
coloniaiism, \lvalcorned the Marxian Gxamplar which they saw as an 
aily and a precic1us "comerade". Thus, China was attracted to the 
Marxian exarnplar undor the leadership of ivlC'w. Cuba ulKiur CasUa, 
Africa under N'f<l'urnah, the Arab world uncJerl\Jasser, etc... They ali 
adopted the Marxian CX811ip!ar and believed development 'b' POSSI HS 
within that frame and that frame only.Due to the deep differerlces 
between ali tilese nations, vie have come to a variety of socialisrns, 
we 1l8vst'theloss will engulf them ail ur\(!erthel8.belof the 
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historical process wh ich expresses itself dialectically th ro ug h 
labour and the relations of production.Human society, according to 
Marx, has gone through five stages and known five modes of 
production(35), What characterises the capitalist mode is its 
i n t ern a leo n t r a die t ion, t hat is, the d i a lee tic all y 0 p p 0 sed 
relationship between, on one hand the capitalists,owners of the 
means of production and the "Proletariat" the workers, who, on the 
other hand are deprived by the former of their wage-labour, which 
is taken by the capitalists under the form of a "surplus-value". 
The more the prole· tariat is exploited,the more it is likely to force 
a class consciousness and starts a revolutionary movement which 
will liberate the whole society from the capitalist 
strangulation.Hence, revolution will absorb the private ownership'of· 
\ 
the means of production and will install a socialist society which 
through collective ownership and self-managed economy will reach 
the communist ideal. 
This is "grosso-modo" the Marxian scheme of how societies 
develop. With Engels and Lenine,this theory will become a practise 
and guide the Bolechevic revolution in Russia (1917). The Soviet 
Union became the Marxian Examplar of Development in the world 
and the rival of the prevailing capitalist examplar. 
The new nations of the third world, still under the trauma of 
colonialism, welcomed the Marxian examplar which they saw as an 
ally and a precious "comerade". Thus, China was attracted to the 
Marxian examplar under the leadership of Mao. Cuba under Castro, 
Africa under N'Krumah, the Arab world underNasser, etc... They all 
adopted the Marxian examplar and believed development possible 
within that frame and that frame only. Due to the deep differences 
between all these nations, we have come to a variety of socialisms, 
we nevertheless will engulf them all under the label of the 
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political economy theory and examine its leading currents. 
The Marxian theory unlike the capitalist one conceives 
development under three methodological indicators. First, 
development is a historical process, the same process which has 
brought development to Europe and N.America has also brought 
underdevelopment to the rest of the world. This has been done 
through a process which has accumulated the plunder of the third 
world(36), the devastation of the African continent and the ripping 
of its labour force(the slave-traffic) etc ... (37) No word is really 
strong enough to express what F.Fanon has termed as the 
"Deracinement" of the colonized(38). Hence, underdevelopment is 
the consequence of development. How did this happen? To answer 
this question, let us follow the industrialization of Europe. 
There are four stages which the political-economy theory 
distinguishes in this evolution. These are: The economy of scale, 
the import substitution, the multinational corporation, the export 
orientated economy. The first stage occu rred in Europe when the 
process of capital accumulation took place. Capital started growing 
much more rapidly than the labour force and it followed that while 
capital was abundant; the labour force was scarce, the result 
therefore was that wages started growing and profits declining. 
This was not to please the capitalist who resorted to immigrants 
to solve this problem.He thus hired peasants from the countryside 
just as A. Lewis has demonstrated to us. Then, when he .could not 
find them anymore, he was obliged to export his capital out of his 
country wherever he could fructify it according to the comparative 
advantage scheme. He also used automation to create redundant 
labour but capital was so abundant that he had to invest abroad and 
chQ,se wealth wherever he could find it. He invested in two kind of 
economicctl asseVVs, either in agricultural plantation of the 
Latifundian type or in extractive industries: gold, mines, oil, etc ... 
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The investments of the capitalists did not transform the 
indigenous economies. All that happened was the establishment of 
Economic zones "enclaves" around the exploited farms and mines 
and the construction of a railroad system linking them to Ports. 
This has led to the colonialist nightmare. Not only did the 
capitalist destroy the indigenous economic tissug but he also tied it 
to the capitalist central system creating thus, dependency and 
economic subordination, 
The indigenous societies never benefited from the capitalist 
adventure and the thesis of the "civilizing mission" is as much a 
myth as the legend of "tarzan"(39). The technology used in the 
economy of scale was the same rudimentary technic used before 
and after the capitalists investments.Changes however occured in 
the economic indigenous structure. People who had been subsistant 
farmers were turned into landless labourers or workers into farm 
and factories. This allowed an enormous increase in ~ 
productivity and the gains were shared among three categories of 
people.First, the European investors,second,the qualified European 
technical experts and the managerial staff, third, the small 
minority of local e lite constituted by the indigenous hierarchy. The 
question, hence, is what did these people do with their 
gains?particularly the expatriated and the local elite? The answer 
is, they used it to import goods and luxuries from Europe, cars, 
furs, drinks and so on ... As a result, the indigenous economy 
developed a pattern of consumption which requires a high 
concentration of income.With such a pattern,the indigenous 
economy was well in its subordinated state to the capitalistic 
system. 
The next stage was that of import substitution, following the 
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economic reppression and World War II, the local elite started 
producing locally wha,it used to import from Europe.Luxuries which 
required capital intensive technology which in turn required a high 
concentration of income. So the gap between the minority of the 
"petite bo u rgeo i s ie" and the population started wide ning; 
luxuries, "villas" with pools and tennis courts sided with ghettos. 
The third stage was thus reached, that of the "octopus". The MNC's 
emerged as the new sovereigns of the world market(40). Mostly 
American centered corporations invaded the world. Even Europe felt 
some uneasiness with their upsurge( 41). 
MNC's moved into the third world with their capital intensive 
factories, reinforcing concentration of income and deepening the 
capitalist seizure of the world. MNC's brought to the third world 
countries further concentration of income. Their financial 
contribution turned out to be a financial drain, a "decapitalization". 
The balance of payments outflows were accentuated through import 
overpricing and inflated royalties(42). 
We now live in the fourth stage of the capitalist system which 
is chracterised by what Frank calls "a supposed 
redemocratization of the world order. The aim is to 
maintain and institutionalize the insertion of the third 
world countries into the capitalist system,,(43). We have 
seen how MNC's have revitalised the international market through 
the injection of capital into its divers antennas allover the 
world.Countries such as India, Brazil, Eygpt, Taiwan, S.Korea, 
etc ... were encouraged to produce light industrial goods and some 
heavy industries for exports. This trend spread during the 1970's to 
Malaysia, Phillipines, Sri Lanka, Singapore, Morocco and Ivory Coast 
etc .. Because of the nature of their products, these economi(;s 
competed against each other by offering to foreign investors cheap 
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labour and providing plant facilities, electricity, transport and so 
on ... tax relief and every kind of incentive for foreign capital to 
come and produce for the world market. 
Politically the whole state apparatus had to be adapted to the 
third world's new role in the international division of labour.Since 
then,one government after the other have been falling over itself to 
the capitalists. Thus, took shape the trend toward liberalization in 
the state noticeable in the late 70's, early 80's. This has been 
reflected in the new alliance between labour and the oppositions 
with governments often more rightist but which nevertheless 
appear less evil than the "Military Juntas"; such as the Free 
government in Chile, Magalaes in Brazil. Aquino in Phillipines, the 
coming Civil government in Haiti and so on ... 
The second methodological indicator of the political economy 
theory is the globality of the phenomenon of development. It is not 
anymore the GNP per. capita which determines the level of 
development but much more the equal distribution of income,the 
rig ht of people to se If-dete rm i natio n, se If-respect and dig n ity 
which are all considered to reflect the developmental task. 
Here, the political economy school has found itself confronted 
with a big doctrinal problem.The unexpected turn of the Soviet 
revolution to a bureaucratic drive and its flirt with dictatorship 
and state capitalism has led many political economists, 
particularly from the third world J to a reinterpretation of the 
Marxian heritage(44). Hence, the classical figure of capitalism 
versus socialism has been converted to a much wider and universal 
configuration of a world system perspective where the imperialist 
center of the capitalist system stands as the axe around which 
rotates the peryphery i.e.the rest of the world. This new formula 
derived from the dependency theory of Dos Santos and lnostroza is 
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elaborated today by E.Wallerstein,S. Amin,E.Arighiri, among 
others.Hence, Wallerstein, a political economist with a deep insight 
into the history of capitalism tells us: "that the world system 
today is one,a capitalist system of production, around 
which is shaped the universe. The socialist societ~s are, 
no matter what part of the system) a]td getting integrated 
more and more to the capital system"( 45), As A.Frank has 
put it: "Socialism is banking on the capitalist west"(46), 
This is visible today in the Economic arena through the 
accelerated integration or reintegration of the socialist economies 
in the International division of labour through trade and 
production. To illustrate his view,; Frank points out that the 
socialist countries import technology from the west and in order to 
pay for it, they export two third of fuel and raw materials and one 
third of manufactured goods. Yet, in turn, they export to the third 
world two thirds of manufactured goods of a low order of 
technology and import two thirds of raw materials. Hence, they 
occupy an intermediary place in the international market system 
and as such they are an integral part of that system(47). 
This global view of the issue of development has helped to 
enhance the third world position at the international level. The 
belief that the reality of development is an integrated wholeness 
led to the conclusion that the third world countries have to 
struggle in order to develop. It is not a struggle against, as much 
as, it is a struggle for something, a struggle for independence, In 
order to exist by yourself, you have to achieve a first condition and 
that is according to S.Amin, to delink yourself from the capitalist 
trap(48). Wallerstein, on his side, asserts that "intelligent 
analysis, demands knowledge of the complete texture of social 
reality and historical phenomen~.Such a global view presents to 
I; 
142 
our sight the emergence of the world system perspective as a 
consequence of the dramatic challenge to European harmony over 
the world,which has called into question all European egocentric 
constructions of social reality"( 49). 
C.Furtado, who has expressed so eloquently the Latino-
American conception of development asserts : " That enough is 
enough, history cannot any more be made without us"" Furtado 
dethrones the Marxian ethic of its prophetical aura : "based on a 
theory of history that made a powerful impact because it filled 
obvious gaps in the social sciences and was vague enough to adopt 
itself to any number of situations without entailing serious 
contradictions; the ideology of scientific socialism played a major 
role in spreading industrial civilization in areas where the process 
of accumulation has been weak or non-existent"(50). 
S.Amin, on his part, stresses that the social fact is one, an 
indivisible one which is neither economical nor political, nor 
ideological. It may be looked upon from a specific social angle but 
any exclusive approach has no chance of remaining scientific if it 
neglects to measure its limits and prepare the way for a global 
social science(51). Along the same line argues also, A.Abdelmalek. 
What is remarkable in the third world economists attitude VIS-
a-vis Marxism is their desperate attempt to "Third-worldlize 
Marx i sm ". They really try hard to extract from Marxism some sort 
of "know how", some sociological guidance for the achievement of 
development in the third world.The authors I mentioned are all, 
despite differences in details, unanimous in)claiming with Sartre, 
that Marxism, is "La Philosophie indepassable de notre 
e p 0 que". They all perceive the issue of development in terms of 
production and relations of production.They are willing to expand 
the Marxist notion of the proletariat(52), but on the whole, they 
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would not transcend the Marxist cage and are thus, unable to provide 
a clearly defined "third worldist" alternative to development. They 
are pragmatic and realists to an exagerated point,which for the 
. most prevent them from seeing reality other than what it seems to 
be. Their reflection lacks of humanism. Afraid as all Marxist are of 
the humanitarian value, they speak much more as technical experts 
than as human beings. We will come back later on, to this point 
Let us before closing our review of this issue examine how 
S.Amin,for instance, eliminates the transcendental factor we 
raised a while ago. "questions which transcend the existence 
of man as a social being are valid, ' yet historical 
materialism does not respond to them because it does not 
ask them. The action of social transformation does not 
imply or require them.Such a position holds open the door 
of reintegration into the social transformation camp to 
those who continue to be pre-occupied by transcendal 
questio~; but who do not reduce the future of humanity to 
a passive reflection on these questions"(53) 
S.Amin, concludes emphasizing that this is not a matter of 
political tactics but of fundamental convi c. tions. Now, in this 
article ,S.Amin,is reviewing the green movement and replying to its 
challenge as a spiritually enhanced doctrine. From this passage, we 
like to infer that Amin, not -withstanding the fact tfra~historical 
materialism; does ask$ the transcendal questions and provide them 
with clear cut answers, qualifying them either as "Opium" or 
reactionary forces;~s accusing these transcendal questions of 
reducing the future of humanity to a passive reflection. As if the 
present state of humanity within its materialistic cage in both 
socialist and capitalist societies is far from being a passive one? 
A state vrere the human being has lost meaning and becomes a 
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fetichist commodity jungled between social desintegration in the 
liberal society, and social extrangulation in the socialist society is 
conceived by Amin as an active reflection on the question of man's 
existence and being. 
We will continue our argument with Amin later on(54). 
Meanwhile let us, move to the third methodological indicator of the 
political economy theory which is its structural conception of the 
phenomenon of development. In order to understand development and 
underdevelopment, we have, first, to understand the structural 
relation, !' which existS between, on the one hand, the Market 
forces, i.e.supply and demand and on the other, between the internal 
and external factors. 
First, the supply/demand relationship, the key determinent of 
economic development is, according to the political economist 
theory, the distribution of income. ~II me who has the income 
and I tell you what sort of economy you have.The distribution of 
income determines the structure of final demand. Who is going to 
decide what sort of goods and services are to be produced? 
Logically,it is who has income who decides. Therefore, if we are to 
produce goods in order to satisfy consumption patterns, we have to 
add extra costs. If we want to avoid these extra costs, we should 
then produce what the income holder decides. In a poor country, the 
local elite, who has the income requires a transplant clinic, then, 
that is what they will get.We will not produce paramedics out in 
the village,we will obey what the income holders command.ln some 
cases, like'in the "oil Emirates" you can be lucky and dispose of 
such a mass of income that you can produce both a transplant clinic 
and paramedics in the village and satisfy all kinds of consumption 
patterns. Even the most fantaisist, but that is another story to 
which we will come later on in another chapter(55). 
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With an equal distribution of income, the situation is 
different,you have people who demand basic needs and you respond 
to their demand.You cannot introduce new consumption patterns 
until you have satisfied completely the basic ones.Thus,like in 
almost all the socialist countries, you start by giving everybody 
shelter, food, work, education, health services and so on .. 
The structur al relationship between demand and supply 
determines, on one side what kind of goods you produce and this 
determines in turn what technology you have, who gets jobS and so 
on... On the other hand, it determines who control$' the social 
surplus.The concept of the social surplus goes back to A. Smith, you 
take the total output of the country and subtract from it the 
necessary consumption and that leaves you with the social surplus 
which you reinvest in order to generate more growth. If it is the 
capitalists who controle the social surplus, then, they will align 
themselves with external capitalist forces and part of their profits 
will be sent abroad as a hedge against inflation and the threat of 
revolution. So, the internal dynamic is linked to an external central 
dynamic. In order to be in control of your social surplus,you need to 
destroy the capitalist connection, liberate your economy and 
therefore, what you need is a socialist economy which'through 
collective ownership of the means of production and self-reliance 
will allow you to achieve development. Political Economists are 
optimistic. Historically, the capitalist system is cond~mne,d, so all 
you have to do is wait for the internal contradictions to cause 
desinteg ratio n. (56) 
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The Arabo-Islamic Attitude 'vis-a-vis' 
The Western Paradigm On Development 
Having described the main feature of the western Mecano-
materialistic paradigm with its two examplars, let us now, 
examine the Arabo-Islamic world's attitude towards it? $.s'it has 
expressed itself in Arab thought and praxis. Early in this century, 
when the Ottoman empire started desintegrating,the Eu~pean 
powers were busy dividing the Arab-Islamic world between 
themselves. The old sick man of Europe was agonizing when Russia 
started annexing parts of Asia minor. The Constantinople agreement 
guaranteed the French and British interests in the Empire. The 
treaty of London, incl uded Italy. Finaly, the secret "Sykes- Picot" 
agreement in May 1916, ended the division of the Arabo-Islamic 
Empire by transplanting through the Balfour declaration of 1917, an 
artificial "Zionist state" in the heart of the Arab Land, Palestine. 
Since that time, the Arab-Islamic world has undergone major 
changes and events,attempting to define itself vis-a-vis the 
western world. The eternal question of who am I ? Has so far been 
answered by another question : who is the other? 
This subject has been dealt with so extensively that by now, 
the question seems almost settled and most people would tend to 
believe that Islam is reconciled with liberalism and that nothing 
compatible separates them. In reality, nothing is further 'from the 
truth. The relations between Islam and liberalism has always been 
treated in a "Partizan way" and as such, it has been provided with a 
partizan answer. Islam has very seldom questioned the tenents of 
liberalism. It has always tended to look to liberalism from an Anti-
Communist attitude. Islam has never defined itself in regard to 
liberalism in an objective way, It has always tended to view 
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liberalism as the counterpart of Marxism. Therefore, and since 
Marxism is held to be frankly "atheistic", the answer could not be 
but favourable to liberalism, that is why most people have ended up 
believing that Islam is compatible with liberalism but not with 
Marxism. 
Muslims scholars of the "Nahda" have perceived liberalism as no 
more than a politico-juridical structure embodied in the concept of 
Democracy. The defensive position from which Muslims approached 
Democracy has led them to produce an apologetic attitude to its 
"vis-a-vis". This was reflected in their insistence on the fact 
a 
Islam is much more democratic than democrcy itself.Early Muslim 
views of Europe such as those of the "Sallafiya" were more mature 
and had much more self-confidence '~n Islam, though they too, were 
very impressed by the European model.Seldom, was there any 
attempt to analyse the philosophical foundations of liberal tought. 
M.Akkad tried to some extent but his view had much rethoric in it 
and did not escape the apologetic trend(1). Taha Hussein(2)and Ali 
Abderrazik reinforced the apologetic trend by supporting 
secularism and rationalism. 
Islam and liberalism are far apart. In fact, they are 
incompatible. Seyyed Tabatabai, in his multi-volume commentary 
on the Qur'an, "EI-Mizan" (The Balance)(3), has argued that Islam 
is opposed to the liberal assumption that truth lies with the 
majority rule and that Islam does not allow for unlimited freedom. 
He admits that Islam has allowed man the licence to enjoy all 
pleasant and beautiful things in life, provided he does this in 
moderation.Yet, it would be absur d to conclude from this, or from 
the saying "there is no compulsion" in Islam, that the individual is 
given "Carte Blanche" in Islam to do what he pleases. How? 
questions Tabatabai, can Islam allow unlimited freedom and at the 
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same time require belief in the unity of God, his prophets and the 
hereafter ? 
The meaning of no compulsion in Islam, aims simply to prevent 
the use of force or coercion in regard to belief and matters of 
faith.Some dialectical materialistics} argues the author, claim that 
Islam by contravening the principle of contradiction, which is the 
driving force of all evolution in human history, dooms the Islamic 
community to a "statut-quo". An easy reply to this charge, asserts 
the author, would be a "boomerang" one, i.e.sending back the charge 
to historical materialism which aims at the dissolution of all 
contradictions. The author prefers, however, to answer the charge 
through an epistemological exercise, arguing hence, that "valid 
propositions are of two kinds; relative like those of science or 
reason and absolute values like those of religion. The islamic state, 
being the realization of an absolute value contains the relative 
value (science) but does not submit to it. In other words, the 
Islamic state being "perfect" is in no need for change, meaning that 
if changes occur, they should do so within the Islamic framework 
and not alter it"(4 ).The view of Tabatabai may sound in a more 
earth to earth language as otherwordly and hence, reactionary. We 
believe it is not. In any case, it reflects already a huge change In 
a1titude, a regain of self confidence and intellectual temerity. 
Liberalism as a philosophy is opposed to Islam. Islam is man's 
knowledge of himself through God's revealed knowledge. It includes 
man's knowledge of himself by himself i.e. philosophy. Western 
philosophy in all its various contemporary versions, is 
reductionist, expert and fragmented. Religion at the opposite is 
wholistic, global and divine. That is why religion is much wider in 
its horizon and this also explains why Islam has absorbed all 
philosophical currents under its mantle. No wonder, therefore, that 
while some ~ claim Islam to be liberal, others have done the 
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opposite by asserting that Islam is socialist etc ... As we have 
already stated,lslam is neither this nor that and the Islamic state 
is neither a democraticai- state nor a proletarian one. It is an 
Islamic state. 
Among those who argue for an Arab development within a 
liberal frame is Y.Sayigh. With him we enter a new dimension of the 
problem of development in the Arab world, the technical one.Sayigh 
is not deeply concerned with philosophical issues(5), he is much 
more technically orientated,though he has recently started 
expanding his view on Development(6). It is however one of his 
marked feature.5that when analysing Arab economic issuJ on which 
he has extensively written, he tends to emphasize the supra-
national character of Arab Economy and concentrates on showing 
{ 
all the advantages of an Arab EconomY, Complementarity. It is In 
this respect and in regard to his committed effort to contribute to 
Arab Economic unity that he is worth mentioning. Sayigh thinks 
that the outlook for Arab development, judging by the present 
situatio n and the i ncreasi ng powe r of se paratlst se nti ments 
(irrespective of declarations to the contrary) is very low. This 
assertion is based on the recent conviction that an 
Arab society which is developing in the profound and genuine sense 
and which has a high level of performance, which is just in 
distributing its oppprtunities and rewards, which is free and able 
to provide scope for its citizens to participate in decision 
making,which protects its national and regional security and 
strives to liberate the occupied Arab land and put muscles into its 
national will,is a society worth the sacrifice(7). Of course, nobody 
denies that.Yet,it is only a far away projection and the question 
remains how to achieve\it? 
The study of A.Brahimi, is technically much more rigorous with 
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its global approach to the issue of Arab development(8). It is 
particularly worth mentioning for its socio-political maturity. 
Brahimi makes it clear that we have a choice:either to continue 
fragmented as we are concentrating on the national welfare 
system, FTsing the slogan of Arab unity while living in economic 
subordination; or to try and cons<tt~ct a regional) viable economic 
sector through the restructuration of the forms and relations of 
production, Self-reliance and mobilization of our resources and 
people. That is the only way to reaffirm the depth of our Arabo-
Islamic civilization(9). 
There are many other scholars who are concentrating their 
efforts, trying to understand the present dilemma of the Arabo-
Islamic society and finding ways out and remedies by p rov i ding 
guidance and theoretical insight. 
One such a schola<S Ali Shariati, an Iranian sociologist with a 
deep grasp of Marxism. We have already talked about the atheistic 
character of the Marxian philosophy which is at the origin of the a 
priori hostile Arabo-Islamic attitude in regard to communism. 
There is a second Marxian characteristic to which we would like to 
alert the reader and that is, the mythical appeal which Marxism has 
exerci~ed on the Arab world. This ethical appeal of Marxism resides 
in its humanist feature as an equalitarian doctrine and certainly 
not in its "pseudo-scientism". 
The Marxian social equity aim is very close to the Islamic 
/.. 
"M ussawat", ihere has bee nag reat deal of talk$ about Marx's 
humanism. Ali Shariati, tells us that Marxism is humanist despite 
its declared anti-humanism(10). He quotes many times Marx 
himself to show how clear is the humanist spirit in his 
teachings.Marx wrote in 1847, "that Christianity preaches 
contemptibility, objectness, servility and humility, in short, all 
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base qualities. The prol~ariat refusing to accept this debasement, 
has much greater need of courage, self respect, pride and desire' for 
independence than of bread"(11). Shariati wonders wether the 
author is Marx? That very Marx who ',holds morals to be but a 
superstructure of the "bread" structure? Shariati declares that 
western humanism rests generally on the mythological foundations 
of ancient Greece which considers man as the touch-stone of truth 
and falsity \ Protestantism, Capitalism, Marxism and FaijS1sm are 
four brothers raised in the same household and nourrished of the 
same materialistic creed although now, they have followed each a 
diffe re nt carre r( 12), Hence, according to Shariati, when the 
intention is to deny the west and resist its hegemony; Marxism is 
the most effective weapon and this for no other reason than, if we 
are to borrow Marx's terminology say Shariati, Marxism is only a 
superstructure resting on a bourgeois liberal infrastructure(13) 
Other fClclor..s have also facilitated the Marxist intrusion 
In the Arabo-Islamic world such as colonialism,liberation 
movements, It remains that no matter how much Arab 
consciousness has used western thought in its different versions, 
as a tool for action; western thought in general is alien to the 
Islamic "Umma" and is rejected sooner or later. Marxism has 
penetrated the Arabo-Islamic world during the "Nahda" Arab 
renaissance. It has since, constituted the axial frame of 
revolutionnary Arab thought, it has given birth to the "Baath Party" 
today still dominant in Iraq and Syria, to Nasserism and Pan-
Arabism in Egypt. All this was accompanied with ~tremendous 
amount of political and ideological literature on the issue of 
Marxism and Arab socialism. We will mention but few examples. 
Hence, M .Sibai's thesis on "Arab socialism" is often mentioned 
among the most illustrative Arabo-Islamic apologetics(14). Sibai 
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argued against nationalization in Islamic socialism and provided 
five principles on which stands Islamic socialism:the right to life, 
the right to freedom, the right to knowledge, the right to property 
and the right to dignity. As a reaction to Sibai's thesis, Sheikh Med 
Shaltut, supported Nasser's policy in Egypt and authorized 
nationalization(15). Yet, it is S.Moussa, who is considered as the 
father of technocratic socialism in the Arab world(16). 
There are many others and in order to make a long story short, 
let us say that Nasserism and Baathism are the most elaborated 
forms of Arab socialism.They have contributed to the shaping of 
Arab revolutionary consciousness and have reinforced it. They 
share, however, a common weakness in their philosophical basis 
and that is their non-reliance on Islam and their preference for 
"Pan-Arabism" in the struggle for self-determination. This is not to 
say that the authors of these movements ignored Islam.We have 
already quoted Nasser in that respect. As for the Baath founder M. 
Aflak, his Christian faith has not prevented him from paying tribute 
to Islam.Hence, in his theoretical thesis, he has noted: "I believe 
that Islam possesses a magnificient moral experience and 
a tremendous human aspect which can enrich the Islamic 
people and their culture. Islam is a revolution that can 
only be understood by revolutionaries. Further on, he adds, a 
momentous event occured in our life with the coming of 
Islam, an event of both national and human significance.1 
do not believe that the Arab youth gives it enough 
importance and I do not find them concerned to study 
Islam in depth.1 believe that Islam can enrich our life both 
t theory and in practice"(17), This may help to understand the 
genrAi of Aflak and his success in mobilizing Arab masses. 
Baathism like Nasserism has failed to achieve Arab unity and Arab 
development. They nevertheless have much merit in guiding the 
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Arab world to unity and increasing its political consciousness. 
The leftist debate has since haunted the Arab mind.C.Maqsud, 
one of the most outspoken representative of that current has 
resumed the crisis of the Arab left, and has defined it in terms of 
the erronous attitude of Arab thinkers vis-a-vis communism(18). 
This attitude, entertained by an Arab inferiority complex, has 
prevented the Arabs from understanding Marxism. 
Socialism, asserts Maqsud, without an international,self-' 
sufficient statu~ 7 becomes a mere political speculation, whose 
socialist directives can be applied without thereby endangering any 
of the basic prevailing non-socialist systems. This 
attitude, continues Maqsud, has led to a tendency 
negative 
towards 
accommodating traditional conservative forces. What is needed 
therefore is a re-thinking of our leftism, a strenghtening of the 
ideological foundations of Arab socialism. Emotionalism 
toward communism is a sign of the lack of self-confidence. It 
leads to the loss of confidence by Arab masses in the 
leadership of Arab left. 
Communism in itslDiamat" version has become the enemy of 
the Arab left. It may well be, says Maqsud, that pOlitical life in 
the futu re wi II consist in a struggle between a 
stagnant reaction and a stagnant communism on the one 
hand, pitted against the vital forces that work for 
progress(19). One could not be more rightly anticipating since 
the author wrote his essay in 1960. This is how political 
lit!erature in the Arab world has interpreted socialism~ this was 
the dominant view of Arab socialism during the 1960's. 
Let us see what is happening today and how this view has 
evolved. In a recent work, A.Abdelmalek has dealt With~his 
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issue(20L He starts by pointing out the conceptual ambiguity 
surrounding contemporary terminology and terms such as: 
Nationalism, third world, etc ... These concepts, he dismissed as 
confusing and suggests instead of nationalism 
"nationalitarianism" which he defines as a phenomenon in which 
the struggle against the i mpirialist powers of occupation has its 
object, beyond the clearing of the national territory and the 
independence and sovereignty of the national state, in that 
reconquest of identity which is at the heart of "renaissance" 
undertaken on the basis of fundamental national demands. The 
world,notes Abdelmalek, is conceived in Europe's image~ whatever 
does not conform to it, is rejected as an el~ption. Abdelmalek 
suggests instead of "Third World", a tricontinental league, at the 
image of the famous trilateral American Commission, whereby 
non-aligned countries from Asia, Africa and Latino-America would 
form a coalition or a "front" against imperialism. 
Abdelmalek believes that Marxism represents a critical 
sy.,nthesis of British political economy, German idealist philosophy 
and French utopian socialism. He quotes Mao, in joining theory and 
praxis,advocates self-reliance as a global encompassing dynamic 
and declares openly that he does not adhere to any rigid orthodoxy. 
What is of importance to him, is the civilizational strategy which 
should mobilize the tricontinental front in the struggle against 
imperial hegemony. Abdelmalek, inspired by Nasser, develops a 
theory of historical fields "Les Champs Historiques,,(21), where the 
third world is divided into two major circles: One is Asia,with 
China at its centre and the other is the Afro-Asian-Islamic world 
circle with Egypt as the center. 
The role of the Orient in seizing the historical initiative is 
reflected in the shift from Economism to civilizationism. Invoking 
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Mao's famous East wind, the author argues that the Eastern wind is 
prevailing over the western one. We can but sympathize with 
Abdelmalek views though some of his conceptual tools' are no less 
ambiguous than the ones they intend to replace. 
Another author, who has written much about the Arab world and 
its economy is S.Amin. We know how close Amin is to Abdelmalek 
views. Yet, there is a fundamental difference in their outlooks and 
undoubtedly,that of Abdelmalek seems much more equilibrated. 
S.Amin, develops his argument along historical materialism(22). 
He conceives the historical evolution of human society into three 
stages: com mu nitarian, tributary and capitalist(23). His analysis of 
the international system based on the Metropol/satellite scheme, 
conceives historical forces of two sorts: those of revolution and 
those of decadence. The first and indispensable condition for 
development is according to Amin, a total rupture "delinking" with 
the capitalist system(24), Like Abdelmalek, Amin advocates self-
reliance and gives much consideration to the non-aligned bloc,' his 
analysis of the Islamic word is however superficial and deceiving. 
IS there a political economy of Islamic In an article entitled: 
fundamentalism?(25) He 
Kutb's book "Islamic 
concentrates on the analysis of Seyyed 
Social Justice"(26), and shows little 
of Islam. Amin sees fundamentalism on Iy ~an understanding 
extremist interpretation of Islam.Somehow, he seems to consider 
Islamic fundamentalism as the rival of Marxisny~feth, 
believing that the choice in the Arabo-Islamic world is either for 
this or that. Thus, when he raises the question:Does 
fundamentalism possess a viable political economy ?(27) He is in 
fact misunderstanding the whole Islamic issue. It is as if someone 
would ask ~ther Marx has advocated any ritual prayers for his 
fellow proletarians? I do not defend fundamentalism, 11fact, I 
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condemn all forms of dogmatic fundamentalism be they Islamic or 
non Islamic. 
Elsewhere S.Amin,ismuch more promising and less 
objectivistic, for instance, while analysing the Arab Economy 
(28)., He argues that the example of Iran's revolution has proved 
that the Islamic people refuse and reject western forms of 
development without being able as yet to formulate a coherent 
strategy .. He also asserts that Arab Unity is a historical necessity 
and a concrete possibility in the near future .He does not seem to be 
afraid that his argument may sound "non-scientific". 
The attitude of our progressist intelligentsia on the whole, is 
still heavyly handicaped by the materialist dogma.Marxism, like 
any other human philosophy, has a negative and positive potential. I 
agree that the positive potential, judging from its contribution to 
the liberation movements, has been tremendous Yet,as an observer 
has wisely noticed "Marxism is only a ruse of history to 
promote the accelerated Western__..__ ization of people 
who have remained outside until recent times"(29). Such 
a deep evaluation coupled with the similar observation note d 
earlier with C.Furtado,(30) certainly requires a certain alertness. 
This will allow us to consume heartedly the humanitarian soul of 
Marxism which, in our opinion lies beyond materialism, in the 
brotherly e~ualitarianism, a spirit very close to Islamic 
communitarianism, "EI-Mussawat". 
Among western scholars who have studied the relationship 
between Islam and the western paradigm is M.Rodinson. In his 
"Islam & Capitalism (31)" Rodinson discovers no major 
contradictions between the two, except minor points such as 
"Riba" usury and so on ... He finds Islam very rational, much more 
than Christianity and Judaism and concludes thereof that the 
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Muslims can construct their development along the capitalist 
mode of production. Marxist as he claims to be, Rodinson cannot 
conceive of any role for the Islamic religion other than as an 
ideology of class struggle.The Muslim world, he asserts, is 
specific but not exeptional, Hence, it will not escape the laws 
which govern human history (32). Once more. we are back to 
the Marxist deterministic trend. The author of "Islam and 
Eapitalism" concludes that if the Muslim world does not 
confirm to Marxism, it will suffer a severe crisis and the 
consequence will be a detachment of the Masses from their 
traditional faith. There is no other alternative, either 
capitalism and as a consequence Marxism or desintegration(33) 
Rodinson though aware of the deep attachment of the Islamic 
people to their faith, seems to believe that Islam is finished, 
in order to survive,it has to adopt i.e.to compromise and faces the 
modern reality, otherwise, it will lose its adherants. It is as if 
he is analysing the agony of some European political parties, say, 
the French Communist Party. Islam, we ought to remind Rodinson, is 
not a vulgar political program. It is a divine religion and as all 
Muslims, we believe that the deep attachment of the Islamic 
people to their religion is indestructable. 
The problem with Marxist scholar5who have analyzed the 
Arabo-Isalmic world is as A.Kreutz has put it: "in their 
references to the Middle East, one frequently finds that 
their economic and social analysis is lacking or deficient 
and that their knowledge of the full historical context is 
insufficient. There is hardly any feeling of solidarity 
with the working people of the non-western cultures 
and there is definetly not enough ordinary human 
compassion and understanding, their comments are 
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sketchy and occasional and often without the necessary 
connections, either with the logical sequence of their 
own general interpretative theory or the obvious facts of 
social reality" .(34) 
The same sort of intellectual blackmail is uttered from the 
other side of the Atlantic ocean, by B.Lewis(35) who warns that 
the islamic community used as it 
Totalitarianism will not mind in the 
communism before shifting back to 
is to dictatorship and 
beginning a "bite" of 
liberalism. We move to 
examine the opinion of another western orientalist, who with much 
more understanding of the Arabo-Islamic reality, notes that the 
Arabo-Islamic society has a potential for innovation in the theory 
of EI-Fikh, through which the Arabo-Islamic community should 
construct its unity not as a defensive measure against the 
aggression of modern times but rather as a mean) for a genuine 
modern project(36),lslam as a refuge and as a resistant strategy 
can only prepare the way for an Islam historian. The globality 
of the Islamic belief asserts, Berque, is an irreplaceable gift.lt is 
the fire which should enlighten the islamic community and the 
world at large(37). 
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Section three: R.E.S.D . The Legal Dimension 
It is very ironic to see international lawyers arguing strongly 
with each other about the "binding" and "non-binding" character of 
UNGAR's. While, they almost unanimously agree on the fact that 
even the so-called binding rules of international law are not 
that binding. 
The most demystifying blow to the binding rules "Jus Cogens" 
has been the recent "Iran's hostages case", where one of the most 
"sacro-saint" of all peremptory norm s of I nternational Law, which 
is "Diplomatic immunity" has been torn apart without much legal 
fuss. 
This could easily lead us to conclude that there is no such a 
thing as an international binding rule. All there is, as Hobbes has 
bluntly yet, correctly depicted it, is a society of wolves biting each 
other in a permanent struggle for survival where only the fittest 
will survive. Indeed, there is no use in trying to distinguish 
between what does constitute an International norm and what does 
not, because there is simply no consensus on what is binding and 
what is not. What might be binding for you is not necessa~~ so for 
me and vice-versa. As R. Higgins would put "The identity of 
international law in areas of pressure from change is very 
much in the eye's of the beholder"( 1 ). 
W.Friedman is wrong in assuming that only the five great 
powers have the will to effectively apply their political 
decisions(2), Small states also have that will; and "will" is much 
more than military might, otherwise, how are we to admit that 
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a small state like I ran could defy the most powerful of all; 
arrogantly humiliate it and get along safely with it ? The problem 
with powerful nations as Morgenthau has wisely noticed it; is that 
they never learn from history except when it complies with their 
schemes(3), 
As to the legal nature of U.N.G.A.R's, particularly those 
promoting development7 We have described the debate on this issue 
as an ironic debate! even in the case of agreement on the right to 
development, would still remain the question of what use is the 
agreement itself to the international community? Recognizing the 
right of people to development is not going to change much to 
the nature of the human society and its basic power oriented 
structure. 
In other terms, the recognition by the international 
community of the right of people (states) to development is not In 
itself a concretization of that right into a reality. Development is 
something which does not need United Nations aprobation in order 
to become a reality. Hence, it is something which comes first and 
then imposes itself on the U.N. frame. 
It is like in Domestic Civil Law where a new born child 
comes first and is legalised after; that is registered in the civil 
convenant. Why then the need for legalization? In the case of 
, ' 
the child, legalization is necessary as a social recognition for 
an eventual legitimation when the child reaches maturity. In the 
case of development, legalization is necessary as a pre-
legitimating step. 
Logically, third world states should wait until they achieve 
development and then request legitimation. In requesting now the 
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legitimation of their right to development, they are running ahead 
of time and inviting other nations to recognize something which 
does not exist yet. Hence, the refusal of the "Developed nations" to 
comply with their demand. 
Looked at from the third world perspective, the same issue 
presentS itself in a substantially different manner. The third world 
states have achieved political independence and have become 
members of the United Nations entitled to the same rights and 
duties as all other nations,that is to say, the new born child has 
been legalised.Having reached maturity, he is being denied 
leg1j timacy.This does not seem to make much sense. 
We will come back to this point later on, let us now examine 
the different interpretations of the right to development as 
provided by the legal schools. 
I. The Anglo Saxon School and 
The Right to Development. 
As we have seen earlier, the movement which has led Europe 
and America to the prominent position of leadership in the world is 
the scientific revolution. In the field of legal studies, this has 
produced what one may call "Legal Scientism" a sub branch of 
that more general positivistic Vienna school. Kelsen emigrated to 
America where he established the reign of the pure theory of law. 
In England, the disciples of Austin produced the "Fitzmaurician 
School", which has it that the judge does not make Law but simply 
applies it(4), This old orthodoxy is still dominant in the Anglo-
American legal tradition (5). Yet, it is today challenged vigou rously 
by scholars who conceive law not as rigid rules but rather as a 
purposive legal process(6), 
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The Anglo-American school interprets the right to 
development as mainly a human-right; that is a right of 
individuals rather than states.Why? The answer encompasses a 
combination of many elements running from positivistic 
formalism to purely ideological reUlOric. 
First, it is held that law as a purely technical device should 
not concern itself with meta-juridical values whether political, 
economical, or else ... The notion of development because of its 
unlimited scope runs across the spectrum of social sciences and 
causes formidable difficulties to the legal discipline. As a 
result,legal efficiency's sake requires us to keep away from it. 
Second, and here the ideological element expresses itself 
clearly the right to development claimed by third world states is 
a serious threat to the cherished individual liberty. In focussing 
on the right of people (states) the third world's claim challenges 
the emminence of liberalism as the ideology of the free world and 
hence, advocates the triumph of socialism. 
As for the first point, the best anglophone critique of the 
notion of the right to development as a right of state elaborated by 
International Development Law, comes from Professor 
Schwarzenberger(7), It may be useful in this respect, to examine 
Prof Schwarzenberger view on International Law before looking at 
his opinion on this matter. 
Schwarzenberger sees International Law as a normative system 
which does not condition but is instead conditioned by the rule of 
force. International Law expresses according to him, power 
relationships instead of regulating them(8). Hence, International 
Law is powerlaw (naked or disguised). It is also a rational Law of 
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reciprocity. It could be a law of coordination but it is a law in the 
proper sense only in the first two cases. The three categories of 
law mentioned above coincide in Schwarzenberger's view with 
ideology - reality - utopia, examining the emerging International 
Development Law, Scwarzenberger urges us to limit our 
understanding of International Development Law to International 
Economic Law (a sub-division within the general IPL). Unless we do 
that, we are going to blur the relationship between Lex Lata and 
Lex Ferenda. {he new terminology brought in by third world 
lawyers is highly exposed to ideological missuse and is 
dismissed by Schwarzenberger as "academic irrelevancies"(9). 
It is up to those who want changes in the International Legal 
Order to prove the effectiveness of these changes. Schwarzenberger 
raises strong reservations about the meaning of Development. What 
does it mean ? It is too vague; then, he goes on to describe the 
proponents of an International Development Law as optimistic 
idealists who rely on Dubious sources, "Soft Laws". Their 
argumentation ignores the real international power structure and 
their main ~al is a departure from the rational and realist law of 
reciprocity,.' the rise of majority ru Ie at the United Nations tells us 
Schwarzenberger affects the appearances rather than the reality of 
the power game. The author ends his appraisal of 
International Development Law with some interesting remarks, for 
instance, he outlines the need for: 
a) A rigourous definition of development, 
b) A critical attitude towards governments who speak on 
behalf of states, elites, groups, etc .. , 
c) A critical attitude of the common western origins of 
apparently irreconciliable western and eastern ideologies, 
Schwarzenberger concludes by asserting the validity claim of 
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the orthodoxy in Benthamite terms :"The greatest hapiness of 
the greatest number has not done too badly across 
millenia before their unasked development"(10). He thus, 
urges for the re-establishment of a Non-Development 
Law.Schwarzenberger claims to be neither pessimistic nor 
optimistic (foreword or backward looking). 
In his view, he is a scientific lawyer and his approach is in the 
terms of his disciple :"down to earth, practical and 
realist''(11)' This approach is assumed to be free from national 
self interest and the effect of power politics. It just happens 
however, that this view coincides with the conservative stance of 
G. Britain at the international level and is thus, far from being 
value free. In regard to the Benthamist device, the greatest number 
which Schwarzenberger has in mind has certainly nothing to do 
with the three billions of people who are from the non-western 
world. It may seem easy to dismiss urging legal changes as non-
existent, ignore them and indulge in self-conceived comfortable 
legal formalism. "The old ways, as Falk has put it, are 
simply not working and the sooner we can allow ourselves 
to acknowledge the reality the better the chances are that 
we can do something about it"(12). 
The best illustration for the second point is provided by 
,....-
Prof.Weil's article: "toward a relative normativity in 
International Law"( 13). Weil argues that International Law, 
which he, borrowing from Guggenheim, defines as the sum of 
juridical rules which regulate international relations; is sick, 
primitive and imperfect. All this, tells us Weil, is due to the 
ineffectiveness of the sanction mechanism. Nowadays however, 
another imperfection is added by the emergence of a certain 
"duality of norms" in International Law; soft versus hard laws or 
"coutume civilisee et contume sauvage". The result being the 
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inability of the lawywer to delimit the edge of normativity i.e. the 
point from passing non-juridical norms to juridical ones(14)) 
Weil recognises that International Law without higher moral 
values is a mechanical body with no soul and he also admits that 
the new norms brought progress which no one could deny, He is 
ingenious enough to deny it however< 15}. Weil is afraid 
that the idea of the international community or that of a "juridical 
consciousness" may become codes easily manipulable by the third 
world states toward the negation of the inherent pluralism of the 
prevailing order which is fact third world states 
perceive as egocentric. Hence, Weil does not support the new 
norms which, according to him) are blurring the distinction 
between "Lex Lata-Lex Ferenda". To attempt today the 
elaboration of the international order of tomorrow, is, according to 
him, like making ,a key which does not open the lock it intends to. 
That a SOCiOIOgJe-~argues Weil, analyses the infinite "nuances" of 
the reality is one thing read acceptable; but that a lawyer 
who depends on the simplifying riggiJr attempts the same task is a 
different matter altogether.read 
has failed to condemn Iran in the 
unacceptable. That the I.C.J 
hostages' case, is a mistake 
which Prof. Weil} regrets deeply because that was according to 
him, the ideal opportunity to reinforce the higher norm some sort 
of the ground norm. Yet pursues Weil, it is not too late. Lawyers 
have plenty of time to react and reject the new norm because 
they are the source of the dilemma of International Law(16). 
There is not much to say about Weil"s heretical article, efept 
that it is as Abi Saab has seen it : a yearning for a lost 
paradise(17) or as Falk has describedit: a slightly hrsterical effort 
to stop the World-from changing(18). One cannot help to see in 
Weil's argument and his pairs that same ~~tlttorical redundancy 
which so often is reprgched to third worldts lawyers. Doyen 
170 
Charvin has quiet nicely denounced in a Bunnuel's title, "Le 
Charme Discret Des Courants Doctrinaux"(19). The realism 
which Occidental Lawyers so proudly exhibit in their 
confrontation with W~ rest of the world is no more than a Cynical 
accommodation to vmher's tragedy. The tendency to ignore the 
genetics of international rules, pursues Charvin, is part of a cold 
logic which seeks to isolate the norm s from their causes. 
Occidental international lawyers, asserts Charvin, who are so 
fond of transpos,itions from domestic law, never resort to the 
principle of "Nemo audditur propriam, turpitudinem 
allegans ... ", nobody can claim rights for himself from his own 
wrong doings~instead they resort to the ineffectiveness of a law 
which through their doctrinal discourse they contribute to 
weaken(20). 
Occidental lawyers and this apply to lawyers in general are in 
reality caught into that old dilemma of the two duties "to make a 
living and to make a meaning". In order 
are obliged to stick to the main-stream and 
to ensure the first, they 
defend the statut-quo 
and those constitute a majority everywhere. Those who dare to 
challenge openly the mainstream and search for a meaning without 
ignoring the imperative of a living are quiet few. 
In regard to the Anglo-American school and its conception of 
the right to development. P.H. Brietzcke(21) has attempted to 
, . 
reconcile the dichotomy inherent to the right to development 
"people versus states right". Brietzcke tells us that the only hope 
to overcome bureaucratic manipulation is through a patient 
educational process,· prudence and moderation are required if we 
are to avoid misperception. Pragmatism cautions that the NIEO 
requires the redistribution of the international political surplus. 
Yet a peaceful bargaining for first and second world's support for 
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the rig ht to development necessitates a lessening of North-South 
and East-West tensions. Commenting the multiplicity of normes in 
International Law, Brietzcke refers ironically to those "normes 
sauvages" which some wish to domesticate and others to annihilate 
and suggests that the U.N. norm, s on the right to development 
should legitimately be called "Organic Laws" desi3rted to remedy 
the "Lex-imperfecta" prevailing today with the condition that they 
should specify concrete duties correlative to the rights being 
created. This, the author believes, will resolve the pertinent issue 
of auto-interpretation(22). 
The rig ht to development according to him has run far ahead of 
meage r ph ilosoph ical fo u nda tio ns and a se nse of directio n. 
Increased consensus would in fact result only if political 
arguments wl!re converted to an intellectual dialogue; into ideas and 
ideals with the power to move people. Behind all claims to rights 
are beliefs, stresses Brietzcket,these beliefs could provide a sense 
of directiO,y to the right of Development(2 3), Development as a 
human ri*" is . so depressing a prospect in the face of so much 
promise that1\tJplifting conclusion from A. Sakharov seems 
1\ 
appropriate : "the ideology of human rights is probably the 
only one which can be combined with such diverse 
ideologies as communism- social democracy- religion, 
technology and those which may be described as national 
and indigenous. It can also serve as a foot-hold for 
those who do not wish to be aligned with theoretical 
intricacies and dogmas and who are tired of the abundance 
of ideologies,none of which have brought mankind a simple 
happiness.The defense of human rights is a clear path 
towards the unification of people in our turbulent world 
and a path towards the relief of suffering"(24L 
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II. The French School &the Right to Developrnent 
France has always strived for self-determination. Indeed it is 
known as the homeland of revolution and French people every where 
and when would like to have it their own way. The Gaullist 
tradition has recently given a new impulse to this French feature 
which many would call "French Chauvinisme" but are not we all 
chauvinistic somehow ? 
In the field of legal theory, French lawyers were prompt to 
raise the right to development to a new legal discipline(2 5). The 
school of Reims under the inspiration of the late Ch. Chaumont 
has played a leading role in stressing the urgency for the 
recognition of the right of people (states) to development. Other 
current such as the work of M. Miaille have contributed to the 
elaboration of a critical approach to the study of law(26). 
Today all what relates to the right of development is 
assembled under the title "0 ro it International Du 
Develo ppement" ,abreviated as "0.1.0" .International Development 
law; tell us, French lawyers, is the sum of principles, rules 
institutions and procedures which aim at the development of all 
people and states(27). This integrated corpus derives historically 
from the colonial legacy through what once was known as "L e 
Droit D'Outre-mer" or "Le Droit De Cooperation", from that 
.historical affiliation, it has inherited three distinctive 
" 
" 
features:(28) 
1) The geographical object "Third World States", 
2)A certain "paternalism" reflected in the notions of Aid , 
"SGP", etc .. 3) 
3)A positivistic methodology. 
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Virally stresses that 0.1.0. is nothing more than a part of 
international law(29). Yet, he distinguishes in the 0.1.0. three 
relevant remarks(30) : 
1) 0.1.0. is a sum of legal principles but not rules of law. 
2) O.I.O.is a synthesis of political negotiations. 
3) 0.1.0. is a conflict of interests. 
Virally denounces what he calls "juridicentrisme" whether 
that of third world lawyers who tend to interpret "U.N.G.A.R." as a 
source of law; or that of western lawyers who speak of a "soft-
law" which obliges without being an obligation(31). Hence, he 
concludes by ironically inviting the lawyers to turn into politicians 
and concentrate on the rich promises of political bargaining rather 
than stick to a juridit~ical formalism which is not going to be met 
by political practice anyway. 
M. Flory for his part has devoted most of his work to the 
elaboration of "DID", which he conceives as a purposive law IOU n 
Droit De Finalite' a law which has a finality and aims at 
achieving a clear cut objective,the eradication of under-
development(32). DID, stresses Flory, rejects "Pharisaisme" and 
the good consciousness of a certain "J u r id ism e" which ignores 
the essential(33), Flory distinguishes three main legal currents in 
regard to 010(34): 
1) Positivistic Orthodoxy , who sees DID as a distabilizer, 
those are according to Flory Lawyers who do not want to take 
side~in what they conceive as a metajuridical debate. 
2) Third world radicalists who either reject DID as a mean for 
further underdevelopment or else conceive it as an effective new 
International Order. 
3) Accommodationists or reformers who believe DID to be a 
genuine instrument for adapting International Law to new economic 
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international realities and an efficient platform for the promotion 
of a North-South dialogue based on equal participation and 
multiculturalism(35), He sees himself as an adept of this last 
current. 
Pellet also would fit along this third current(36). He criticises 
both conservatives and radicalists who engage in wishful thinking 
more than in analysis of positive International Law. International 
Law is not an ideal philosophy or some kind of mental games "J e u x 
De L'Esprit". It is rather a guide for concrete social action(37). 
Pellet wants to grasp International Law in all its infinite variety 
and refuses the positivistic black or white dictum(38). In between 
legal and non-legal norm s, there exists a twilight zone of 
normativity which a lawyer cannot simply ignore. Hence, he 
advocates a dynamic role for the lawyer which beside guarding the 
norm, should aim at bringing about understanding and encouraging 
agreements~ "soft-law" is the mean which allows for the 
integration of changes which are now unavoidable. UNGAR's hence, 
play a tremendous role as a source of inspirc:tion and moral support. 
They create international expectations, exerc~pressure and provide 
vehicles for changes. In addition, they orient the development of 
International Law in the form of "Statut-nascenti" and as a 
delegitimizing device of international rules which are 
outdated(39). In any case, concludes Pellet, those rules, soft as 
they may be, are bette r than no ne. Th us, 0 I 0 constitutes a 
compromise in regard to the global perspective of the NI EO(40). 
G.Lacharriere for his part, proposes an interesting 
transposation between law as "ut"; that is as an ought and law as 
"quia" reality(41), All existent international laws are "ut" laws 
disguised in "quia" laws. This is his famous realist notion of the 
international legal policy(42). Lacharriere stresses that third 
world proponents of a "naked" undisguised international law of 
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development is a good lesson of realism given by the third world 
lawyers to the orthodoxy. What in Lacharriere's view constitutes a 
weakness in the third world argumentation is in fact that they have 
nothing to offer in replacement of the old liberal device which ties 
automatically the pursuit of individual interest with that of 
national egoistic claims(43). 
In 1979, at a workshop organized at the Hague Academy, on 
the right to development at the international level) It was argued 
by French scholar that the right to development has surprised and 
shocked certain habits of thinking in te rms of Aid and Cooperation 
and has aroused defensive reflexes in the west(44). 
H. Sanson, argued that the right to development is better 
understood when looked upon as a meta-juridical notion. It 
consists in resolving the app~arant contradiction between being 
and non-being through a synthesis which he labeled: "etre par so i 
et par autrui", being by one-self and by others( 45). 
The secretary general of the academy, emphasized the 
distinction between "Mechanist utopia", which is based on the 
belief that all you need in order to solve international 
problems are complex procedures 
formulas; and "prospective utopia" which 
advance of history without ignoring the 
and abstract technical 
IS a motivating force, in 
difficulties ahead which 
can only invite to much committement and willingness to outpass 
obstacles(46). He reaffirmed the notion of the international 
community against its critics and argued that community and 
conflict go hand in hand. Their inseparability, Dupuy thinks, can 
only indicate to us how the 
strategical asset to the 
s ta b iii ty (47) . 
international community ideal$ is a 
project of peace and international 
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III. The Maghribean School and 
The Right To Development 
The U.N. charter expresses clearly the will to employ the 
international machinery for the promotion of the economic and 
social advancement of all nations(48). , this has 
remained a shimerical slogan despite three decades dedicated to 
what Pellet calls the ideology of development. 
The third world move towards a NIEO, has already altered the 
old bipolar balance of power. The decision making process has been 
shifted from the security council to the general assembly. A whole 
series of resolutions voted by the general assembly are now 
despite what some may think, effective legal means for 
cons~1cratirs the right of all nations to equal sovereignty and 
deve lop me nt( 49), 
This has started with resolution 1514, December 1960. 
abolishing "De Jure" as well as "De Facto" colonization. A decade 
later, this was followed by successive resolutions stressing the 
right to development for all nations. In October 1970, resolution 
2625, was adopted by consensus as a declaration on the principles 
of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation 
among states in accordance with the U.N. charter. It stated openly 
that all states enjoy sovereign equality and have equal rights and 
duties~ they all are equal members of the international community; 
not - withstanding differences of economic, social, political 
aspects or else. 
After that, came the program for action toward a new 
international economic order (Resolution 3201 May 1974). 
President Boumedie:'ne of Algeria, opening the special session of 
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the GA on that occasion declared: "In the eyes of the big 
majority of mankind, the prevailing order is as much 
unjust and outdated as the old colonial order from which 
it derives. The dynamic to which this system maintains 
itself and grows is that which makes the poor poorer and 
the rich richer. It constitutes the major obstacle to the 
development of all third world nations"(50). 
The same year, a charter of economic rights and duties of 
states was adopted by the general assembly (Resolution 3281 XXIX) 
Dec 1974), despite the strong reservations of western nations. 
Article one of the charter proclaims the sovereign and indeniable 
right for every state to choose its economic, political, social and 
cultural system in accordance with the will of its people without 
outside interference, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever. 
Article two, recognises that every state has and shall freely 
exercice full permanent sovereignty, including possession, use and 
disposal of all its wealth and natural resources and economic 
activities. 
Since then, third world states have been advocating global 
international negociations in order to find remedies to 
international problems;hunger and starvation, underdevelopment 
and technological monopoly, wealth distribution and terms of trade. 
In Dec 1979, a resolution (34/138 and 139) was voted by consensus 
at the G.A. calling for global negociations in regard to international 
economic cooperation and the promotion of development. As a 
result, a series of meetings were held here and there( 51 ). 
Dialogues were promoted universally as well as regionally(52). On 
the whole, however, not much has been achieved yet. 
What we have labelled the "Maghribean School" in regard to 
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international development law is the contribution of the Arabo-
Islamic society to the right of development at the international 
level. Indeed, the Arabo-Islamic society has played a leading role in 
the clearification of what the substance of the right to 
development is about. As Bedjaoui has put it "The Algiers 
Charter of Human Rights, The Algiers Summit of 73 and 
the U.N. special session "74" will remain as the Bandoeng 
of development"(53). 
In 1976, an international colloque was held in Algiers on 
"Development and International Law"(54). Lawyers from the two 
coasts of the Mediterranean gathered to examine international 
vital issues such as: The sovereignty of states, the right to 
nationalization, the legal validity of U.N.G.A.R's etc ... 
Analysing the charter of economic rights and duties of states, 
F. Anjak, pointed out that the charter constitutes from the legal 
point of view, a prototype of the new mode for the elaboration of 
international rules (55). All in all,and in the words of the late 
Algerian Foreign Minister Benyahia(56) "The colloque achieved a 
critical assessment of the role of law avoiding mystification and 
establishing the vanity of any attempt which aims at the 
separation of the rules of law from its basic supports which are 
the economic social and cultural realities", 
In 1982, the North-Africain lawye rs participated to a' "t a b le-
ronde" at Aix en Provence on "Normes Formation in 0.1.0"(57), 
Their contribution came as a reply to Prof Weil's article. 
Prof Mahiou stressed the fact that the new norms incarnated in 
DID have brought a new dimension to the legal discipline. It is true, 
reckons Mahiou, that DID is still ambiguous and lacks a sense of 
179 
direction but this should not lead us to conclude that there is a 
duality of norms. In reality the norm is one but the content IS 
double. What we need henceforth in order to unify that content is an 
international social law(58), 
Pr.Benouna's reaction was much firmer in regard to Weil's 
argument/Whom he describs as fighting a rearguard-battle (Un 
combat d'arriere garde)(59). International Law, stresses Benouna is 
not sick, it is the mind of some lawyers which is really sick. Our 
interpelation of international law is not a matter of scientific 
curiousity.lt represents for those concerned a question of quasi-
existence in regard to their future in the international society(60). 
In reality, notes Bernouna, the change is not appreciated in the 
same manner between North and South. There, it is a question of 
economic restructuring and adaptation. Here, it is a question of 
survival,identity and existence(61), 
Prof Benchikh has denounced "DID" as the law of 
underdevelopment(62) a meanS' for further unequal dependency, 
neither SGP in trade nor the euphorism of the Lome' convention has 
altered in any way the foundations of the unequal exchange and the 
overwhelming exploitative character of the capitalist international 
Division of labour(63). As a consequence Benchikh has urged for a 
"Deconnection" from the capitalist system. He has labeled it 
"Distantiation,,(64) Self-reliance according to him is the key 
factor in any genuine move towards the achievement of an 
integrated development. 
M Bedjaoui is probably the most outspoken voice in the 
Maghrebean School. His appeal for a NI EO has been constant and 
uncompromizing(65). The novelty of our times, asserts, this author, 
resides in the divorce between law and force. Force cannot anymore 
imposes its rule. The third world, remarks Bedjaoui disposes today 
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at the international level of a rule for the creation of law. That 
rule is the rule of the number (majority) as opposed to the rule of 
force. Beyond all academic speculations lies the fact that 
international development law which is the sum of UNGAR's, is an 
authentic development of international law. Those who advise us 
today, remarks Bedjaoui, not to go too fast and be in hurry are in 
reality afraid of losing their priviledged positions in the 
international stratum(66). 
Development is an international problem of the first order and 
that is why the inter-dependence and solidarity of nations must not 
take for ever the shape of the horseman and his mount(67). The 
right to development is a right "erga omnes" to develop. It is a 
right claimed by a state which is "master in its own house" and 
which is opposable by it towards all others and at the same time it 
is the right of the state as an active protagonist in international 
relations and represents a right over others namely a right which 
may be exacted by that state from other states as well as from the 
entire international community(68), 
There is an organic link which ties together state sovereignty, 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources and the right to 
development in the same chain, which is OnIY~SOlid as each of its 
individual links. If the "right to development" link is especially 
frail, the same will be true of sovereignty itself(69). Bedjaoui 
does believe in the necessity for a consensus between North and 
South. Yet, he expresses his fear that such a fragile hope cannot 
stand the latent and omnipresent pulsions of confrontations(70). He 
has strongly advocated the establishment of an international fund 
for food resources in order to fight and eradicate starvation and 
hunger and give an effective substance to the notion of the common 
heritage of mankind and international solidarity(71), 
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Assessment. 
In this chapter, we have examined the notion of development 
both as a concrete economical model (liberal or socialist) and as 
legal right stipulated either by international economic law (the 
Anglo-American School) or by International Development Law 
(French and the Maghribean Schools). In regard to the first 
dimension, We have shown how the Arabo-Islamic society rejects 
the western empirical and material reading of political economy 
and its hegemonic pretentions. In regard to the second dimension, 
the right to development, we are offered almost the same dualistic 
alternative in the form of an orthodoxy and its critical opponents. 
Of course this is not to say that· the Anglo-American school 
represents the liberal option while the French school represents 
the radical. It is true as has observed Slinn that the Anglophone 
School does not have the equivalent of "Chaumont's Reims" and is 
on the whole more conservative(7 2). It is also adamantely 
positivistic (73) Yet, it is nonetheless true that among all schools 
including the Maghribean there,.. are liberals and radicals, 
positivists and legal analysists etc ... As Pellet would argue; after 
all Mahiou is not very far from Weil(7 4), The same could be said of 
Bedjaoui and Falk,Flory and Benouna, etc .. What is mostly lacking to 
the Maghribean school is a sense of historical identity. All its 
proponents have in their majority received their education from 
western (French) Universities and are in a way or another 
dependent on French leftwing ~~Jt~oric. (7 5) It is therefore no 
surprise to find them unaware of what ties them to their 
prestigious Maghribean jurist ancestors :Ibn khaldun, Ibn rushd, 
sha'ttibi.etd76) . 
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The so-called "Orthodox" positivists exhibit a cynical realism 
which tends to present reality not as it is but rather as "they" see 
it should be. For those enlightened mentors of a "Scientific Law" 
third world clai ms for justice and equity are mere lOW 0 r d s" (7 7), 
DID is a "m irage", UNGAR's are not international rules. Law is 
whatever they say it is, the source of all instability at the 
international level. As if there has ever been a stable international 
order which is today threatened by the third world's claim for a 
right to development. 
There is undoubtedly in the positivistic stance a paranoic 
nostalgy for the golden age of the "Law of the Civilized" and the 
undisputed reign of the imperialistic rule. The neutral and value 
free appreciation of the legal norm which is claimed by the so-
called scientific lawyers is bold r~t~oric. Indeed orthodox as well 
as their critics are fully engaged in the political debate, the former 
no less zealously than the later~ everyone seems dedicated to 
serving his political aims. Hence, if there is no doubt that the 
orthodoxy serves well "the Reagan ~ Tatcher alliance". there is ) 
also no doubt that the French School serves well the "G a u II i 5t 
t ra d it ion", or that the Mag ribean School serves well; what one 
may call the "Boumedien's legacy". The question, the real one, is 
who cares for the legal norm ? It is true, generally speaking, that 
the weight of academic opinionj as Gautron has put it, is rather low 
compared to power-politics. Yet, if lawyers continue to believe 
that it is not their business to make law, then one is entitled to 
wonder how and who is going to care about the quality of the legal 
norm ? We do believe with Carty(78) that law is what lawyers 
produce and the sooner this is admitted the better it is for law. 
Law tells us Touscoz(79), even as a highly developed technic is 
an art rather than a science and the role of the lawyer is to 
appreciate the sufficient effectiveness and legitimacy of the rule 
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in a given society. Law asserts Touscoz catches only a glimRse of 
~ 
reality and that is why if we are to avoid "Juridicentrisme'f need to 
grasp more fully the legitimacy of meta-juridical elements, such 
as, political-science, sociology, ethics etc .. (80) 
Realists contend that the legal executory norm cannot be 
changed unless the basis on which it stays i.e. "the power 
relationship" is modified. Now, how can we possibly modify that 
power relationship ? Realists would contend that it is only 
possible by making war. Hence, their discourse of law is a 
discourse war, a Hobbishan permanent state of war, that is why 
Schwarzenberger prefers to define international law as a law of 
war "De Jure Belli" rather than" Jus Pacis"(81). Thus, according 
to the realist, law is a coercion, full stop. How do the coerced 
conceive of that coercion ? or, is that coercion legitimate ? 1hese 
are questions out of the legal scope of the realist. 
When Kelsen confronted this problem, he solved ~y legitimizing 
the coercion through his hypothetical "groundnorm". He never 
bothered to define "legitimate coercion" other than by hypothetical 
assumption because that would have led him to destroy the whole 
legal pyramid. The legal pyramid of the realist is thus shaky and in 
terms of Quadri, cannot simply stand on its feet(82). 
The rule of law as a legitimate coercion is a legal rule in a 
state of grace "Divine Law". Hence, in Islamic legal theory 
1 
legitimacy is the essence of law. It supersedes legality while in 
western secular thought the order of priority is reversed. As a 
western lawyer has put it, "there is a long haul from 
legitimacy to legality"(83) 
The aspiration behind the right to development and the NIEO 
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perspective is the logic opposite to that of the realist. The 
modification of the rule is seen as the first step to the 
"delegitimation" of the power realtionship and its eventual 
modification. Hence, it is a discourse of peace and dialogue for the 
achievement of pacific changes. It is the whole difference between 
"-
--a "Coup a la Pinochet" and an accession to "legitimate coercion a la 
Allende". 
What the Magribean School is trying to make clear is that 
development is a global dynamic process. The legal discourse can 
hope to reach a definition of development only if through legal 
humility. It welcomes a process of integrating metajuridical 
insights and norms. Development has been defined as a "dynamic 
process of cumulative liberation and transformation of 
psychological, political, economical, cultural and social 
structures of a given social group, according to its own 
rythme and values"(84). In order to grasp that,the legal 
discourse needs to drop its technical arrogance and commits itself 
to the enforcement of the developing task.Laroui believes that the 
Anglo-Saxon school is moft than any other weak,vulnerable,given to 
circumstances;it is the school which complains about the lack of 
Arab'sunderstanding for its objectivism and its sympathy towards 
Arab desseins while in fact it is the most open of all schools to 
ideological priori's(85), Djait, on his part believes that it is the 
French school wh<hj/, rather, is the most paternalistic of all and that 
Parisian intellectuals are savant dictators(86). As we will 
attempt to show in the next chapiter,it is the German school which 
seems to be the closest to the Arabo-islamic thought. The Arabo-
Islamic lawyer will defend international law to the extent that the 
later defends his right to development. If the western orthodoxy 
refuses him that right, then he will advocate a total rupture with 
that orthodoxy, to each his own law and to each his religion. 
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Some have asserted that a total "rupture" from the dominant 
international system is an"utopia". History proves them to be wrong. 
China, Albania, USSR have all in a form or another exerced autarcy 
and it did not fail them if we are to judge by their positions today. 
Of course, people today talk about the heavy price that a "Stalin~" 
has required from his people. Naturally everybody knows that 
development requires a high price in a form or another(87) and only 
the people concerned are to decide whether it is worth the price or 
not. The point is not that we favour "rupture" instead of 
international cooperation but rather that we ought to keep our 
distances from an international order which consider us as 
"undesirables", 
A widely spread tactic among western lawyers for denying 
third world states the right to development and advocating instead 
a policy of human rights, is their ~cautious stance towards what 
they generally conceive as dictatorial third world 
governments(88). 8edjaoui replies to this charge by pointing out 
that it is because we are denied our rights and participation at the 
international level that by extension, our people are denied in their 
turn their rights and participation within our national legal 
o rde rs (89), The individual pu rsu it of the rig ht to deve lopment vis-
a-vis his state can only weaken the state and would occur at the 
very time when the state needs to be strengthen if it is to 
neutralize the negative effects of the international factors which 
counteract its collective development. In laying claim to 
development, the individual would undermine the state at a time 
when the later is engaged in the attempt to secure him that same 
development(90), This may sound like a "trickle-down" theory of 
rights but it remains nevertheless true to most extents. As long as 
international development or international economic law is 
understood only as a corpus concerned with the technical task of 
1~6 
.; 
providing legal tools for the conduct of international business) h 
will remain useless and will keep the tension between North and 
South. Before you do business with some body, you need to 
trust him and be confident about his good faith. DID should aim$ 
precisely at bringing about that trust and all along sets the 
technical ground for an effective equal partnership at the 
international level. 
Before closing this chapter, it is worthwhile to stress an 
important aspect in the right to development and that is its 
theological aspect(91 ).As the pope has himself asserted, 
development is the new name for peace. The influence of the 
Christian ethic on DID is undeniable(92). DID is indeed a theology of 
liberation. It can only be understood as a global right pertaining to 
the state as well as to the individual(93). It is an undeniable right 
of all nations without discrimination and only dialogue and 
international negociations could lead us to a workable definition of 
what development as a right is about. I would like to stress that 
DID cristallizes in my opinion that Hadith which I have quoted 
earlier and which preaches "that a believer is not a true 
believer until he likes for his brother what he likes for 
himseJf"(94). Those who have been reading international law as a 
discourse of force and war will no doubt continue to do so, despite 
the repeated lessons of history or transcendental wisdom. They 
have long before doomed the human specie to a gloomy fate. 
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Chapter four 
The Right to Cultural Self Determination 
Section one: The Cultural Dimension In 
International Law 
The expression "legal culture" is emerging today as we witness 
a growing interest in the role which culture plays in the formation 
of legal norms(1). This trend has come as a logical consequence ~of 
the failure of Positivism as a legal methodology. Does one need to 
forget that the first objectif sought by positivistic normativism is 
the purification of legal theory and its deculturalization? The 
result obtained by a half century of zealous positivism has been 
exactly the opposite of its declared intent , that is , a culturally 
biased legal theory which has driven the modern society and with it 
the entire international community to a deadline. 
It is our thesis, that only a revived legal culture based on 
dialogue and communicative action will, allow legal theory to 
regain its vital function of guidance and mediation between the 
different components of the social life-world. 
Culture, following GeertE, could be defined as a historically 
transmitted patttern of meaning embodied in symbols through, 
which men communicate and develop their knowledge about life. (2) 
The sphere of culture has been avoided by lawyers who under the 
spell of positivism have come to see it,. as that nebulous 
amalgamous alien to the legal world. Hence, despite the recent 
emphasis on cultural rights at the international level particularly 
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within UNESCO'S frame, very little as yet has been achieved in D,e 
rehabilitation of culture within the legal sphere. 
One of the major obstacle still lying ahead in that respect is 
the obssessed positivistic exigeny of a functional definition of the 
phenomenon of culture. The positivistic jurist rejects whatever is 
not reducible to fragmented and standardised calculable norms. 
Attempts have been made to cla~ifY cultures linked with legal 
systems "open and close legal systems,,(3). At a more general 
level, scholars have divided cultural systems accordc(ling to the 
traditional classification: sub-national, national and international 
systems. 
No doubt, the comparative democratisation of legal and 
intellectual life in the twentieth century has led to an important 
increase in sensitivity towards a better understanding of the 
cultural world. As wallerstein has put ii-: " it is elementary to say : 
this new intellectual focus on "culture" comes out of 
disillusionment with the efficacy of transforming the world by 
altering its economic or political forms,,(4) . Culture, hence has 
become the alternative through which "the intrusion of human 
agency is intrinsically possible and 
hope.,,(5) 
constitutes a source of 
In the field of international law, Scholars have long ago 
advocated a culturally inspired theory of international law : 
Professor Northrop has long ago argued that "the cultural values 
and moral principles of the world in all their living law diversity 
and unity, rather than precedents, power politics, momentary 
expedients, constitute the realistic basis for resolving the 
ideological conflicts and disturbanc~es of our world by peaceful 
means .,,(6) 
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Recently, at the proceedings of the American Society of 
International Law, scholars have commonly argued that the world 
legal system is based on trans-cultural values(7). YASUAKI for 
instance, observed that Western, methodology is still 
overwhelmingly dominant in legal education. Textbooks and cases 
cuwrently in use are "Westernocentric" and bear little mention if at 
all to non-Western values and contributions. The academic 
situation of international law has re~Lned overly conservative and 
has failed to liberate itself from traditional "Eurocentrism". Hence 
what is required of international legal education is the 
development of a deep sense of / and commitment to 
intercivilizational law.(8) 
In similarly provoking term s, Professor Dorsey has criticised 
Western ethnocentrism and its hegemonical nature. He has warned 
that such s .tuborn egocentrism will inevitably lead to nuclear 
Armageddon.(9) Dorsey asserts firmly that the nation-state 
system is a cultural system which has failed to distribute power 
and wealth equitably among cultures and that it is high time to 
relinquish all such hegemonical world frames and adhere to a 
genuine universal democratic society whereby everyone is entitled 
to his freedom and free to justify it in terms of his preferred 
theological or philosophical traditions(1 0). Dorsey is convinced 
that a cultural priori is necessary to the formation of a human 
cosmopo I itarian society, he th e re fo re appeals fo r a cu Itu ral 
pluralism, at the international level. 
To meet these appeals from western scholars, third world 
lawyers are required to retaliate by a similar committment to 
international solidarity. They should strive to free their own 
societies from totalitarianism in all its forms fascism 
dictatorship and religious fanaticism. 
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In this chapter, we intend to argue for the right of~rabo­
Islamic cultural entity to self determination. In order to do that, 
we need to step out from the narrowness of the prevailing legal 
methodology to an extensive form of knowledge. Indeed, it is our 
conviction that legal philosophy as the matrix of all social 
sciences should keep open its doors to reflexive and critical 
thought stemming from its sub-branches and seek in that flow of 
ideas a stimilus to its agonizing methodology. 
Hence, we intend to desert orthodox legal rethoric for a change 
and attempt to establish a dialogue. We will introduce basic 
features of the Arabo-Islamic culture with the aim of provoking 
the reader's curiosity and initiating with him a dialogue on the 
merits and draw-backs of the Arabo-Islamic culture, on means and 
ways to integrate it with the international society and allow 
for its participation to the establishment of viable cultural 
pluralism at the international level· 
I. R.C.S.D: The legal dimension 
It is only lately that the right to cultural self-determination 
has been emphasized in the united nations literature. The basic U.N 
.document in this respect is the declaration proclaimed by the 
fourteenth session on november, 1966 and adopted by the general 
conference on international cultural cooperation. Taken as a whole, 
the declaration tells us, Cristescu, must be interpreted in the 
particular light of the right to self-determination( 11). The 
declaration states in its article one 
- Every people has the right and the duty to develop its 
culture. 
II - Every culture has a dignity and value which must be 
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respected and preserved. 
III - In their rich variety and diversity, and in the reciprocal 
influences they exert on one another, all cultures form part of the 
comma>n heritage of mankind. 
Article V reads as follow 
cultural cooperation is a right and duty for all peoples and all 
nations, which should share with one another their knowledge and 
skills. 
Hence, in order to promote international cultural cooperation; 
the g e n era I con fer e n c e has f e I t com p eire d ; fir s tIt 0 s top 
decu Itu ralizatio nand en su re6 P rote ctio n to th e trad itio n nal 
cultures which are the object of much pressure exercised upon 
them by the consumer culture of modern times and second, to 
advocate acculturation as a mean to promote international 
cooperation. 
One method of fighting against the standardization of ways of 
living and mass consumption is by preserving cultures. The universe 
of machines and amenities of civilization, while they lessen men's 
labour and guarantee a well being to which only a priviledged 
minority could formerly aspire, do not offer men a justification for 
living, there is no need in here to go over all the ravages which has 
provoked the introduction of the modern way of life in traditionnal 
societies such as those of Africa and Asia, We have given the 
reader a glimpse of that in the last chapter. What· we feel 
important to stress in this section is that the right to cultural 
self-determination is an indivisible part of that global principle of 
self-determination. It is the part which has been neglected because 
of the erronolJ s guidance provided by the western paradigm in 
regard to which every thing is reducible to economic terms: How 
much ? never have Africa and Asia been so miserable than when 
they have met colonial Europe, the fact that the promethean ethic 
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never succeeded in gaining the off-share of those lands is an 
eloquent indication of the vigour of indigenous cultures and their 
ability to acculturate modernity and adopte it. ~II they need in 
order to succeed is sympathy from the international society and its 
willingness to accept them as they are and recognise their right to 
cultural self-determination. The cultural rights of a people mainly 
involve the power to maintain, revive, develop and make known to 
the world their own values. In doing that, they develop from time~ 
to time$! patterns and values which are universal in their spirit. 
Hence they enrich the commun patrimony of mankind and contribute 
to the advancement of international norms. 
International law, we are told( 12), is formed by the actions 
and customs of separate sovereign states. Their actions always 
reflect their fundamental inner aspirations and needs which are at 
their turn but a reflection of their ambitions and own legal 
traditions. These traditions will form a customary international 
pattern and will eventually be recognised as a customary 
International Law. This process is the one that has set up 
classical international law in the 16ikand 17th centuries. Only 
then, it was restricted to a small club of nations. As Virally has 
put it :"We always have a tendency to favor contemporary 
juridical systems which have achieved a high degree of 
technical advance such as those derived from the Roman 
law" (13). Or as Verzijl has stated : "The prevailing 
international law of our days is mainly of western 
European origin"(14), 
Today, it has become obvious that International Law cannot any 
more stand on this. exclusive European basis, without losing 
o 
further ground with internatinal reality. Jenks, has rightly 
observed :"In today's International Society, a world in 
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which the distribution of power and influence has 
changed radically~ International Law can hold the 
allegiance of the world at large only by establishing its 
claim to continuing acceptance of the legal thought of 
widely varying traditions and cultures. It can no longer 
be a project of a group of closely related systems but 
must rest on the broader intellectual foundations 
necessary to give it worldwide authority"( 1 5), 
As a contribution to the promotion of a multicultural 
international legal system) Jenks has attempted to domesticate 
that rebellious concept of sovereignty within a wide and universal 
pool of legal traditions and has shown that it is possible to arrive 
at a global consensus in regard to the principle that all 
sovereignties should abide by the law(16). Hence, sovereignty has 
a meaning only if defined and regulated by law. It is easy for 
realists to dismis~ Jenk's vision as an idealist utopia and to argue 
that domesticating sovereignty in theory is one thing, doing it in 
practice is quiet something else(17). Jenks is aware 
of the trap which consists in his endeovour to make lawful, "T h e 
source of lawlesness". Jenks realises very well that sovereignty 
is a juristic mo nstrosity and a mo ral eno rmity( 18) . Yet, it is 
probably because of that arrogant nature that he has embarked on 
with his team in an adventurous expedition which consists in truly 
emancipating the international community from all short-sighted 
and egocentric strategies and directing its efforts towards a new 
law of mankind(19). 
The cultural dimension is the last one to be empha5 ized within 
the scope of international law. In 1971, Bozeman launched the 
compaign by publishing her "the future of law in a 
multicultural world,,(20). It is somehow ironic that an 
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American scholar should draw attention to the missing cultural 
dimension in international law. It is after all America which best 
incarnates cultural imperialism at the international level. 
II : International Law in a Multicultural World 
In 1983, under the auspice of the United Nations university a 
workshop was held at the Hague academy on the future of 
international law in a multicultural world(21), 
The general secretary of the academy opening the workshop, 
summed up its agenda by the following question: Does the 
emergence today on the international scene of cultural systems 
other than the western which prevailed so far, endanger the future 
of international law, or on the contrary, does it add new currents to 
it making it richer? 
Scholars from different parts of the world attended the 
workshop. Some argued that the emergence of Multiculturalism has 
provoked a deg radation of internation~1 "norms"(22), while others 
less sever9- talked about a slight "infation" of norm s(23). Virally 
contested the argument of "degradation" and asserted that 
multiculturalism's effect on international law vary depending on 
which international issues we are dealing with(24). The 
universality of norms is much more admitted In the fields of 
science and technology than it is in personal status. 
Bozeman argued ironically against multiculturalism(25) and 
refused to admit the notion of the right to development making hers 
implicitely Galbraith's thesis about underdevelopment being due to 
religious totalitarianism, she claimed that development cannot be 
granted as a right to those who keep sitting on a motionless 
outlook.(26) 
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Bedjaoui remarked that the question is wrongly put. It is not 
multiculturalism which degrades international law but rather the 
opposite. Multiculturalism is still only an aspiration put forward 
by the majority of the people in the world while international law 
is still particularist.(27) There has,argues Bedjaoui, never been 
any golden age of international law and the question is how and 
what are the means available so that our multicultural world can 
progressively influence international law and convert it into an 
instrument of peace and development(28). 
Once again we face the everlasting dichotomy that we have been 
facing allover this study; that between the one and the many, 
between the individual and the state. At the cultural level, this 
expresses itself as the right of every culture to be itself while 
keeping its duty towards other cultures. Sanson, has attempted 
during the 1983 workshop, to provide theoretical ground for 
conciliation. He, thus, distinguishes three modes for the 
coexistence of cultures Pluralism of tolerance,. Pluralism in 
laicity,. Pluralism of equality. All three serves the common aim of 
mankind, that of elaborating an ultimate law for the human 
spect~) 
Nonwithstanding what has been said at the Hague workshop, the 
tension on the cultural dimension has risen at the international 
level and reached its culmination with the US withdrawal- from 
UNESCO- followed a year later on by that of Britain. We are told 
that the reason for this Anglo-saxon withdrawal is part of a 
counter-offensive operated by the alliance "Reagan Tatcher" at the 
international level in order to stop the thirdworld's stronghold on 
the united nations, machinery(29). It is ~bvious that UNESCO under 
the leadership of the "Muslim M'boy" militated for a truly 
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multicultural international order. Its efforts for the establishment 
of a more equitable informational order and its committment for 
the preservation and the promotion of cultural values other than 
those of the western world were not to please the hegemonical 
tendencies of the capitalists. 
III . Toward A Sociology Of International Law 
There is today a widespread concern about the failure of law as 
a technical device for the resoI1J1(()f\ of social conflict and 
political disputes at the national as well as the international 
levels. The emergence of the phenomenon of "terrorism" is the most 
cynical evidence for what one could call the "legal crash". 
No doubt, this is due in part to the power-politics discourse so 
overwhelming in our environment. As Habermas has observed, the 
spiritual situation of our age is qui~te sad(30). Indeed one looks in 
vain around for a peaceful corner to retreat to. Law serves force 
instead of educating it. Such seems the device of our jurists 
scientists. l)3pecialization, fragmentation expertise and even 
science fiction have so penetrated the legal mind that one does not 
feel any pride to claim himself a Jurist. A critical reassessment of 
the concept of law has thus become an urgent necessity. One may 
notice that a trend is emerging allover the academic world with 
the declared aim of demystifiying legal positivism and reviving 
natural law tradition through communication and social interaction. 
In regard to International Law, which Grotius sought as a 
motive for world order, for he openly states: "that the law of 
nations is a more extensive right, deriving its authority from the 
consent of all, or at least of ~any nation". We have already quoted 
his contention that positive law can never enjoin what natural law 
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fo'bide) nory( forbids what the lattr permits. Therefore, to the father 
of the discipline and to his forunners7 International law can never 
be reduced to a set of technical devices. What the dicipline 
requires today is as Berman has advocated : an integrated 
jurisprudence including all legal schools and currents. "A 
jurisprudence which will emphaisize that law has to be believed in 
ioorder to work. A law which involves not only reason and will but 
also emotion, intuition and faith. It involves in brief a total social 
commitment." (33) 
A sociology of law is hence, more than ever needed in order to 
dismantle the positivistic strangulation which todays reduces 
law's effect and annihilates its essential fu~tion:' that of social 
mediation: This sociology, Third world nations have attempted to 
elaborate it through the law of development "DID" but as we have 
r 
seen earlier? It has met with staunch refusal from the western 
nations for whom, a true sociology of international law is first and 
foremost a sociology of power and force. 
International law can be enhanced as a mean for world peace 
and international cooperation only if as Schachter has urged: 
"international lawyers adopt a theological approach which goes 
beyond appearant facts to examine the values and ends served by 
the law: An approach which enables us to understand more clearly 
the purposive and instrumental role of the law".' I n order to do that 
asserts the same author, we should interpose no a priori limit 
about what is relevant"(34). 
" 
Indeed, how are we to understand in/expressive norm sand 
formulaes without a clear consciousness about their teleological 
real substance ? For instance, Carty has noted "western legal 
theory greets the concept of econ~omic self-determination on the 
inalienability of economic national identity as essentially 
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incomprehensible unless translated into a formal concept of legal 
freedom, the exercise of which is intrinsically limited. Or, adds 
Carty, third world nationalism looses its identity as a political 
entity and submit<7 in the North-South context to a logic of 
co nfo rm ity and i mita tio n II( 3 5), \Jv,hat is the aim of a critical 
sociology of international law ? we have already answered that it 
is the elaboration of truly multicultural international law, the 
promotion of dialogue and communicative action among the 
members of the international community. Only such a peaceful 
course could open wide the doors of international cooperation and 
orient the activity of the international community toward the 
resolution of those perpetual and shameful pleas of mankind such 
r' 
as : hunger, malnutrition, illetracy and fanaticism. 
In order to reach an international consensus on the priority of 
such an action, we need to reach first an understanding on the 
limits of our national interest. Bnly by consenting to sacrify our 
egocentrism and by showing our readiness for self criticism and 
self control can we overcome our tragedy and rise to the level of (]v 
free and civilized human being. The pedagogy which we intend to 
extract from a critical sociology of law is that which will help us 
to admit otherness and teaches us ways of living together in peace 
and harmony. , 
The need for such an internatinal legal culture is widespread 
among scholars(36) and lawyers. Prof.Bull's testimony is the one 
which stems directly to mind, so deeply attached and committed he 
was to international harmony. Bull has devoted all his life long to 
the service of our anarchical society. Never has he ceased to look 
for means and ways for overcoming our chaotic dissara y and 
establishing order and justice.Among other things, he has advocated 
the cultivation of a cosmopolitan culture as the basis for 
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international detente and solidarity. This nascent culture conceived 
as a mean conducive to that kantian premise of a pacified 
international community, needs according to Bull, to absorb non 
western cultural values if it is to be genuinely universal and 
provide a foundation for a universal international society.(37) 
Such a culture exists already in the form of a diplomatic 
international culture and what it needs in order to be universally 
agreed upon, is to integrate~hird world's cultural affinities and 
/1 
values which present a universal inclination and are conducive to 
agreement. Of course, the so called realist lawyers would openly 
mock such idealist themes. To them, international law is that 
technical instrument which comes in rescue whenever' naked power 
does not swiftly conclude. Besides, they would argue as Brot3w~ie 
openly does " that international law consists in self-limitation and 
that is something which third world states can not perform 
because of their fanatical nationalism and religious bigotry.(38) 
They seldom confess, as a moderate lawyer like Fraod!39) would 
do, that the real destructors of international law are the super-
/. powers whose eagerness for power and wealth has no equal. \hose 
are the ones who set the bad exemples by stampling on the law 
every time their interest is at stake. What one can say to these 
people, is to remi nd the m of that po u nderous reflectio n of 
lauterpacht :" Mtj3.y dear man, do not give yourself airs, we are all 
realists in the sense that we wish to avoid a frustration of our 
effort, we are all envious to find out what things actually are. We 
all wish our endevour to be effective and not futile " (40)' 
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Section two: An Epistemological Inquiry: 
Contemporary Thought and the Crisis of Truth(1) 
Today, which ever intellectual horizon you choose to scrutinize 
you often, will end up facing a crisis of some sort. Every single 
aspect of our social life, everywhere, seems to be in crisis. We 
have crisis in the world economy, we have it in both industrial 
and non industrial countries. We have crisis of nationalism and 
internationalism We have also crisis in every social discipline 
from politics to legal thought, to Arts and Aesthetics. We have 
simply a global crisis, that of knowledge. What does man know? 
That is the question. It is indeed a question which has haunted 
man since earliest times. Does man know sufficiently how to cope 
with his extravagant nature or does he stand blind in a cave 
deciphering reflected images and distorted truths? Though as old 
as man himself, the question is still with no agreed upon answer. 
It will probably never reach one. Unless wisdom comes in rescue. 
Man has turned and returned this question in his mind, 
providing it every time with assumptive answers and deserting 
them one after the other. The more he discovers the falseness of 
his premises the more he has been eager to come up with more 
fantasist ones.Crisis is then, the dominant mood everywhere., In 
America, Europe or what we have been reU/Bring to as the western 
world as well as in the rest of the world. How then does the so-
called developed West cope with its crisis? To know that, we need 
to review western contemporary critical thought in all its variety. 
Hence, we will examine what the Frankfurt school has to offer in 
this respect, particularly ~ leading mentor J. Habermas. We 
will also examine the hermeuneutics of H. Gadamer and L. Strauss. 
To end up this epistemological excursion, we will attempt to cover 
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post-structuralism in France M. Foucault as well as F. Lyotard 
and the deconstructionism of J. Derrida. Once this is done, we will 
move on to compare our findings with the Islamic episteme. 
I . The Frankfurt School 
In their respective books, D. Held(2) and T. Bottomore(3), 
introduce us to the Frankfurt school. It all started with the 
establishment of the Institute of Social research of Frankfurt 
university in February 1923. The aim of the institute was to 
encourage social and philosophical discourse and help to clarify the 
epistemological ambiguity caused by the distortions of Marxist 
tought through determinism and positivism. In other terms, the 
theory versus praxis issue which is central to the Marxian Diagram, 
was at stake and thus, was at the origin of the coming into 
being of the school. In 1922, tells us Bottomore, Felix Well, the 
son of a wealthy merchant, organized in the summer a seminar 
attended by Lucaks(4), Wittfogel, Korsh, and Pollock, outspoken 
members of the Hungarian and German communist parties. The 
theme of the seminar was a re-interpretation of Marxism. As a 
result of this seminar, the institute was founded and Horkheimer 
was appointed as its first director. The Frankfurt school, through 
the works of Horkheimer, Adorno and H. Marcuse wanted to give a 
shape to a critical theory in the field of social science, theory 
through which, the society can grasp the source of its instability 
and resolve the di.§quilibrium between what is and what, ought to 
be. Hence, the method used by the Frankfurt school is much more 
globalist than that of political economy. The school is Marxian in 
its foundations, one of its declared goals is to reconstruct 
historical materialism. 
In order to achieve that, Horkheimer and Adorno start by a 
critic of positivism in its larger scope. The positivist philosophy 
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with all its branches, such as the scientism of the "V i e n n a 
Circle", -the empiricism of Berkely and Bacon, the value freedom of 
Weber. Positivism in this sense, is based on the assumption that 
what ever does not exist as a matter of fact is of no relevance to 
science as such(5). In the terms of M. Schlick, the mentor of the 
Vienna Circle, positivism is not the denial of the existence of a 
transcendant external world. This would be just as much a 
metaphysical statment as would ~its affirmation. Hence, the 
consistent empiricist does not deny the transcendant world, but 
shows that both its denial and affirmation are meaningless. The 
empiricist does not say to the metaphysician: What you say is 
false, but says I do not understand you(6). Hence, positivism for 
the Frankfurt school is biased and cannot assess its own 
objectives or the purpose for which it is employed; since it 
regards the world as a domain of neutral objects. The social 
world is objectified throug h the adherance to the principle of the 
uniformity of nature. Thus, nature is considered as a potential 
instrumentality and knowledge restricted to a technical 
function. In other terms, the ideals of positivism, objectivism 
and value freedom, are themselves no more than values and pre-
give n hypoth eslPs wh ich orie nt scie nce toward a me ar17-e nd 
rationality championed to the exclusion of all others. Positivism is 
thus reductionist and leads to "decisionism and instrumental 
reason"(7), 
The rise of instrumental reason is, according to the Frankfurt 
school, not to blame per-se. It is the organization of production 
(capitalism) which threatens the survival of society .. 1he sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries,nurtured the principle of individualism, 
the pursuit of rational self-interest and overtime" /\his was 
transformed into labour productivity figures and measured by 
standards external to man. As a result, propositions concerning 
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productions, organisation, the use of science and techniques are 
judged true or false according to Jether or not the means to which 
they refer are suitable or applicable for an end which remains 
unquestioned. 
I 
This has led in H.Marcuse terms to the "0 n e - dim ens ion a I 
man "(8) and as consequence to a decline in critical thinking and 
the split between theory and practice. According to the Frankfu rt 
school, Marxism, in its "Diamat version" of the second 
international, has taken a positivistic drive and is in need of a 
reconstruction.Before going any further, we may need to review 
some of Marxf arguments as he has himself formulated them: "Th e 
first historical act of man, tells us Marx, is the 
production of material life itself.,(9). "Labour, says he, is in 
the first place, a process in which both man and nature 
participate and in which man of his own accord, starts, regulates 
and controls the material reactions between himself and nature. He 
opposes himself to nature as one of her own forces) ,,4etting in 
motion arms and legs, head and hands, the material forces of his 
body in order to appropriate nature's production in a form adapted 
to his own wants. By thus, acting on the external world and 
changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature"( 1 0). 
"Nature, continues Marx elsewhere(11), for the first time 
becomes purely an object for mankind, purely a matter of 
utility and ceases to be recognized as a power for itself. Here, 
the theoretical discovery of autonomous laws appear merely as 
a ruse so as to subjugate nature to human needs, whether as an 
object of consumption or as a mean of production"(12). On the 
other hand, tells us Marx(13); in the social production of their 
existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations of 
production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their 
material forces of production. The totality of these relations of 
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production constitute the economic structure of society; the real 
foundations, on which arise a legal and political superstructure 
and to which correspond definite forms of social consciouness. 
The mode of production of material life conditions the general 
process of social) political and intellectual life. It is not the 
consciousness of men that determines their existence but their 
social existence that determines their consciouness. As material 
wealth grows through the capitalist mode of production, the 
worker finds himself increasingly devalued, alienated from what 
he produces. He may build a luxurious palace but he himself is ill-
housed or even homeless, so that, what he creates with his own 
hands appears to him as a hostile alien object belonging to others, 
not to him. The worker, hence, is alienated in the very act of 
production. He does not work because he feels the need for work but 
in order merely to exist. Work becomes a sacrifice of the self. 
The direct relationship between the worker and production 
produces intelligence, but for the worker, it, produces, stupidity 
and cretinism. Thus, it is quite obvious, stresses Marx from the 
start, that there exist a materialistic connection of men, which is 
determined by their needs and their mode of production and which 
is as old as man himself. This connection is evertaking on new 
forms and presents a history independently of the existence of any 
political or religious nonsense, which would specially hold men 
together(14). 
The contradictions inherent to the capitalist mode of 
production will grow and blow up the whole capital structure. 
The Proletariat will rise and through revolution will resolve all 
capitalist contradictions, abolish the private ownership of the 
means of production and realize the communist society, Then and 
only then, tells us Marx, when the enslaving subordination of the 
individual to the division of labour and with it the anti-thesis 
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between mental and physical work has vanished; when labour is no 
longer a mean of life but has become life's principle need} Only 
then, will it be possible completely to transcend the narrow 
outlook of bourgeois right. Only then will the society be able 
to inscribe on its banners: from each according to his ability, to 
each according to his needs(15). 
That is how Marx sees human history. His interpretation has 
succitated an incomparable interest and has in a way or another 
influenced since then theory and practice in general. There is no 
doubt, that Marxism has succeeded in denouncing the inhuman 
character of the liberal ethos and that.J we believe, is the real 
merit of Marxism. As a revolutionary philosophy, it has failed to 
requestion the logic of the capitalist system. Marx never hides his 
admiration for the historical progressist role of the 
80 urgeoisie(16). What he denounced was the aggressivity shown 
by the bourgeois and their disdain of social justice. Marx 
attempted to recapture the dynamic of the accu mulation process 
within a more egalitarian frame. His desire was to introduce a 
little humanism into the inhuman capitalist machine. He never 
declared that, we know he could not, because he wanted or 
believed his doctrine to be an objective science. 
This obvious weakness in Marxism has led to an everlasting 
quarrel among Marx's disciples on what really Marxism means. 
After Marx' death, Engels ended the Marxian doctrine by introducing 
the concept of IMotion".Engels has defined motion as the mode of 
existence of matter:The inherent attribute which comprehends all 
changes and processes occuring in the universe(17). Lenin on the 
basis of Engels's "Anti-duhring" was to lay down the foundations of 
what was to become "Soviet Diamat", the petrified mechanical 
interpretation of dialectical materialism, what was to form the 
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philosophical core of Soviet theory and formalized as the orthodox 
official Marxism, was to close down the theoretical prospect of 
revolutiona ry synthesis(18). 
Scholars have observed that : "Replacing the concept of 
practice with that of motion is the first step along a 
path which denies humanity an active part in 
transforming itself making it instead the puppet of 
mechanical law of nature and hence, history"(19), Althuser 
came along and in order to reinforce the diamat version, 
suggested a new reading of Marx(20). He divides Marx into two., 
the young idealist and the mature scientist and bases his division 
on a certain epistemological "co u pure ", break which he believes 
is clearly visible in Marx's writ~ings"Early and Late"(21). 
Althusser, therefore argues for a "Diamat" path to structural 
determinism and declares Marxism to be "anti-humanist"(22). That 
has !ed Benoit to the conclusion that A l'l'll U c se r' c.' j-e ad I' ,..., (; "f ~ Ii! CJ ,., .. I J ..... .J lid VI i\ l ... \I."" .. 
is accomplice of positivistic idoalogy(23) .The deterministic and 
positivistic reading has killed Marx. Marx, argues Benoit. is dead 
because of Lenin~, Stalin, Althusser and all those who have 
confiscated his thought and converted it to a fanatical, intolerant 
Praxis(24). 
Rose has made that even more clear by stressing that 
socialism and capitalism though quite different,have nonetheless, 
in both societies led to an incorporation of science into close 
correspondence with the technological and ideologica! needs of 
state and industry. In this sense, the critique of scienco 2S the 
domination of nature (man) may also bt~ generalised as describing 
the situation in both the USSR, Europe and N. America(25). Today 
argues Rose, the domination of mlture and bureaucratic rationality 
are said by many to represent an almost irreversible trend I 
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potentially disastrous. Only a clear recognition of the present 
alarming situation in the actual phase of imperialism will make it 
possible to develop the forms of genuine science and demystify the 
paper-tigers "technology and modern science"(26), This brief 
overview of the Marxian patrimony and its doctrinal quarrel v\las 
felt necessary in order to follow Habermas thinking and his 
criticism of Marxism. Since this has been done, let us now move to 
him. 
Jurgen Habermas his project is to strive for a critical 
theory in social science. It is as Held has put it :"a struggle for 
the critical soul of science and the scientific sou! of 
criticism,,(27) The rise of technocratic consciouness with its 
disintegrative effect on the public sphere is to be stopped if 
emancipation from domination is to remain a project of humanity 
and we cannot stop it, unless, we restore to philosophy its due 
right as a theory of guidance.As long as our guidance is trusted to 
instrumental reason, we are going nowhere. Instrunlentf.i.I rsa~jon 
leads to self ief!active impovrishment. What WGnt ,<vreng then 
with "vestSI'll tli.-.ught and philosophy ? To s!lO\lV us the distortion 
that has corrupted western thought, Habermas invites us back to 
review vvith him Hegelian and Marxian premises for there lies the 
source of modern western thinking in both its idealist and 
materialist forms. 
Habermas goes back to Hegel's lectures of "Ye n a" to derive 
Hegel's definition of the self "i" as personality and as 
universality and also his definition of labour as that' 
specifically human mode of relatino to ,~ nature including 
language, labour and family ,desig nated as symbolic 
representations. The labour process and interactions mediates the 
relationship subject/object, each in its own vvay. Hegel conceived 
them as diverse forms of the for mativ8 process(28). Therefore, 
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Habermas present us with his thesis : "a radicalization of my 
thesis would read: It is not the spirit in the absolute 
movement of self-reflection which manifests itself in 
among other things, Language,labour and moral 
relationship, but rather, it is the dialectical 
interconnection between liguistic symbolization, labour 
and interaction which determines the concept of 
spirit"(29), It is quite obvious that ijabermas remains close to 
Marx. What he reapproaches to Marx however, is his little 
consideration of the "intraction" element In his dialectical 
analysis. Although Marx, says Habermas, takes account of both 
labour and interaction in the form of relations of production; he, 
under the unspecific title of social praxis reduces communicative 
action i.e. interaction, into instrumental action(30). Because of 
r 
this,Marx' brill'ant insight into the dialectical relationship 
between the forces of production and the relations of production 
will quickly be misinterpreted in a mechanistic manner(31 L 
Epistemologically speaking, Marx locates the learning process 
associated with social evolution in the sphere of labour and the 
result is a slide toward positivism because labour is equated with 
pu rposive ratio nal actio n which refe rs e ithe r to instru me ntal 
action or rational choice. Habermas attempts a reconstruction of 
Historical Materialism by breaking it into pieces and reconstructl·ns 
it so as to make it reach its original goal which is the unification 
of the knowledge process. 
In his analysis, Habermas puts Hegel and Marx on equal 
footing.Neither the "Yena" lectures nor the German idealogy have 
clarified the dialectical relationship adequately. Hegel has 
neglected the object, Marx the subject. Hence, they have both 
failed to reach the truth. The self-formative process of spirit as 
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well as that of our species,essentially depends on and requires the 
development of norms which could fulfill the dialectical 
relationship in an interaction free of domination, on the basis of 
reciprocity allowed to have its full and non-coercive scope(32). 
In his "knowledge and human interest", Habermas points out 
to a genuine self-reflection where "knowledge for the sake of 
knowledge comes to coincide with the interest in 
autonomy and responsibility.Reason then,would obey an 
emancipatory form of cognitive interest which aims at the 
pursuit of reflection"(33). 
l-labermas distinguishes three forms of knowiedge 
interest:(34) technical - practical - emancipatory. Only in its last 
form, that is as emancipatory knowledge interest, does knowledge 
shows interest in a reflective appropriation of human life, an 
interest in reason, in the human capacity to be self-reflective 
and self-determining. This is a cognitive interest with a quasi-
transcendal statuS4 Every consistant epistemology, tells us 
Habermas is caught in a vicious circle from the beginning and that 
is: the faculty of knowledge is itself already a form of I~nowledge. 
Hence it cannot achieve its goal since it is that goal already. This, 
tells us Habermas cannot be solved by the problematic{,lmethod of 
pre-given unproblematic assumptions because this only lead us to 
distorted knowledge(35). 
Marxism, through its emphasis on the objectification of 
knowwledge J has ignored the epistemological justification of 
social theory. Man is not only a tool making animal, he is also a 
language using one and learning takes place in both these two 
dimensions of man.The result of the learning process are passed 
down in cultural traditions which provide the essential resources 
for social movements. "Authentication" is the process by which 
people who have been the victims of distorted communication 
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try to free themselves by a re-interpretation of their essence. The 
ultimate test of ideas is the degree to which they are accepted 
and utilized in practice. The belief that the object of scientific 
knowledge exists independently of the epistemological framework 
on the basis of which they are investigated and that we 110 longer 
understand science as one form of knowledge but identify 
knowledge with science. In a word, scientism is the belief of 
science in itself(36). Hence, methodology has replaced 
epistemology in western thought after Kant 
Today,says Habermas, revolutionary self-confidence and 
theoretical self-certainty are gone and not only because in ,the 
meantime bureaucratic socialism has turned out to be a worst 
variant of what was to be fought against. Technocratic 
consciousness has emerged as the dominant form of political 
reality in the capitalist system(37). Politics does not any more 
bear the constructive goal of a betterment of the society. It has 
become orientated toward the avoidance of risks and the 
eradictions of dangers. The legitimation system of advanced 
capitalist society tends to become a systemized technocratism 
based on the ability to guarantee a minimum level of welfare and 
sustain economic growth(38). 
The Proletariat has been dissolved in the capitalist society and 
domination as the other side of alienation has been divested of its 
undisguised expression. Recalling Marx's Methaphor, Haberrnas 
contends that if the critical mind or the head of revolution is still 
there, the heart, i.e. the proletariat is not anymore; alienation has 
been deprived of its palpable economic form "Misery and class 
exploitation" and has been replaced by socio-technical 
manipulation and consumer's sovereignty(39) 
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Habermas asserts that liberation from hunger and misery does 
not necessarily converge with liberation from servitude and 
degradation for there is no automatic relationship between them. 
State regulated capitalism suspends conflicts and makes them 
latent. Yet, political economy is an insufficient basis for the 
development of a theory of society(40), What is the solution then 
? Habermas proposes his theory of communicative action and the 
elaboration of a universal pragmatism(41), 
II. Universal Herrneneutics 
Hermeneutic is the discipline concerned with the art of 
understanding texts.1 n Gadamerian Herme ne utics, understand i ng 
must be conceived as a part of the process of the coming into boing 
of meaning, in which the significance of all statements (texts, 
arts, etc ... ) is formed and made complete(42). Gadamer denounces 
the pretention of method in regard to truth. Absolute reason he 
declares is impossible for historical humanity and prejudice is 
unavoidable. Hence, he affirms :"There is undOUb~y no 
understanding that is free of ail prejudice, however much will of 
our knowiedge must be directed towards escaping their thrall. This 
indicates the limitation of method, but not that of science. A 
discipline of questioning and research, a discipline that guarantees 
truth"(43), Understanding in Gadamer's view is not some sort of 
a mysterious communion of souls in which the interpreter 
the subjective intention of the author,' rather it is a fusion 
author's horizon with that of the interpreter. 
grasps 
of the 
Gadamer defines the central task of a truly historical 
hermeneutics as the examination of prejudices and the attempt to 
distinguish between legitimate prejudices and illegitimate 
ones(44), How do we do that? Gadamer does not openly face the 
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question but he indirectly suggests that the solution to that 
puzzle remains somewhere in the commonly shared meanings that 
constitute the human linguistic community(45) In other terms, in 
dialogue and communication. 
Gadamer like Habermas transcends the dialectic of the 
enlightment, subject/object, and as Bernstein has observed(46) 
goes well beyond that to search for the best way to play the game 
of life. In fact Gadamer believes that language is a game that plays 
us (47), That is why prejudice instead of being an obstacle to truth 
is at the opposite the essential pre-condition for it. We do not 
reach truth. It is rather truth which comes to us and happens to 
us :"in understanding, says Godamer, we are drawn into an event of 
truth and arrive as it were too late, if we want to know what we 
ought to believe"(48), We are drawn to the truth by the common 
understanding of our linguistic community and our critical openess 
to tradition.Prejudices reflects our situatedness in time and 
history. They have been driven out from scientific inquiry in 
applying the cartesian method. 
Gadamer rehabilitates prejudices as a necessary condition for 
arriving at the truth. In distinguishing between prejudices that 
make understanding possible and those that hinder it, Gadamer 
suggests an intermediate way between the polarity of strangeness 
and familiarity between tradition and modernity. Hence, he asserts, 
that the "the true home of hermeneutics is the intermediate area 
because both the enlightenment and romantic orthodoxy fail to 
grasp tradition as a freely chosen action of preservation(49). Our 
prejudice is always self-reflective, that is, they reveal us to 
ourselves) they are parts of our life and of our self-understanding. 
Hence, they are legitimate prejudices. False or illegitimate 
prejudices are those which do not meet these criteriDn _ They come 
to noth i n gin the wo rki ng 0 U t. He n ce co ncl udes c~adame r, 
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Hermeneutics is the science which consists in a discipline of 
questioning and research, a discipline that guarantees truth(50). 
Leo Strauss: reading between lines: The crisis of modernity 
according to Strauss is primarily that of modern political 
philosophy(51), As is generally admitted, modern culture IS 
emphatically rationalistic, believing firmly in the power of 
reason. Surely, if such a culture loses its faith in reason's ability 
to validate its highest claims, then it is in crisis. Strauss joined 
his voice to attack positivism and historicism charging modern 
thought of treason vis-a-vis traditional wisdom. In his '5ix 
83says on I?olitical~hilosophy", Strauss tells us, that historicism, 
in the very act of proclaiming that no human thaught can be 
universally valid because of its relativity, advances a thesis 
claiming that which it denies to others. Value judgements which 
are forbidden to enter modern sciences through the front door 
continue to enter them through the back door, that which modern 
science refers to as psychopathology(52). The conflict between 
different values or value systems is said to be insoluble for human 
reason but this as yet,is never proven. If we cannot decide which 
of the two mountains whose peaks are hidden is the highest, cannot 
we decide that a mountain is higher than a mole-hill ?(53). 
In an article entitled "Athens and Jerusalem", Strauss's aim is 
to stop the process of the western decline.He believes that 
philosophical truth has become repulsive and undesirable or as 
he puts it "Intellectual honesty is not love of truth." It is a kind of 
self-denial which has taken the place of love of truth because truth 
has become repulsive and one cannot love what is repulsive. Yet, 
just as our opponents refuse respect to unreasoned belief, we on 
our own part, with at least equal right, must refuse respect to 
unreasuned unbelief. Honesty with oneself, regarding one's unbelief 
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is in itself no more than unreasoned unbelief(54). In fact, seems 
to tell us Strauss, truth has always been not only repulsive but 
dangerous to the society's existence. Ancient philosophers such as 
Plato, EI Farabi etc ... have succeeded in transmitting knowledge of 
truth through a combination of wisdom with the amount of truth 
needed by the society in order to preserve its equilibrium and 
harmony. That is why they revealed their knowledge indirectly and 
in an esoteric style, using either mouth-pieces or writ~jng 
between lines. The whole dilemma of the human society is resumed 
in the conflict between philosophy and religion, i.e, between 
"Athenes and Jerusalem" 
Civilization argues Strauss, needs religion in order to flourish. 
a 
Man is being that can understand to some degree that knowledge of 
evil and good is evil for him.Religion intends to teach him to live 
simply without knowledge.The human being cannot withstand the 
burden of knowledge. Evil is the price for knowledge and hence the 
motivation behind the thirst after knowledge. Had the human 
being not sinned (Adam) he would not have earned his freedom. 
Eve, claims Strauss, is the first philosopher. ~he arose against 
tradition and rebelled and the snake was only half lying when it 
told her that she will become God if she ate from the tree of 
knowledge. As seekers of knowledge, people set themselves in 
permanent opposition to God. 
The Christian belief in the possibility of a synthesis between 
"Athenes and Jerusalem" is responsible for the naive trust in 
modern philosophy. Christianity embraced philosophy as its 
crowning glory, oblivious to the fact that its Queen would become 
soon its vainquisher and 
Christianity.So great is the 
destroyer. Philosophy has vainquished 
belief in philosophy that the modern 
heirs of Christianity continue to cling to the hope that western 
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philosophy could replace God and withstand the death of God. 
Enlightenment is believed capable of establishing good order and 
political bliss. Strauss concludes that social science is in danger 
of mistaking peculiarities of say mid-twentieth century modern 
society, for the essential character of human society. To avoid this 
danger, it is compelled to engage in cross- cultural research( 55). 
III Post structuralism and Deconstructionism. 
In France, Foucault raised almost an identical voice to that of 
the Frankfurt school. Like Habermas, Foucault is disappointed by 
the project of modernity. Modern society is a "disciplinary 
j a i I h 0 use". The on Iy way out is through deconstruction of the 
prevailing discourse and the establishment of a communicative 
action. Foucault has labelled his epistemological thesis as an 
"Archeo logy of knowledge"( 56). He argues for a reconstruction 
of knowledge not on the basis of past tradition as reflected to us 
by documents and history of ideas, but on an archeological 
investigation whereby dynamic monuments of a discursive action 
take the place of the old bureaucratical documents. To carry out on 
his investigation, Foucault proposes an original method and 
suggests a new terminology : Discursive formations, archives, 
clinic. madness etc... Everything that tells you how sick is the 
I 
modern society and how urgent is its need of a therapeutic cure. 
The dissipation of human science is due to teleologies and 
totalisatio ns. 
Foucault attacks strongly the concept of sovereignty which he 
believes is the source of the disciplinary system based on 
punishment and seclusion(57). In order to liberate the society 
from the prevailing lip a no p tic ism" the widespread universal 
technic of coercion, we need to recall the vitality of our archives. 
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The concept of "archive" is central to faucaldian thaught. The 
archive tells us Foucault, is the general system of formation and 
transformation of speeches. Archive does not have the 
archaism and stubborness of tradition and at the same time, is 
not the absence of memory which welcomes any new discursive 
item. It is in between tradition and modernism and it helps to set 
the rules of a practice in which discourses can self-modify and 
substitute independently and regularly(58). Foucault's escape from 
materialism and economism has led him to seek knowledge III a 
reclused field of psychopathology and semiotics( 59). His attempt, 
like that of the Frankfurt school is a direct attack on the capitalist 
mode of production and its juridical framework centered around 
the key concept of sovereignty. Hence, what he calls for IS an 
insurrection of subjugated knowledge. 
Archaeology would be the appropriate methodology and 
genealogy would be the tactic. Foucault defines genealogy as the 
union of erudite knowledge with local memories, that union 
allows the establishment of a historical knowledge of struggle, a 
knowledge free of subjection to power,an emancipated 
knowledge(60), Foucault denounces those who strive to impose 
a certain form of knowledge under the false label of science. As 
he puts it :"when I see you straining to establish the 
scientificity of Marxism, do not really think that you are 
demonstrating once and for all that Marxism has a rational 
structure and that therefore its propositions are tile 
outcome of verifiable procedures; for me, you are doing 
something altogether different. You are investing Marxist 
discourses and those WllO uphold them with tile effects 
of a power which the west since mediavel times has 
attributed to science and has reserved for those engaged 
in scientific discourses"(61) 
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In a society like ours, asserts FQucault, the relationship 
between truth, right and power is distorted and we are forced to 
produce the truth which produces wealth in the first place. The 
"foucauldian" structural analysis of power demonstrates how the 
mechanism of exclusion, prohibition and madness lend themselves 
to economic profit and that is why they were colonized and 
maintained by the state system or the juridical political theory of 
sove re ig nty. Th is late r apparatu s has prod uced durin g the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries a new mechanism of power 
"the disciplinary order". 
Our order today derived from these premises, has produced a 
"society of normalization" where the disciplinary mechanism have 
triumphed over the rights and legal codes. The solution to our 
dilemma is not an opposition of sovereignty to disciplinary 
mechanism, because both are integral parts ~s of the general 
mechanism of power today but rather E7ft·o. ·tiw construction of a 
new right, an anti-disciplinary one which at the same time is 
"anti-sovereignty". How and what is that right Foucault does not 
tell. He has sought to deconstruct the arbitrary present social order 
of the modern society and to that extent we can say that he has 
effectively done so(62). 
IV . The Islamic Episteme 
The Kor'an states : "say knowiedge is only for God""God 
knows but you do not" 
Knowledge in Islam is often compared to a tree with various 
branches as different sciences. The tree grows and produces leaves 
and fruits in conformity with its nature. No branch is allowed to 
grow beyond its limits because it will destroy the tree's 
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harmony, that harmony which reflects the globality of knowledge in 
Islam. 
One of the best articulated epistemology of knowledge in 
Islam is that provided by Abu hamed EI-Ghazali{63}; who lists 
three criterias of knowledge : 
(1) The source: where he says, we have revealed knowledge 
which is acquired by prophets and is beyond the reach of either 
reason, experimentation or language (senses)and non-revealed 
knowledge which comes from reason, experimentation, language and 
acculturation. 
(2)The level of obligatoriness :where we have, individually 
re._ cquired knowledge "F a r d ~ A in" that is knowledge which is 
essential for an individual in order to survive ego social ethics, 
law, etc ... and socially required knowledge "Fard~Kiffaya" which 
IS essential to the survival of the community as a whole. ego 
agriculture, medicine, architecture, engineering and so on ... 
(3) The social function where we have praiseworthy 
knowledge, that is to say sciences which are useful to social life 
such as professions and ethics and blameworthy knowledge which 
is damaging to that social life e.g. sciences of magic, torture, 
. witch crafts etc ... 
Ibn Khaldun recapitulates the same epistemological 
articulation(64), The quest of knowledge is not an easy task, 
warns us EI-ghazali, it is a long and permanent search which will 
take man from the realm of senses "EI-mulk", that is,the first 
stage of knowledge , where man's ability develops through senses 
and leads hi m to an intermediary stage, that of "E 1- D jab a rut" 
which enables man to reflect on himself and teaches him to think. 
Once man reaches this stage, he is shaken and frightened by the 
discovery of his power. He starts nourishing doubts and errs blind 
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until divine guidance and revealed wisdom comes to enlighten his 
path and leads him to the realm of genuine knowledge that of "EI-
Mal akut", the universal wisdom of the one sovereign God. Beyond 
that stage, says Abu Hamed, knowledge is reserved to prophets 
and saints(65). 
Hence, according to the Ghazalian episteme, knowledge is 
truth and truth is light si~ce light comes from God, "Whom e,ver 
God has not enlighte~!his path, what light has he ?"(66). 
As we have seen with Habermas(67), there is in the Islamic 
episterne a distinction between praiseworthy and blameworthy 
knowledge.ln order to avoid the later and reach the former, man is 
required to grasp the globality of things and their essence 
"Jawhar". He needs to avoid fragmentation because it distorts 
truth and leads to fiction and reification. 
Philosophy "Son ia", the old mind's craft which is so typical of 
the occidental mind, is according to Muslim doctors a dangerolls 
craft. It fools man and mirrors to him, his chance to conquer 
himself and erect his unvulnerability(68). Following his impulses, 
the human being constructs for himself an illusion of power 
the more he seeks to achieve it, the more he finds himself caught in 
a "closed gate"(69), 
EI-Ghazali has accused Muslim philosophers of entertaining 
dialectical speculation and elaborating a science of 
incoherence(70). Ibn Ruchd has retaliated by denouncing the 
incoherence of dogmatic incoherence(71). In fact, both worked 
heartedly for a reconciliation between religion and philosophy, that 
is between revelation and reason. Averroes) blaming the whole 
issue on Dialecticians and sophistes "EI-Mutakallimun" who have 
entertained the dychotomy, argued strongly "t h at phi loso P hy 
226 
is the sister of religion and that truth does not 
contradict truth but confirms it"(72). In the "Tahafut" he is 
even clearer when he asserts: "Religion exists through 
inspiration and is blended with reason. He who holds that 
it is possible that there should exist a natural religion 
based on reason alone, must admit that this religion is 
less perfect then that which springs from 
inspiration"(73). 
Not"..ANithstanding this historical synthesis in Arabo-Islamic 
thought, today's Arabo-Muslim intellectual are still divided on this 
issue between on one hand, the zeallots theologians who do not 
hesitate to decret2.- most Arabo-Islamic nations as "Apostate"(7 4) 
because of their secularization; and on the other, the no-less 
zeallots "Occidentalized" who declare religion to be obstacle 
toward prog ress and modernity(7 5). The former are no less 
dogmatic than the later, both step away from the globality of the 
Islamic episteme. 
In Islam, truth does not depend on either theological orthodoxy 
or pure reason. The first reduces Islam to a religion which has 
performed only during the short period of the well guided caliphs 
and the second reduces Islam to a personal faith. It is obvious 
from historical and sociological experimentation that the 
hypotheses are false and that the truth is somewhere in between. 
It consists in a reconciliation of both validity claims. 
We have to reckon, however that the margin of reconciliation is 
a thin one since as Iqbal has observed :Religion grasps reality as a 
wholeness, while reason or philosophy catches only piece-meal 
reality. Religion is global and reason reductionist(76)'Hence, if we 
are to nourish any hope for an eventual reconciliation between 
the two, we should first admit the supremacy of religion. Indeed, 
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Hay Ibn Yakdhan, the hero of Ibn TofaylJ reaches truth by a reasoned 
approach to global reality, combining his "Fitra" natural instincts 
and pre-disposations, with rational observance,he comes to the 
knowledge of God and revelation(77). 
To argue for the supremacy of revelation over reason is not to 
deny the role of the later in the formation of knowledge, to do that 
is to preach for that virtue which Thomas Acquinas calls, 
intellectual "Dociiitas"(78) which far from being a constraint 
is the intellect's humility vis-a-vis that which is an act of 
freedom which recognises a superior value. 
Today, the Arabo-Islamic society's obssession with 
development 
proof there 
stagnation. 
and its everlasting strive to achieve it is the best 
IS to the fact that Islam rejects fatalism and 
All arabo-muslims should strive to be that unified 
community which the prophet (Peace be upon him) has advocated 
in his saying :"there always, will remain among my 
foilowers, a community of truth, that neither 
disaproll>ving nor disagreement could turn away,,(79). 
Someone in the past, has, while travelling around met an old 
cultivator working hard in his field planting trees. He was 
astonished to see such an old man showing such a will to life 
while being so close to death. He asked him: Do you expect to eat 
from the fruits of your trees? The old man replied : No. We have 
already eaten from the trees that others have planted. Today we 
plant so that others can eat.This will to life is what EI-Mawerdi 
has defined as "The broadest hope", or "EI amal el-fasih"(80), 
that which makes possible what for a normal life is an 
impossibility. 
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What Arabo-Muslims are after is a reasoned Islamic mode 
of life, which will make our existence and by extension that of 
others, much more enjoyable and fulfilling than it is right now. 
In securing our future we do not want to threaten or harm that of 
others,we want to live in honour and dignity for life without 
dignity is worst than death to us(81). 
Some may dream of reaching far into space, of domesticating 
planets and comets and riding them as horses in order to 
conquer the wide and infinite space.We are in no need of sharing 
their dream, we have a much more promising dream and that 
consists in the conquest of ourselves and our selfishness. In order 
to promote our specie's wisdom, we need to learn how to love each 
other, care for each other as brothers do. In any case, we ought 
to keep in mind that we are here only for a short while, we will 
soon pass away leaving behind either an eternal bliss or an eternal 
blame. 
Assessement 
In our epistemological inquiry, we have attempted to cover 
western critical thought as it is expressed by contemporary 
philosophical currents as well as the epistemological premises of 
Arabo-lslamicihought.The conclusion that we arrive at is that both 
reach a common synthesis despite what might appear as a priori 
prejudices. 
Among western contemporary philosophers, Habermas seems 
to us to be the closest to what may be referred to as "a consensus 
on truth", Habermas openly believes in the ability of reason to 
reach sound and emancipated knowledge through communicative 
action and universal pragmatism.We can say that we share this 
belief heartedly with him. Habermas proposes as a mean>to reach 
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that emancipated knowledge a critical theory which consists 
more In avoiding false assumptions than in finding "truth". Indeed, 
Habermas criticises every body : Hegel, Marx, Weber, etc... We have 
seen his criticism of the first two.As for Weber, Habermas tells us 
that he has construed rationalization "Zweckrationalitat" and has 
failed to grasp the selectivity of the capitalist system(82). As for 
Kant and his autonomy of the will, Habermas points out that "by 
presupposing autonomy and that means the will's property to being 
a law l(Dnto itself, as an independant abstraction rather than an 
interactional structure of complementary action, Kant expels 
moral action from the very domaine of morality itself and ends up 
with strategical action which opposes communicative action"(83). 
In his critical reading Habermas seeks to reconstruct not to 
deconstruct, he observes the defficiencies and attempt;. to fill 
them up. He finds a way out from Weberl> closed gate in the same 
manner that he escapes Kant's imperative subjectivation. In all 
his intellectual "promenades"; he avoids that lust of certainty and 
the mirages of truth. His knowledge is overwhelming(8 4), yet 
when criticized, he shows the humblesness of an illiterate. There is 
not much between his outlook and that of Gadamer.Yet, there is a 
difference in emphasis on details.Gadamer shows some hastiness in 
asserting the universality of Hermeneutics and adopting an anti-
foundational stance. Habermas argues that prejudice can be 
dissolved through communicative action and asserts that "we 
would not be able to ascertain the internal structure of 
action oriented to reaching understanding if we did not 
already have before us in fragmentary and distorted form; 
to be sure, the existing forms of a reason that has to rely 
on being symbolically embodied and historically 
situated"(85). 
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The difference between Habermas and Gadamer is much more a 
difference in tone than in substance. While Gadamer cannot help 
declaring that he has found his way to what guarantees truth, 
Habermas moderately points out that "maybe one day ... ". World War 
II, has t~ght all young Germans as well as other youth that war is 
the worst form of social degradation( Habermas recalls what H. 
Marcuse told him when he visited him in hospital shortly before 
his death "I know wherein our most basic value judgements 
are rooted, in compassion and in our sense for the 
suffering of others"(86). 
Today, the spiritual situation of the age is quite sad no matter 
where we look North, South, East or West, what we see is in 
Habermas'terms:"The devastation of the communicative 
capacities of the life world"(87). Man seems to be condemned 
to suffer his reason. This, Muslim philosophers have reached long 
ago. Most of them have retreated to suffism and individualistic 
carelesness.Those like Ibn Ruchd,lbn Khaldun,Abduh,Esh'attibi etc ... 
who believed in man's reasonability have strived hard to leave us 
with thoughtfull guide-lines through which we could communicate 
and solve our social difficulties. 
Western culture has always looked upon Muslim philosophers 
as Dogmatic Theologians who because of their religiosity cannot 
accede to western enlightened thought. Hence, they are unable to 
understand~estern mind and vice-versa. Even someone like Ibn 
Ruchd who handed over Greek philosophy to the western culture is 
either seen as a sophiste or else as an atheist philosopher(88). 
Nobody among western scholars seems able to admit that he could 
be a great philosopher and at the same time an orthodox Muslim 
believer.He is either like us or different but he cannot be both. 
The same applies to all Muslim scholars. This vision is simply 
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Q 
erronous. It is true that Muslim scholars are philosophers 
a certain point, from which they enter the "EI-malakut", 
up to 
the 
world of inspiration and are guided by the divine light toward the 
essence of knowledge and the truth of God. The western scholar in 
most cases does not go beyond that point and hence loses contact 
with them. To him, that do maine is reserved to metaphysics and 
does not interest him much if not at all(89). Divine inspiration is 
universal, God enlightenswhom he pleases. Yet unless we resolve to 
some kind of inspiration, we are unable to communicate. That 
explains why peace is so hard to achieve among nations. All we 
can do is hope like Habermas that one day may be '" 
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Section Three: A cultural identity in search 
for international recognition 
The Arabs are among all nations, the one most remote from 
positivistic legal orders and the closest to natural ones. This 
assertion coming from an authority such as Ibn Khaldun has for long 
been used by Orientalists in a negativesense with the open intention 
of presenting the Arabs as primiti~q pee.ples in need of colonial 
tutorship. Ibn Khaldun has from this observation, infered that Arabs 
are very attached to their natural freedom. He tells us, Hence that 
Arabs never obey rules because of coercion, if they do so, they do it 
generally either in respect of the morality which their desert's 
code of honor has thought them, or by fear of God(1). 
The everlasting conflictual social dynamics which characterise 
Arab society, ihe dialectical dichotomy which opposes the city 
center "AI-Madina" to the " rif " "Al-Badawa"; are so distinctive 
features of Arab sociology that a learned anthropologist such as 
Hodgson has termed them; Islamicates"(2). Laroui, investigating 
the meaning of freedom in Arabo-Islamic society has noticed that 
orientalists have misconstrued that meaning by relying on its 
interpretation exclusively on the Arab dictionary. There is a variety 
of meanings and symbols of freedom in Arab culture which the 
dictionrtJary does not include. Laroui invokes four such instances: 
The rural style of life" EI-Badawa", the tribe "AI-ashira", piety and 
mysticism.(3) 
Arab culture holds life in the countryside as the purest 
3xpression of natural freedom . The Bedouins are free peaple. All 
)ver history, they have been feared by authorities, cajoled, 
Q9. l ~xempted from taxes and hold in great estlm~. The rebelious poets" 
\ss'alik" represent in public eyes the genuineA' expression of Arab 
::lentity. The tribe is a vital space of freedom. Piety and mysticism 
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are urban forms of internal freedom) elaborated as strategies in 
order to escape urban authorities and preserve that original natural 
freedom of man. 
This eagerness of Arabs for freedom explains somerhow their 
perpetual refusal and rejection of artificial social mecanlsms 
which tend to deprive them of that intrinsic freedom with which 
they are born. 
As a consequence of what preceeds, instead of undertaking an 
examination of let us say : the foreign policies of the existing Arab 
States, their behavior at the United Nations, the treaties which 
they conclude with other nations, all of which are interesting 
topics favourite to IQwyers since it provides them with empirical 
evidence. But topics which will fail, I am certain, to inform readers 
o~ the deepest reasons why the Arabo-Islamic society claims so 
~,\ 
vehemently its right to cultural self-determination and refuses the 
strangulating tight space within which the prevailing international 
order confines it to. 
For all that, I prefer to invite the reader to an intimate 
intrusion into the gist of Arabo-Islamic culture and personnality 
and introduces him to informationnal sources capable of reshaping, 
the distorted image which a long tradition of imperial hegmonism 
and ins1rumental orientalism have inerusted in his mini ;d. 
It is our intention thus, to escape legal formalism in this section 
and proceed with the help of anthropological inquiries to shed light 
on the sociological foundations of the Arabo-islamic society's 
yearning for cultural self-determination. 
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I . The Arabo-Islamic Paradigm in deconstruction 
The title may sound a bite pretentious for observers who could 
object to the existence of any such a paradigm, we neverthless 
believe that such a paradigm exi.)f~ The Arabo-Islamic world exisP. 
It is a delimited geographical space stretching from the Atlantic to 
the Gulf, sharing one religion; Islam, one lan g(;1 Arabic and 
looking a head for a common destiny. Hence what we refer to as the 
Arabo-Islamic paradigm is simply the form of thought which 
defines the Arabo-Islamic society, the Arabo-Islamic personality 
and way of life and which spells out values, conductG and attitudes 
toward life in general. The central assumption of the Arabo-
Islamic paradigm is the oneness of the Arabo-Islamic entity which 
is conceived as a universal " U m m a" 1 based on the assumption of 
unity and oneness. The Arabo-Islamic paradigm rejects a" 
exclusive and reductionist methods and adopts a wholistic " theo-
• 1\ 
analytical methodology. 
The gaols of the Arabo-Islamic paradigm are: 
1) r~ Promote qi the Arabo-Islamic identity and personality into a 
universal model through the integration of various elements which 
constitute it and their synchronization into a harmonious and a 
pi u raU,,5 tic entity. 
2) provides guidance and direction to peoples and nations in 
order to implement in a succesful manner the Islamic message of 
peace and human brotherhood. 
The Arabo-Islamic pradigm endures today a severe 
multidimensional crisis . It almost appears as a deficient paradigm 
not because of any intrinsic impediment 
highly requiring performandes. No 
observers believe this paradigm to 
mythical(1). 
but simply because of its 
wonder, therefore that 
be utopian and almost 
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" Le discours Arabo-Islamic en vigueur est situe aux 
antipodes dela realite sociale"(2). There is a huge amount of 
mythical residuals anchored in our sub-consciousness which need 
to be driven out. More than ever before, we need to elaborate a 
ponderated reflection on our state of affairs. We carLnot offord to 
enter the twenty-first century without a clear vision of what we 
are and what do we need to do? More than ever before, we need to 
start a deconstruction of our prevailing modes of thought and codes 
of conduct. 
A . What is Islam? 
Islam is otten obscured by a whole ser1S of meanings attached to 
it by different people. Charlatans use Islam as a mean~ for life. 
Politicians use it as a device for ruling,medias talk about "Islams" 
in plural. We are told that there exist> a tender islam and a tough 
o ne(3). There also seem to exist a subjugated islam as opposed to a 
rebelious one etc ..... 
An Egyptian moralist has many decades ago pointed: "I saw 
Islam, that great spreading tree of peace under which is 
shelter from the blast of life and its sights; turned in the 
hand of men into poisoned arrows with which everyone 
tries to wound his brother.,,(4) 
Sha'ttibi every here and there recalls that saying of the prophet 
(peace be upon him) which asserts: "Islam has been born alien 
and will end up as it begins, blessed are aliens.,,(5) Islam 
is an act of submission to the will of God. It is not as Orientalists 
often define it, an arbitrarly imposed capitulation of man face to 
providence but a rather a willing adhesion to the appeal of God. It is 
an act through which the human being recovers his good nature and 
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peace of mind. It is the achievement of a state of sublimity. 
In islam, there is a chain of being which links the creation to 
creater. Man is located in the midst of that chain torn apart 
between good and evil. Reasonable man follow> the path of good 
guided by revealed wisdom. 
Islam is a religion based on human brotherhood verily says the 
prophet (PBUH) " they will be a muslim only thy who likes 
his brother"(6), "No Superiority has an Arab over an alien 
nor a white over a black, save in pity. "(7) "There is no 
compulsion on islam"(8). "Say the truth is from your 
lord,whdhever will let him believe and whomever so will 
let him disbelieve.,,(9) 
This is brieflY what islam is about. It preaches moderation, 
care and self denial. The islamic "Umma" is united, as As the 
prophet has urged : "When all the members of the community 
are conscious of their responsibilities and when they 
discharge their duties by the love compassion and 
sympathy they bear to one another, they form, a single 
body : if an organ suffers,the whole body responds with 
general fever.,,(10) 
It is quite obvious that the Arabo-islamic community is far 
from resembling the ttD prophet's model. What is wors~ and more 
frightening is the fact that it does not even seem heading in the 
right direction. 
Islam is a simple religion which because of its simplicity 
becomes hard to implement. The point for us to day is not to 
equalize the prophet's model that is out of question as menti~ed by 
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the prophet (PBUH) himself. but to preserve the sense of direction 
and ensure implementation of a vital minimum according to which 
we will be defined as muslims. 
The Arabo-Islamic society has converted its prospective 
utopianism to a mechanist one. It is high time for us to stop 
dreaming about our forefathers ( the early compagnioWs of the 
prophet) and accept living a modest form of islam. This has 
tremendous implications for our life . We could live our islam (that 
of 2000 years) with less glory perhaps than our ancestors but with 
at least some of their realism and courage. We are the best among 
nations in so far that we perform and produce human civilization. 
Any nation could be better than we if it meets succesfully this 
criteria. It is also hig h time for us to realize that we are not any 
worse, than other nations. We do not need to catch up with the 
western world nor with any other but with ourselves. We do need to 
regain our self-confidence and our faith in our religion. 
Islam is what ever the muslims make of it. (11) It is their way 
of life. It may vary from place to place or from people to others. 
But it is neverthless one religion which ressembles all muslims in 
one charismatic entity "EI-umma AI-muhamaddiya" . 
8 . The Arabo-Islamic personality. 
Here is an essential historical and cultural identity which time 
and space have engraned as an identification of the Arab being. EI-
Faruki explains the process by which this identity has come into 
being : "The geographical fact that most of their land was 
desert and lay at the crossroads of countless migrations 
in all directions had surely being their curse and blessing 
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at the same time. A threat of extinction internalized and 
surmd"nted with will and imagination. The Arabs bore their 
poverty with pride and steadily practiced renunciation, 
always ready to wager their lives for the sake of 
convictions. From the dawn of history, they were poets, 
mediative on matters of destiny, masters of the forces of 
life throbbing within them. Even when the desert ended, 
as on the banks of the Nile, or between the two rivers, 
the tropical bounty of nature did not", arouse or wet their 
appetite. The taming and disciplining by centuries of 
de~sert space-time has engrained a mastery before which 
their will to live could only bow in obedience and respect. 
The wisdom of the Arab being was cristallized in a body 
of proverbs and poems to which the obssession with 
language gave a fertile imaginativness to which desert 
existence has made them prone. All these factors, 
combined to temper their cosmic will to life and to whet 
. 
their aspiration to truth, beauty and goodness. Thus, the 
realization slowly d6wned upon them that they are the 
vortex of history, the focal point at which divinity 
breaks through to real existence. It is all the same 
vrether th is preparation was itse If the cau se or the effect 
of providential choice."(12) 
Ibn Khaldun has given us a detailed analysis of that Arabo-
Islamic identity so that we do not need to dwell an its socio-
psychological elements. At the theological level. An Arabo-Islamic 
philosopher has observed, that w~ithin the Islamic chain of being : 
"The Islamic "I" run simultaneously a double series of 
adventures, one in extension and the other in depth or 
intention. It constitutes and explicits itself. The 
incomtemporability between the proper horizon and the 
interworld leads the society to an excessive need of 
--, 
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escape from reality which in turn leads to utopia. No 
matter how harsh may be the environment, the islamic 
per son a lit y m a i n t a ins a n 0 p tim i s tic a tt it u d e tow a r d 
life"(13). 
At the political level, Arabo-Islamic identity symbolises Arab-
unity. A Berber from North Africa or a Kurd~ from the North of Iraq 
is nonethless an Arab and spontaneausly identifies as such. The 
feeling runs deep among Arab people that they are members of a 
solid and unified charismatic entity~ Here is how an Arab analyst 
depicts the popular basis of Arab unity : "out from official 
chancelleries and far away from bureaucratic circles. There lives 
an ironmonger in Koweit city. A vulcanisator in Homs, a seller of 
"Falafil" in Cairo, a shoemeker in Annaba, a shepherd in the Atlas 
mountains, a fisherman accomodating his net in Tangiers, a fig 
seller walking behind his donkey in Djerba, a story teller amusing 
folks in Marrakech. A craftman, a carpenter, etc ... those ordinary 
people who with a slice of bread and some dates reach 
contentment, shiver under the sounds of Oum Kaltoum's melodies, 
lough and applaud Ghawar's tricks, are moved by poems and refined 
prose. Those represent the Arab people".(14) 
The Arabs will never get tired of Arab unity~ what propably 
increase that feeling in their mind is the fact that their unity is 
strongly contested by the west. Europeans particularly hold a 
double standard. Their unity is presented as a rational and 
constructive enterprise while that of Arab people is often 
denounced as an irrational and emotional idea. (15) 
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C . The Arabo-Islamic Culture 
Arabic language is the ciment with which is built Arab Unity. 
"Is Arab who ever speaks Arab." This reported maxim has been an 
effective policy of cultural homogenization. Orientalists headed by 
such prominent figures as E.Renan denigrated Arabic language and 
presented it as a dying language, good only to move simple minded 
people. We have seen with Habermas how language constitute? a 
vital meatl; in the development process of societies. M. Chelli, in a 
recent study of the "Arab speech" has shown that the real power 
of language resides in its potential to communicate and instil a 
will to the society so that it acts in a certain way and enjoys doing 
so(16). Language permits "self-realization" asserts Moncef. tf the 
Arab nations have so lamentably failed in their development 
programs; it is simply because of the borrowed linguistic syntaxes 
from which they tried to transplant!i/ these shemes. (17) 
In most Arab countries, there has been an "Arabisation" 
campaign, the aim of which was to spread wide the teaching of 
Arabic as a mean to the recovering of Arabo-Islamic identity. While 
some noticeable progre~ ha~5 been accomplished in terms of 
fighting illetracy and ignorence, eittle has been done to reform 
Arabic language so as to meet the requirements of modern 
technology. As Berque has put it : " Real culture does not descend 
from the top of the bureaucratic pyramid but ascends from the 
global semiology, when an ascendent dynamism of research and 
discoveries drains every body with it".(18) 
Like any other language; Arabic has particular features which 
herauits of Pan-Arabism have repeated ato satiety. Today, 
Academies all over the Arab world are striving to reform the 
Arabic language. Yet -. As long as the Arab society is kept a~way 
from that process, nothing deep and promising is going to emerge. 
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When the influence of the western culture reached the Arabo-
Islamic world via the st Joseph I nstitute at the Levant and with 
the first promotions of Arab graduates sent to Europe by Med Ali, 
there emerged a trend in Arab literature which continuous up to 
nowdays directing Arab culture toward steril mimetism and blind 
immitation. 1his so called modernist wave has through novelties 
and frivolous fantasies, aimed at some sort of a "Big-push 
theory" in Arab literature. This has provoked the following 
remark from an Arab critic : "our ignorence and our 
backwardness pushs us to admire and like every thing that 
is European to the extent that many among us believe that 
the good, all the good is in the immitation of Europe"(19). 
Our "national-states" conceived and animated quite often 
according to European models reduce our cultural being to a se r/l; of 
folk songs and arty-crafty works dedicated to promote tourism. No 
wpnder therefore, that our culture is of very poor taste today. 
~ether in literature, musi~ or else where, our cultural production 
is dominated by extremist trends. In poetry, proponents of the 
classical school are fighting fiercely against modernist poetic 
styles. In theatre, the school of the thousand nights faces the 
challenges of Brecht and B.vian. The trend is simply overhelming 
and reflects the political climate where the young bearded 
"fundamentalist" who regard himself as a reincarnation of some 
early compgnions of the "sallaf". faces the most chauvinistic 
atheist beside whom Sartre would look as a conservative. Ours is 
the era of islamic fundamentalism. 
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II. Meeting History 
The Arabo-Islamic world stands today at the verge of history. I~ 
faces a cruel choice which is unpleasant in both its alternatives. It 
is ordered to take a decisive resolution in order to settle eewn 
once and for all that everlasting conflict which t~~~ it apart: Opt 
either for identity or modernity (1). 
What a cruel choice indeed(2)? What makes it bitter is that 
dogmatic certainty with which scholars and analysts intend to 
imp,ase it on the Arabo-Islamic world in a black or white fashion as 
if truly, it ought to gamble its existence on a head or tail game 
since they make sure to remove away from your mind the slightest 
chance to reach a compromise(3). 
The Arabo -Islamic world will undoubtedly find its way back to 
history in a way or another. The tests lying a head on its road will 
show. Wether it will succeed in forging its own fate or fail. 
On the agenda facing the Arabo-Islamic society, the issue of 
human rights takes a central position. This topic has become the 
favourite target of western medias. There appears a certain 
eagerness to confound Islam with the human rights charge and 
reveal thereby its anti-h umanistic esse nce( 4). 
Faced with this oppressive charge , the Arabo - islamic society 
retaliates with a similary hasty conclusion . Indeed most Arabo -
Muslim writters dealing with this issue would start by 
emphasizing the fact that islam has promoted a genuine and 
progressist human rights policy at times where Europe was bluntly 
violating them within the mist of its dark ages (5). 
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Hence , a wide gap separates both worlds in respect to the 
human rights issue . In this section we intend to examine 
First: the islamic theory of human rights . 
Second : the confrontation taking place between both worlds on 
the issue 
Third explore means and ways to reconciliate them 
and incite both worlds to enter into a constructi~Q and fruitful 
dialogue for a universal promotion of human rights. 
Notes 
(1) F. ZAKARIl'A .opcit. 
(2) See, the brillant anthropological insight on the cruelty of developmental 
choices in. B.Berger's " Pyramids of sacrifices":political ethics and social 
changes. opcit. 
(3) F. Zakariya, opcit. (p. 4) 
(4) Hence, the famous film relating the death of a Saudi princess which has 
caused much trouble between England and the Saudi's kingdom, the Salman 
Ruchdi's, affair, the spectacular inquiries conducted by french LV on the 
women's condition in YEMEN, etc ... 
(5)The Trend is ab vious in most recent writtings on this topic. See for 
instance: M.M .Shalabi, rector of the islamic institut in Alexandria (Egypt) : 
Islamic law between realism and idealism. University house - 1982 
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A. The Islamic theory of human rights. 
Islam is a revealed religion which seeks to deliver the human 
being from all evil in order to promote his good nature . Islam has 
proclaimed the human being as a vice~e,~ant of god on earth and has 
entrusted him with the task of ordering good and fighting evil. To 
help him in his mission, God has granted him certain rights . 
Right$) according to islamic doctrine, is an attribute sanctified 
by revelation and authorized by the legisla'tor. Hence , the notion of 
rights in islamic law is of a dual nature. Indeed beside the rights 
recognised to the individual, stand god's rights( 1). Those are 
attributes that regulate the sacred religious duties Ilbadat" which 
every believer is required to perform and respect . 
This dual nature of rights in islamic law is not without 
recalling to our mind that whollistic substance of islamic ethics 
which we have already encountered in the precedent chapters . As 
stated before , the difference in paradigmatic perception of legal 
phenomenons is at the root of all the mis-understanding between 
western and islamic cultures. Yet difference is not incommen 
surability. 
When for instance, the rector of the "AI-Azhar" university 
declares that: "comparison between Western norms of public 
international law and those of the Sharia is impossible and 
unacceptable"(2), It is obvious that what he has in mind is the 
fact that one cannot put on the same footing, a hol~y scripture 
with positive law. Once the differences are openly admitted and 
recognised, nothing, either in the Sharia or in positive law is by 
.r; 
itself suffi~ant to command incommensurability. Doctrine wh ich 
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constitues a vital 
part in both legal systems does provide a fertile ground for 
compromises and general agreements. In liberal theory, right 
cannot be conceived of outside the individual's realm. The 
individual as Mille has put it is "Sovereign"(3). He conceives, 
defines and enjoys rights according to the Kantian principle of 
self-determination. The state, seen as the " stade supreme" of 
individuality is required henceforth to promote and protect the 
individual's rights. No wonder if at last, liberal theory has 
promulgated a human rights policy which in fact is no more than a 
capitulation to "superman,,(4). Within the realm of isfam, things are 
=luiet different. Rights have no meaning outside the intent of the 
egislator. As a result, islamic doctrine has elaborated from the 
;tart a " theory of abuse"(5) in order to preserve a harmonious 
)alance between god's rights and those of the individual . Hence, is 
:onsidered as an abuse of right every attempt to usurpate the 
3gislator's intent which inevitably leads to a dam: .aging of others 
ight ..... ie God's right(6). The theory of abuse in islam is based on 
1e Hadith ordering "that there are no dO-m .. age nor 
ndom . laging in islam". LaDarar wa La Dirar.(7) 
Therefore, in order to ensure a good balance between rights. 
;/amic doctrine has investigated thoroughly every aspect of each 
ements within the theory of right and has provided us with a 
)phisticated legal machinery tied to that effect .(8) 
B. An Arabo-Islamic Charter on Human Rights 
When the universal declaration of human rights was proclaimed 
Geneva 1948, Arabo-Islamic states felt some uneasiness to 
:ify it I ~ince that declaration was clearly based on an unstated 
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secular premise(9). As a result, most Arabo-Islamic states 
expressed strong reservations in regard to its provisions, some of 
which were directly in conflict with islamic religious 
principles.(10) 
Since that time , Arab muslim schCllars have been urging for the 
elaboration of an Arabo-Islamic charter on human rights. 
At the regional level, the Arab Le.ague following a request from 
the United Nations, proceeded by resolution ( 2443 /48 in 3/9/68) 
to the creation of a permanent Arab commitee on human rightf 
" This commitee held its first congress m,n Beirut .orl december 68. 
Where strong recommendations were made in regard to the 
instalment of national sub-committees on human rights as a pre-
step to the eleboration of an Arab charter on human rights.(11) 
By the 10 of september 1970, the Arab league council 
designated an expert commission and entrusted it I to prepare a 
draft proposal of the Arab charter on human right, the proposal 
entitled "the Arab declaration on human rights "J is still burtied ,in 
the offices of the Arab league. 
In recent times, the secretariat of the Arab league has 
reactivated the plan and requested from a new commission another 
draft. 
Dr. Ousfour, one of the experts consulted. resumes the issue 
facing the commission as follow: " the question facing us is one of 
form and content. Should we consider the Arab charter on human 
rights as a specifically Arab interpretation of the policy of human 
right tied to the ethical and religious peculiarities of that 
commu~ty or should we just content ourselves with confirming the 
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universal declaration on human rights? Hence, we are cQught intW 
the dilemma of specificity versus universality",(12) 
The dilemma has been unsurmountable so far and this explains 
why nothing has emerged from the multiple projects which the 
league has commended and which tilt nowdays remain dead letters 
burried in the Arab league head quarters. 
C . A Fruitless Polemic 
What is remarquable about Arabo-Islamic literature on human 
rights is the extremism adopted by both offenders and defenders of 
islamic law in that respect . 
S . AI adeeb for instance , argues that the totalitarian ethic of 
islam prevents the elaboration of any consistant islamic policy on 
human rights in harmony with international law (13), AI adeeb is 
not the only Arabo-muslim scholar to hold such a thesis . Gall 
"Occidentalistes " (14) would argue along this line charging 
islamic law with deficiencies in regard to vital issues such as: 
minorities rights. WOlnel1. / rights , free speech etc. 
Islamist> on their part would retaliate by invoking redundant 
apolegetic and arrogant arguments emphasizing again and again the 
supremacy of islamic law in regard to human rights which it has 
promoted and defended at times where Europe was still living dark 
ages (15). 
Hence , we end up with a deceitfull literature on the topic of 
/ 
human rights. A literature entrapped with subjectivism, ~ncapaple 
of conveying any sober analysis on the issue involved. 
Supjectivism emerges very often as a result of a lack of 
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knowledge. Offenders of the islamic doctrine on human rights 
ignore in most cases the philosophical premises of islamic law in 
the same vein as Isla mists appear to ignore the philosophical 
premises of secular thought. 
As an example of that mutua I ignorence, let us examine the 
controversy raised between both camps in regard to the rights of 
women. 
Occidentalists charge Islamic law as being offensive in regard 
to women, since it grants them a "statut" inferior to that granted 
by modern secular thought. Islamists return the charge and accuse 
secular thought of "libertinage" which thus, has converted women 
~lS1, 
to a cheap cOS'Ori'jlmer's good. 
In between these two extremist positions, one is to wonder, 
where does the truth stands? 
On one hand ... it is . true that the Arabic society because of 
its patriachal family structure has always condemned the women 
to a lower rank. During the pre-Islamic period, the Arabs used to 
burlY alive their young dOllghters in order to escape any potential 
scandal which will bring shame on the whole family or tribe. 
Islam has emancipated the Arab and educated him to treat 
women with kindness and pay them due respect. Unfortunately. " 
Arabs are not always good muslims" very often, particularly du ring 
times of Islamic decay where illetracy and fanaticism become 
dominant$, Arabs recover their pre-islamic arrogance and deverse 
their ruddness on their women. Hence, jailing them behinl·d closed 
doors, hiding them under dark veils, secluding them into kitch~\s, 
using them as slaves or submissive concubines, treating them with 
fear suspicion and hatred as if they were carrying a ~harge of 
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dynamite which may blow up any time.(16) 
On the other hand, one cannot ignore nor deny that Arabs have by 
times of islamic renaissance, 0ether in Baghdad, Damas, Fes or 
Courdou ; paid due respect to women and cultivated "Ie culte des 
Dames " up to it~ reffinements (17). As Hajla, the first Arab women 
to get a PHD from~mericain universiti~ has pU~it : " side by side 
with the veil, there always has been a long and well established 
tradition of liberty and good breeding ". (18) 
Hence, the question is not one of law vYether in its islamic or 
positive versions but one of mentality and daily behavioral 
patterns. Such a conclusion is reached by ':?aadi-who at the end of 
his work laments 
" there is a formal concordance between international norms 
and Algerian law in respect to constitutionnal, civil and economic~ 
rights of women. Yet, this equality in paper, is the veil which hides 
a reality made of discrimination and segregation". (19) 
Another issue which has raised intense and polemical debates is 
that which revolves around concepts such as: free speech, freedom 
of religion and so forth. 
Occidentalists, would often mock the basic islamic rules 
called " EI-hudud" and depict$ them as barbarian rites which are 
totally anti-humanistic. To some extent, this may seem true at 
first glance when these rules are looked upon apart from their 
islamic context. However, as soon as one starts investigating the 
"islamic" social framework within which these rules are to be 
operational? the first pre-impression vanishes quickly. Few 
remarks need to be made in this regard. 
(1) The Islamic legislator has severely conditionned the 
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appliance of "EI-hudud" with tough and intricate conditions as to 
render their appliance almost exceptional.(20) 
(2) He has advised the believers to avoid resort to such rules as 
much as possible and has prompted them to close an eye on sinners 
as long as they hide their crimes and do not confess them publicly. 
One can mention in this regard the prophet's saying: 
" Whoever commits one of these dirty sins and keep it to 
himself he has no charges to answer exept to God. If he confesses 
his crime publicly, then, he should be punished accordingly".(21) 
As the juge Abu Yussuf has put it : " The appliance of "AI-hudud" 
is intended as a remedy to the society. It brings social peace and 
stability, limits the number of prisonners, frightens criminals and 
promotes social tranquility".(22) 
Societies applying " EI-hudud" such as in Saudi Arabia or 
Pakistan have achieved a high level of social security which many 
observers have confirmed. One may add that methods of punishment 
applied in modern secularized societies such as the Electrical chair 
or the Gaz chamber are no less inhumaine than their Islamic 
counterparts. The whole issue is in fact. one of cultural 
p red ispos iti 0 ns. 
This debate on human right has reached its climax between both 
worlds when S. Ru~hdi's edition of the "satanic verses" appeared on 
the book-shelves of a Londonian Library. Ru~hdi in his novel mocks 
the Prophet (peace be upon him) and his compagnions and make~ 
ridicule of them.Since Ru'hdi is a muslim, this amount to a public 
act of Qpostasy punisheable by death according to a Hadith that 
states" when a muslim changes his religion, kill him" 
Imam Khomeiny thus, issued a fetwa ordering the killing of 
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RLf9hdi. Western intellectuals stood on behalf of Ru~hdi and 
defended the right to free speech related in that by a huge mediatic 
propaganda. 
The issue became an international affair with political 
ramifications going well beyond its personal nature. Does the right 
to free speech entitles the individual to insult people and make fun 
of their most cherished religious values? The Coran orders to 
Muslims not to insult others peo-ple\' Beliefs so that they do not 
insult yours in return. The debate between Occidentalits and 
Islamists on the human right agenda is an endless and fruitless 
polemic. It can hardly even be termed a debate. 
Occidentalists dealing with Islamic human rights miss the point 
when adressing islamic societies; they exhort them to abandon 
their rei ig io nand rejo in the western secularized social mode I, 
instead of encouraging the islamic societies to carry out a 
ponderate reflection on modern imperatives and instead of seeking 
within islamic doctrine ideas and values which could contribute to 
the promotion of a universal culture on human right; they retreat 
behind paternalistic and egocentric r~t~orics in the same way as 
their islamists adversaries take refuge behind the perfectionism of 
a theory which they never succeed~mplementing coherently. JI 
D. An Islamic contribution to the 
promotion of human rights 
The meaning of the worrp islam is the making of peace . By 
ad'blocati ng values such as brothe r-bood, tole rance, charity and 
mercy; islam has made a due contribution to the promotion of a 
humanistic code of conduct. Yet, islam's greatest achivement 
resides in the restoration of dignity to the human specie. Islam 
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regards man as a breath from the spirit of GOD, hence, it elevates 
the human being to a level of nobility which no other specie can 
reach . It decla~s man as a dignified human being. 
Dignity is one of those distinctive features of man. Allal EL 
Fassi defines human dignity as that supreme morality which man 
has over other creatures(23). In this respect, islam stresses that 
all human beings are equals regardless of race, creed, color or rank 
. The utmost mark of human dignity in islam is paid to the human 
being at his funeral. 
Dignity is one of those puzzling concepts to which legal 
philosophy is unable to confine a precise definition. The concept is 
prolifically used in legal instruments connected with human rights 
. The preamble of the United Nation's charter lists . "Faith in the 
dignity and worth of the human person as a basic ideal which the 
international community is requested to strengthen" ,'the universal 
declaration of human rights solemenly declareS:" all human being<;: 
are born free and equal in dignity and rights". In the American 
convention on human rights (article 5) in the helsinki accords 
(principle V II ) in the AfricatJjl chpter (art 4) in the European 
c~vention (art 3). 
The concept of dignity has required an international audience 
such as that it is universally considered as a legal and moral 
ground for protest against any degrading and abusive treatment of 
persons. 
O.schachter, asserts that the intrinsic meaning of human dignity 
is left to intuitive understanding conditionl4ed in large measure by 
J 
cultural factors (24) 
Etymologically, dignity comes from the latin dignitas and IS 
translated as " wo rth" in French "vale ur". I n Arabic dig n ity is 
translated as " Karama" a word derived from the verb " Karrama" 
which means the making of something worth of honour and praise. 
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Thus the Coran states: " We have honoured the sons of Adam 
transported them on land and sea, gratified them with goods and 
bounty and accorded them preference among our creation". (25) 
Commentators of the Coran have seldom gra sped the intrinsic 
meaning of that act of honourification. Ikrima according to A. EI-
Fassi, is the only one who has provided a concise interpretation, 
Hence, he thinks that God has honored man by endowing him hands 
and fingers so that he could work and eat with his hands in 
dignity.(26) 
The notion of dignity is well incrusted in Arab culture long 
before the coming of islam. The Arab character made of 
stubborness, Anarchism and excess of pride was softned by the 
desert code of honor. The Arab bedouin cultivated values such as 
"AI-Hilm" forgivness and magnamity, " EI-Murrowa", courage and 
bravery. " AI-iffa" purity and retention or self control. " EI-karam" 
generosity and a keen sense of hospitality. 
Dignity is a cherised value to point such that AI-Muttanabi has 
said: 
live in honor or die in dignity 
covered with flags and glory.(27) 
Dignity is a two fold notion. It has a subjective element ( how 
one feels or think about another) and in this regard the Prophet is 
reported to have commanded : " a believer is not a genuine muslim 
unless he wishes for his brother what he wishes for himself".(28) 
and an objective element how one treats another and in that 
respect Islam has stressed that everyone should treat otherS as he 
himself would like to be treated. 
Affronts to human dignity are multiple and can take differents 
forms. O. Schachter has listed twelve cases, among which the 
v 
following cases seem to be widely reculring. 
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1) statements that demean and humiliate individ8)s or groups 
because of their origins, status or beliefs. 
2)vilification or derision of beliefs that people hold in 
reverence.Teaching that particular races, ethnic groups or religious 
hold "ridiculous" or dangerous views, or other wise belittling 
'----" 
cherished beliefs 
3) denial of the capacity of a person to assert claims to basic 
rights 
4) punishement of detained persons by psychological or physical 
means that are meant to humiliate or ridicule their beliefs, origins 
or way of life. 
5) dissemi nation of negative ste reotypes of g roups( eth n ic, 
religious, social) and implications that members of such groups are 
inferior. 
6) Psychiatric treament that involves coercive means to change 
beliefs or choices that are lawfull. 
From the listing abovej It is quite clear that violations of human 
dignity of thousand persons is daily routine toward which the 
international community has grown v.ccustomed and in front of 
which it is quiet badly equiped in order to react. 
Instead of continuously seeking to confond each other~' while 
remaining quiet apart in total ignorence of each others potential 
qualities. Western scholars as well as islamists need to take 
conscience of their mutual nihilism. Extremism can only engender 
hatred and violence. The only remedy to the prevailing situation is 
reconciliation. 
In order that a serious debate attract both camps around the 
vital issues of human rights) both parties have to move in direction 
of one another, the western world has to admit openly the 
existence of an Arabo-islamic social model different in various 
aspects from its own. But sharing in common with the western 
world the same sincere desire of mutual coexistence, cooperation 
under the supremacy of law, and the promotion and safeguard of 
261 
human dignity. The Arabo-islamic world on its part needs to open 
up somehow its rigid and rigorous shiism so as to encourage 
doctrinal exercise with the declared aim of meeting history and the 
world at large. 
Notes 
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(3) I.s Mill, de la democratie. La liberte: textes choisis par Fr. Perroux. Paris ed 
dalloz 1953 
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III . Islam and Modernity 
The first serious attempt towards the elaboration of cr itical 
Arabo-Islamic theory bursted in Laroui's theoretical analysis of the 
Arab ideological crisis(1). Laroui hence, argued for an Arab system 
I 
which though still undefinable, seems to be omnipresent and 
determines Arab politics.(2) The Arab being, asserts Laroui, 
defines himself more through what he rejects, than through what 
he is.(3) He does not seem to resignate) neither to the secular 
nation-state, nor to industrial alienation whether in its capitalist 
or socialist versions. 
Laroui repeatedly stresses that the Arab world forms a cultural 
entity within which every single part engages the whole and " vis-
versa".(4) acquiracHte'ht profits to all the parts. What Hv:. Arab 
society clearly rejects is occidentalization. (5) 
Today, th0.· Arab national state is locked into the positivistic 
cage from where it imposes its implacable logic on its citizens. 
The main concern of the Arabo-Islamic citizen is to get himself 
out from the jailhouse of dictortorship and achieve total freedom. 
Arabs, says Laroui, are exiles in spirit. Their specificity is not a 
historical accident but a desired will to truth. It represents a 
strategic aim and must give rise to a renewal of our socio-political 
organization. Arab ideology should recover from its .. state of 
alienation and be in advance of itself and the western world. It 
should banish particularism, promote a unified critical Arab theory. 
Unless this is done, the Arab dream of unity will remain buried 
under the sand(6). 
Since then, other Arabo-Islamic scholars have urged for a 
similar awaikening . Thus EI-Khatibi and Arkoun have echoed the 
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need for a double criticism. The former sees it necessary to the 
decolonization of Arab thought from internal as well as external 
barriers. (7) This alone will 4:'mable us to decipher the hidden 
knowledge of our "silent societies" and invest it in the 
elaboration of a salutary sociology(8). 
Arkoun, on his part, argues for an applied Islamology, which 
will allow the de mystification of the prevailing ideological 
discourse reflected in the artificial combination of : " stat, 
Orthodoxie, culture savante".(9) Analysing the issue of 
development in the Arabo-Islamic world> Arkoun lists three 
conditions for the liberation of the Arabo-Islamic society.(10) 
A . Traditionalists" vs" Modernists. 
As we have mentioned before, Arabo-muslim intellectuals are 
divided in two opposed groups, Berque has found an interesting 
label for this division ; There are he tells us : "Ahl al assil bila 
massir wa ahl al massir bila assil ,,( 11). Those who hold to 
their authenticity while having no future. And those who look upon 
the future without any care for their past. 
S.H Nasr resumes for us the debate between both camps as 
follow( 12);: The traditionalists " u Ie mas "are very often criti~[ed 
by the the modernists as being conservatives, reactionary, ignorant 
of European political and philosophical theories, yet) they are the 
real custodians of the islamic tradition and its protectors without 
whom, the very continuity of the tradition would be endangered . 
The modernists, he notes have far the most part one feature in 
common and that is their predilection for the western label.1!his 
inferiority complex is a calamity for the Muslim world since it 
afflicts that very group which one could expect to face the 
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challenge. Modernists have, according to Nasr, produced most of the 
apo legetic I iteratu re. 1he most bri Iliant stude nts of ~arvard, 
Oxford and "Ia sorbonne" have far less confidence in western 
civilization than the westernised orientals. That is why concludes 
Nasr, any attempt to harmonize islam and western secular thought 
is doomed to failure from the start simply because they begin 
without exposing all"isms"to a thorough criticism in the light of 
islamic teachings and also because , they consider islam as a 
partial philosophy vhch needs to be complemented by some form of 
modern ideology, rather than as;~omplete system in itself, whose 
very totality ex' cludes the possibility of its becoming a mere 
adjective to modify some other noun which is taken unconsciously 
as central in place of islam. 
Modernists asserts Nasr, reject islam without knowing it 
probably because of that very fact. While both rejection and 
acceptance requires knowledge of that which is to be rejected or 
accepted • (Lacking confidence in their own traditions , modernists 
( 
are like a "Tabula -Rasa" waiting to receive some kind of 
impression from the west, in dress fashion as in philosophical and 
artistic crafts .. 1hey have no role toplay at the source where 
decisions are made. 
Nasr's judgement may seem a bite too harsh. It certainly needs 
to be balanced by a similar critic of traditionalits who often are 
no more than demagogues and reactionary conservatives whose real 
aim is to preserve their privileges and save their interests rather 
than seeking to glorify traditions.(13) 
On the whole however, one has to admit that the moderate 
intellectual has always played a leading role within the Arabo-
islamic society. 
The " Ulemas" represent within the Arabo-islamic political 
structure the influential core of the "Ahl al hall wa al akd " 
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those who bind and loose. ihey know the rules of the sharia in their 
subttle affinities and exercice "ijtihad " in order to provide 
remedies and solutions to the socio-political problemes facing the 
society.1heir recommendations formulated in directives "Fattawis" 
are binding rules for the whole community. Today, they have lost 
that distinguished position as Nasr has put it "they have been 
driven out of their 0Iympus".(14) The ulemas have been 
domesticated by the new division of labor established by the 
modern Nations-States. 'they have, thus, become simple obedient 
employees of the regimes. 
In a recent study of the Egyptian society. G.kepel, has observed 
the emergence of a new branch within the "ulemas corpus"(15). 
This group tells us kepel, is outplaying both the classical "Fukahas" 
and the modernist who because of their closness to the power 
circles have lost their legitimating function. 
This new group is that of the "Islamists" who seek to instau,~~ 
the islamic republic. The Arab masses, in any case do not seem to 
be willing to support any group or government which will not show 
concern to both tradition and modernity.lhey expect whom~er want 
their support to show attachment to their identity while at the 
same tiJJe appease their anxiety about the future. 
1he only way to restaure hope to the Arab people is to revive the 
"Ijtihad" methodology. The famous version according to which the 
gates of "Ijtihad" were once shutdown by the consensus of 
the"Ulemas" is a myth(16). That so-called historical event has 
never prevented scholars such as Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Khaldun, 
Shattibi etc ... from producing works of outstanding quality. The 
fact, as we sees it, is not a matter of bureaucracy but rather one of 
productivity and intellectual creativity. It is the sterility of the 
Arab mind which has given birth to that legendary act of 
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intellectual capitulation. It is high time to reopen those gates and 
free the Arabo-islamic mind. 
The liberation of the Arabo-islamic genuis requires the over 
taking of those steril2 and trivial antagonisms which tend towards 
opposing tradition to modernity, reason to religion etc ... It requires 
a reconciliation of the orthodox "fakih" with the modern university 
doctor in order to produce what Ben Achour labels the " Zeitouni-
sorbonni". That is a brillant synthesizer. (17) 
An authentic "M ujta hid" is an intellectual of a global vision, 
someone enjoying alongside his wide knowledge ( the mastering of 
classical and modern thought), a strong personality, a rich and 
powerful sensitivity, cosmopolitanism and a strong cultural open 
mindness. The profil many seem highly demanding but as al 
Mutanabi has put it :(18) 
Edifying tasks require outstanding will as virtue requires a 
generous soul. 
B . Modernity: that uncertain promise 
The issue of modernity has become the central issue in 
contemporary thought. It arouses every where intense and 
polemical debates. 
In Europe .Habermas has attempted to adopt a middle way 
position between neo-conservatives and deconstructionists(19). He 
believes that modernity is an uncompleted project. Western 
technological achievmemts are valuable scientific acquisitions 
which undoubtedly add and enrich our life -world "a~fkl~~rung" . Yet, 
European societies have paid a much too high price for it. Hence, he 
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condemns" the devastation of the communicative social potential 
through the instrumentalization of professional life. The 
mobilization of the work place, the extention of competition and 
performance pressure, even into elementary schools. The 
monetarization of services, relations and life's stages. The 
consumerist redefinition of personal life spheres, the 
bureaucratization and legal regulation of private and informal 
spheres of action and above all the political administrative 
incorporation of school, family, education and cultural reproduction 
in general". (20) 
Neo-conservetives like 0.8ell criticise modernity and consider 
it as the project of the bourgeois culture: pragmatic, rationalistic 
and materialistic. They recommend religion as the solution.(21) 
Post Modernist Lyotard defines "modernity" as that "W h i ch 
designates any science that legitimates itself with reference to a 
meta-discourse ;making an explicit appeal to some grand narrative 
such as dialectic of the spirit, the hermeneutics, the emancipation 
of the rational or working subject, or the creation of wealth"(22). 
Post-Modernists consider modernity as an outdated issue. We 
already have entered Post-Modernity, the era of informatised 
societies and banal truth. "It is, according to lyotard, the era 
of the sublime where the philosopher does not narrate 
anymore but creates"(23). 
5 
Habermas criticises both neo-conservatives and post- modernits 
deconstructionists:- The former because of their hypocrisy."'" Since On 
one hand, they welcome the process of societal modernisation and 
on the other hand they lament about its cultural poverty. they 
confuse cause and effect and seem ready to throw out the baby 
with the water. The later, because of their nihilism, they want to 
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make us believe that they stand nowhere. That is simply 
inconceivable. It is an ad-hoc negation which can but leads us 
back to context dependent reason. Habermas asserts that : "Social 
purposes are better served by beautiful ways of 
harmonizing interests 
detaching oneself from 
of Lyotard's c1ai mSis that 
to 
rather than by sublime way 
other's inter~t"(24). Indeed one 
of 
of 
since consensus is impossible, the best 
performativity and to the temporal thing is to hold 
co nve n a nt(25) .tYet how can we expect justice from the temporal 
convenant which in essence is oriented to promote the interest of 
someone over that of another ? 
It is quier easy to understand the sublimation which blures the 
deconstructionists from a historical perspective, Western culture 
has jumped from the medieval dark ages to an enlightened era. We 
know what happens usually to anybody who comes directly to light 
from total darkness. He is blurred and may well confuse his 
blurness with sublimity. That is what we believe, has happened to 
the deconstructionists. They have come to light through western 
cultural contact with the Eastern theory of "illumination" via the 
works of Diderot, Voltaire, Shopenhawer, Nietz~s1,e, etc .... Instead 
of absorbing light progressively and selectively as does a Habermas 
and others like him7 =they have been blurred with the spectrum of 
modernity and led to nihilism. As Rorty has put it, "we could 
agree with Lyotard that we need no more metanarratives, 
but we also certainly ought to agree with Habermas that 
we need less dryness"(26). 
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C . Modernity In the Arabo-Islamic Society 
Habermas tells us that the term modernity is derived from the 
Latin location "Modernus" which was introduced to distinguish 
Christian era from the pagan past(27). Yet, the belief persists 
that modernity is an anli-religious phenomenon. Does being 
modern means to be at octj's with religion. The question is at the 
heart of the Modernity debate within the Arabo-Islamic society? 
We understand by modernity a state of mind " un 8tat d'esprit" 
In harmony with its own time and space, a psychological attitude 
which expresses a willingness to assume history. Hence, we 
consider all living nations today modern in the sense that they are 
all in their variety contributors to the project modernity. 
All the people of our era have witnessed man's conquest of the 
moon. They all have shared that exiting and proud historical 
moment with the American team of Astronauts, well aware that 
behind the technical prowess, hides the obssessive and frantic lust 
for power inner to man's nature. Thus, while the achievement is by 
itself a modern act symbolizing our reasonable quest for progress. 
The motives lying behind, cristallized into that fierce arm's race in 
which nations are totally engaged; are far from being modern. We 
could put it otherwise and assert$ that modernity is a moral virtue 
which honours the human being and qualify his dedication for the 
betterment of the human condition. 
From that definition, we can infer that modernity is not 
modernization which consists in the edification of large urban 
centers related with high-ways and communication networks. 
Hence, while most occidental nations are modernised societies, 
they are not necessary all modern. 
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Therefore when modernity is presented to the arabo-islamic 
world in the form of modernization; it is automatically rejected 
because of its identification with "occidentalization" which in turn 
is linked to imperialism, colonialism and zionism. 
Occidentalisation has it that modernity is technology and 
nothing else. Thus, if the body does not fit into the bed, then all you 
need to do is cut the body and and makes it fit. We have while 
dealing with development explained the reasons why the Arabo-
Islamic world rejects economica~ determinism.We need to say a 
few more words on technology. 
D . Islam and Technology 
Recently, a scholar has reviewed the argument put forward by 
those who hold Islam to be incompatible with technology and 
resumed those arguments into the following :(28) 
1) Islam is a religion requiring performances and rituals which 
are incompatible with the pre-requisite of technology. 
2) Islam is based on divine causality and this is completely at 
oddes with scientific rationality. 
3) Islam promotes an unbalanced relationship between men and 
women and hence blocks social development. 
We could of course reject all these charges as unfounded, biased 
western ethnocontric prejudices and put them aside. But ,we could 
bear them attention and examine their validity claim. We have in 
our epistemological inquiry established that Islam is a rational 
religion which encourages and promotes scientific research. We 
have also examined the issue of laicity and demonstrated that 
Islam while elaborating a laicity of its own does not consent to a 
total separation between religion and politics.(29) 
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As to the charge related to the Islamic rituals and their negatilif' 
effect on the society. This seems to be c:tS1 a xenophobic remark 
which has no historical consistency. Have those rituals prevented 
the Muslim from the Abbassid Era from achieving remar@ble 
scientific breakthrough in the fields of mathematics, medecine and 
Alchimy? Do religious rituals today prevent the chinese or the 
Japanese from technical skills? 
There were times, where our ancestors tried to resist 
modernization. Anecdotes about Saudi-Arabia "ulemas" rejecting 
the phone and similar gadgets are famous.(30) {his however, far 
from being a shameful conduct is a natural instinct. We all abhore 
novelties specially when they are imposed upon us in a violent way. 
Today, the era of glorious certainly has passed away; we have 
come to realize that not all novelties are worthed. \;~e need to be 
selecti'fl3in our modernity. \Je need to keep our vigilance aw~e in 
order not to be blurred by the magic of modernity. 
In all fairness, we should not repraoch to the Arabo-Islamic 
society its hypocritical stand vis-a-vis modernity. Our desire for it 
is tempered by ou r fear of its devastating social costs . 
It is like someone playing with fire, like chronos in his char, we 
ought not to step beyond a certain line. 
Modernity is a dream toward which mankind has been longing 
since earliest times. Technology is the tool which makes the 
project looks more real than it is. We therefore, ought not to 
confuse the mean for the end nor should we loose sight that in 
order to conquer modernity, we need first to conquer man's good 
nature and win his dedication to love and brotherhood. 
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E . Islamic Fundamentalism: 
neither ghosts nor puppets. 
There has been much fuss about this social phenomenon which 
has bursted lately allover the islamic World(31). 
Western analysts who abhore whatever does not correspond to 
their sacred " canons" of scientism have reduced it to a non-
rational mouvement. They have with the help of a media system 
dedicated to scoops and novelties, made of islamic fundamentalism 
the uncontested number one of all international events. 
The story begins with the outburst of the charismatic figure 
of AI-Imam AI-khomeiny who from Paris guided the Iranian islamic 
u 
revolution against the Shah's secular regime. The trimph of the 
Iranian islamic republic sent a strenuous wave allover the islamic 
world which produced here and there strong echoes. 
The collapse of the communist bloc and its desintegration has 
prompted and reinforced islamic fundamentalism as the last refuge 
against western cultural imperialism.(32) 
An acquainted student of islamic history would easily identify 
this trend of Islamic fundamentalism as a reccurent one which 
bursts every time the islamic community confronts a real threat. 
This historical mecanism has already given birth to a serfJ};f' of 
fundamentalistic movements such as Shiism, Kharijism, 
whahabi sm and so fo rth. The rece nt ve rsion lab:c)~(t~J radical 
islam(33) is the off-shot of that secular extremism pm"ned by such 
prominent leaders as Ataturk and the Shah . The later is 
unamimously identified as the father of secularism within the land 
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of islam : " all resistance to the impetious torrent of modernity is 
futile because that tor~nt is so strong that it will pierce 
mountains, flies in the sky, sweeps away the nation striving to 
survive with a medieval mentality and primitive superstitions and 
condemnes them to perish or to be enslaved and humiliated".(34) 
The failure of the national state regime Jether in its socialist 
or liberal version has left the Arabo-islamic society with no other 
choice but to retreat to that old and conforting refuge which is 
religion. Islamic fandamentalism is first and formost a cultural 
phenomen. It expresses in a violent way the distress of a society 
facing the threat of deculturalization. The fundamentalist thus, is a 
terrorized citizen who attemp~ to hide his terror through 
simulation and religious identification. 
The more the threat becomes stronger, the more he is inclined 
to proselytism and provocation which he proudly displays in dress 
e. 
and condu(tThere is no wonder therfore that he ends up a terrorist; 
that is the negation of negation itself. 
Remarkable in this respect, is that cultural wave to which 
Islamic fl0ndamentalism has given rise all over the Arabo islamic 
world. 
It has been labeled according to that first battleground of AI-
jihad "the Afghan wave". The wave consists of cultural festivities 
which take place particularly within "ghettos" of large urban 
centers. 
. Hence, during religious ceremonials such as the Friday's prayer., 
~The places nearby the mosques are invaded by islamic "zeal lots" 
who display on the ground an impressive bazar : video films and 
cassettes of the most famous preachers; perfumes and islamic 
toothpaste (siwak), robes and tchadors; buletins, books and reviews 
glorifying the islamc ideal city etc ... hence, one is submerged by a 
strange feeling of nostalgia and cultural affinity and let himself 
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easily consoled by that securing mass schizophrenia. 
This state of mind which seeks refuge and peace within the 
realm of fantas y and illusion will last as long as the muslim being 
feels threatened,prosecuted and humiliated in his intimate values 
and convictions. Islam could well have remained that inoffensive 
lamb which it has al~wats been, had not the western world first 
became a wolf. Modern culture ought to open its gates to muslims 
in the same way that themselves are requested to dig a passage 
from the closed gates of "Ijtihad" in order to rejoin modernity and 
humanity at large. 
Assessement 
We have embarked in this chapter on an adventurous expedition 
which consists in an attempt to retrace the cultural dimension of 
international law. 
Throughout the exposition of the basic cultural features of the 
Arabo-islamic society, we have strived to establish the vital link 
which ties together norms and values. We have gone so far as to 
argue that a legal norm which has no cultural substance backing ~ 
is an illegitimate norm which fails to command adhesion because 
of the lack of symbolic validation inherent to its artificial and 
bureaucratic essense. 
In order to carryon such an intricate quest, we have leKt/--
,J \) 
compelli to desert the orthodox legal methodology of positivism. 
Such a reductionist methodology is unable to " reflect" socio-
'", 
cultural phenomenon in their globality and who lism 
(¥S/ 
We have from the start make it clear that our aim is not so 
much to indulge into some grandiose objective analysis of 
international law as it is to try and contribute to it t;enrichment 
through our own subjectivities. 
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It is our feeling that dogmatic positivism is out of date. 
Entrapped as it is within a net of bureaucratic procedures and 
formalities, hindered by a fallacious and artificial terminology : 
Territorial sovereignties, contracts and so on .... It can no longer 
follow the path initiated by post modern international society in 
direction of regional community building and (block's) constitution. 
Economic protectionism and the growing need for regional security 
outlets, will reinforce this pattern and ring the collapse of the 
positivistic stronghold on international affairs. As wallerstein has 
put it . "1989, rings not the begining but the end of Pax 
Americana,,(35). 
Law is impelkd within such an extensive international 
athmosphere to regain its mediating function in order to pave the 
way for change and trans_ formations within the world strata. 
Can the world community submit eternally to the logic of force, 
brutal power politics and obey only those who by the sword and the 
bombs entertain the reign of terror? 
Can the world community still tolerate an order which relies 
ex.eclusively on tyrants and dictators implanted througkout the 
periphery by the imperial powers of the center? 
Can the world community remains undefinitely deaf to the 
aspirations of millions of people who long to live in honor and 
dignity, who dream unceasingly of being ruled by honest, diligent 
and competent rulers? The late Sir Holmes Jr, is reported once to 
have said to a class of law students : " Your business as lawyers is 
to see the relation between your particular fact and the whole 
frame of the universe,,(36). 
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That, we have strived to achieve by alerting the student of 
international law to the importance which cultural factors play in 
the formation of international norms. rBur hope while doing that is 
to contribute to the cultural decolonization of international law. 
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Concluding Chapter 
Conflict Vs Dialogue 
The Dilemma Of The International Community 
When' . people get tired of fighting each other, they ressort 
to talks and diplomacy and when again, they become tired of talks 
or are i'A short of arguments, they revert to war. This 
Clautzwickian dialectic of peace and war is a prominent feature of 
the human condition. It is particularly a feature which has 
characterized the historical relationship between the western 
world and the Arabo-Islamic one. 
During the 1970's, it becqme. a fashion, to emphasize dialogue 
and mutual understanding at the international level as well as at 
the regional Dialogues which all came to a deadline in the face of 
the staunch refusal of the western powers of the notion of global 
international negociations as opposed to their favorite "case by 
case" formula. It may seem very rational to dismiss the vision of a 
global international negociation as an "Utopia" irrelevant to the 
reality of the international community. Yet, it is no less rational to 
contest the blindness of the one-sided policy of "case-by-case". 
In this chapter, we intend to examine what are the chanceS for 
C{,f,Q 
dialogue as a mean to help promote an international order mt;ch 
equitable and balanced than the one prevailing now. Tremendbus 
effort is display.ed both in the fields of le~al theory and 
international law in direction of a communicative action and a 
practical rationality which will allow for a peacefull settlement 
of disputes and help to promote cooperation and a new 
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International consciousness which will enable the international 
community to free itself from egocentrism and discrimination. 
We will also '. examine what can be done in respect to 
regional cooperation and what is known as the Euro-Arab dialogue. 
It is our belief that such a dialogue is the road to " detente" and 
reconciliation. 
section One: legal Theory : From Harsh Positivism, 
to Smooth Communicative Action 
What is law? 
This is the everlasting question which moral philosophy and 
jurisprudence seem unable to provide with a satisfying answer. Is 
law the will of the strong? Or, is it rather, the device of the weak? 
Does law ensure order, or does it apply justice? SocrateS used to 
think that law is a form of flattery and deception and that it is 
better to suffer wrong doing innocently than to do wrong legally. 
Indeed, he did so and was condemned by that deceitful law. Since 
then, the question of whether a legal rule can be considered so even 
if it is atn unjust has haunted the mind of jurists and has led to 
their splitting into two opposed schools. 
To the natural law school, which runs from Socrates,' and Ciceron 
down to St. Thomas, the Spanish philosophers, Vittoria and Suarez, 
to Puffendorf, Kant and Locke7 Moral principles which objectively 
define right and wrong, are the substance of legal rules. Hence an 
unjust rule is not legal. 
To the positivistic tradition which runs from the Sophistes 
281 
down to Hobbes and Bentham down to Austin and the late Kelsen, 
law is a social fact, an order backed by threat and as such it has 
nothing to do with morals. 
The late version of this unending debate is provided by "Fuller 
... , 
Versus Hart" early in the sixties. (1) Hart argued in Th.e concept of 
~ 
law that the legal system is an order backed by threat; " the 
gunman situation writ large"(2). Hart suggested his division of 
legal rules into primary and secondary rules, whereby the 
secondary rules would be power-conferring and would serve to 
legitimate the primary rules. This, he hold> to be of paramount 
importance in the history of human society. it is as important as 
the discovery of the wheel(3). It allows, according to him, the 
human society to quit the "pre-legal" stage and enter the legal one. 
Hence, Hart stresses, " ... a transition to the legal world occurs 
when the society first conceives and applies to its affairs the 
notion that a rule may confer a power to make or change rules of 
duty". Such is the role of the rule of recog nition( 4). 
What Hart obviously misses in his notion of law, is, in the 
words of Fuller " a recognition of the role legal rules play in 
making possible an effective realization of morality in the actual 
behavior of human bein~"(5). Law, asserts Fuller, is not one way 
projection of authority. It cannot be based on the managerial model 
because law is a purposive activity. It is an act of communication 
and that is something more than surviving. It is a way of being 
alive"(6), Law, according to Fuller, should not be associated with 
force or with efficiency. Such an association is a departure from 
the principle of law's inner morality and constitutes an affront to 
man's dignity as a responsible agent(7). Fuller distinguishes 
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between the morality of duty: II do not ste~l" and the morality of 
aspiration " love your neighbobi,r". The later alone, asserts Fuller, 
aims at preserving and enriching our social existence.(8) 
Fuller has left us since and Hart has come to admit that the 
relationship between law and morality is not as simple and clear 
cut as first, it was thought to be. To argue for instance that a legal 
system such as that of the Nazi regime is sound and legal is to 
justify those for whom Hart's model is the incarnation of the 
colonialist situation, where by the indigenous population would 
obey the law of the white man either by fear or by a vague sense 
of obligatedness·(9) 
Nowadays, the jurisprudential debate has shifted to the level of 
interpretation and legal reasoning. Hart has come to admit the 
existence of a penumbral zone between the legal and non-legal 
worlds. Within that zone of doubt, Hart recognises that judicial 
discretion plays an important role in legislation and the creation 
of norms(1 0). Hart has even gone further and admitted openly that 
natural law theory's chief and very great merit, is to show the need 
for an understanding of law in the context of other disciplines. (11) 
Now if that is so, then Moles is justifiably right in charging Hart 
with the responsabilty of cutting adrift modern legal theory from 
its philosophical insight.(12) Moles, not only condemns Hart for 
his misunderstanding of the Austinian legacy, but also, considers 
the Hartian model as fundamentally flawed and false.(13) 
On the whole, however, there seems to be emerging a general 
awareness among lawyers in regard to the obvious 
complementarity of morals and law, Dworkin, for instance, takes a 
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middle way position between Fuller and Hart and attempts to 
reconciliate law and morals. In his latest work, he argues that : 
"law's empire is defined by attitude, not territory or power or 
process, law's attitude is constructive it aims in the interpretive 
spirit to lay principles over practice, to show the best route to a 
better future. It is finally a fraternal attitude, an expression of 
how we are united in community though divided in project, interest 
and conviction." (14) Dworkin argues that the ideal of law as 
integrity not only permits but fosters different forms of 
substantive conflict or tension within the overall best 
interpretation of law and in that, he fully agrees with Habermas) 
critical potential of interpretation. Where he seems to retract, is 
when he insists on our ability to reach a coherent and monistic 
truth.(15) Hence, at the end Dworkin remains trapped within the 
positivistic bias and despite his mixed monism fail to apprehend 
law as a social communicative mediator. 
Silverman, on his part I has urged for a dualistic legal theory 
which combines analytical standards with insight from natural law 
theory and provides a genuine next step towards post positivist 
reconstruction of legal reasoning.(16) Silverman distinguishes 
within the positivistic school, two currents : pure monism such as 
that of Hart and kelsen and mixed monism such as that of Dworkin. 
In his opinion, both currents are unable to apprehend complex legal 
phenomenon in which occurs a structural transformation 
converting illegality to legality.(17) A legal phenomenon, tells us 
Silverman is any event relation, or act to which legal culture gives 
special significance. In order to give a complete account of the 
normative structure of legal phenomenon, Silverman presents us, 
with his three stages theory of structural legal transformation: 
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formal illegality, problematic illegality and legal illegality. While 
positivism condemns for instance the United States constitution 
and its ratification as illegal because not conformed to the rule of 
recognition prevailing then) Dualistic legalism considers it to be 
the inaugural event in a narrative setting a new legal system.i.e. 
the achievement of legal illegality.(18) 
This last point has been the topic of much argumentation. 
Positivism in general has shown a rather rigid stand vis-a.-vis 
legal changes and revolutions. Bentham was appa&led by the French 
revolution, Kelsen considers the idea of revolution as a blow to 
that of a legal system and Hart though sharing the same premises 
with his predecessors has come under constraint to adopt a wait 
and see position. This is reflected by the circularity of his 
argument in regard to the authorising rule, whereby we cannot have 
obedience to law until we know what the authorising rule is and 
we cannot know what the authorising rule is until we have 
obedience to law. (19) 
It is because of the refusal to recognise legal fictions that 
positivism cannot conceive of legal changes. Hence, it either 
reject.s revolutionary government as illegitimate or else, considers 
them such lin the case of the Nazi regime, legal. Indeed, legal 
fiction wt+ich Fuller defines as " a statement propounded with a 
complete or partial consciousness of its falsity and recognised as 
having the utility,,(20)or as a useful device ensuring equilibrium 
betwen rules and principles so that neither the scope of the rule 
nor that of the principle exeed each other . 
/{here is an urgent need today to conceive law and morality not 
as opposed notions but as complementary conponents of the same 
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social lifeworld. ~w, as Bodenheimer has argued.i3elongs to both 
I 
spheres of empirical reality and normative ideality. Its anchorage 
in these two domains may be uneven and shifting. Yet, law is of 
value to human society only when grasped as a bridge from a human 
"all too human" world to a higher and more nob~IQ realm.(21) 
Indeed, the debate between those who uphold a procedural 
ethic of right and those who advocate the supremacy of the 
ultimate good, will stimulate our social integration only if both 
parties acknowledge the complementarity of their competing 
validity claims and strive mutually for an emancipated legal 
theory. 
Lawyers should seek to forge a midway in between the two 
extremes in order to rejuvenate that practical rationality and 
wisdom like knowledge "Phronesis" which our illustrious 
precedecessors from Aristotle down to Averroes and 8t Thomas, 
8ha'ttibi and Austin have all sought to preserve. There has been a 
time where positivism could be looked upon as a revolutionary 
doctrine which burst@kd in order to co~~ct the mythical falkcies 
propagated by natural law theo~rtical excesses. Today, in its turn, 
positivism has become a dogma and is strangulating modern legal 
theory. 
To deny that doctrinal current altogether is to commit that 
same mistake which has discredited positivism. Therefore, as 
Virally has wisely advifj:ed:(22) 
" Nobody seeks to replace positivism or deny its merit. Yet, its 
short-comings are all too visible. Those who have forged it have 
greatly exag~rated some of its aspects while oversimplifying some 
others. It is about time to submit it to a thourough reappraisal." 
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A neo-positivist such as MacCormick today would argue that 
the demand from people to be law abiding is never and can never be 
morally a neutral demand.(23) That law embodies ideology does 
not commit analytical jurisprudence either to legitimating or to 
denouncing particular legal orders. The analytical approach offers 
a theory of reasoning that replaces certainty by the plausibility of 
a democratic search for consensus(24). On the other hand, 
moralists would contend that the fact that practice has failed to 
extract itself from the social context does not mean that we 
should disavow the objectivist ideal and its technological 
breakthroughs all together. Instead, both currents should seek to 
enhance that wisdom which Aristotte called "phronesis" that 
unending and ever- renewing human-energy which resolve 
unexpected conflicts whenever they occur. 
'1 
To conclude this brisk exursion in the realm of legal theory 
lets us state that the point is not so much to establish the 
closeness of the natural law theory to the islamic one , as it is to 
underline the fact that human society is in need for both law and 
morals. If it is to be granted that the Arabo-Islamic society in 
order to emerge from religious fanaticism needs a sober and 
vigorous shaking of its deficient mentality, then, it should also be 
granted that western society is in a similar need for moral 
enhancement in order to step out from the cold and annihilating 
positivistic log ic. 
In islamic legal reasoning, Shattibi has argued for a purposive 
law whose aim is the achievement and the preservation of the 
287 
society's well being. His analytical theory which we have 
summarized in an earlier chapter combines a mUltitude of legal 
devices to maintain the equilibrium between secondary and primary 
rules. It is true that islamic legal theory has that privilege of 
disposing of a stable and undisputed recognition rule. Yet on the 
whole1 at is not as performant as it should be because of stagnation 
and neglect and is as much in need of revitalization as does its 
positivistic counterpart. 
Islamic legal theory has experimented a variety of currents and 
schools stretching from the mere subjectivism of "\ k h wan-
Essafa", to the analytical reasoning of "AI Hanafiyya" wa "E I 
Malikiyya" to the legal formalism of Ibn Hazm. In its infinite 
variety) Islamic law is technically well equipped and can easily 
adopt to historical and political circumstances as shown earlier. 
One reason for this subtelty is its richness of what Chaim 
Perelman would call "confused notions". 
In order to illustrate this last point, we may ressort to explain 
the meaning of Hadith which stipulates, that the divergences 
noticeable among muslim jurists are a mercy to the commmunity. 
Now, taken in its literal sense, this hadith obviously stresses that 
divergence is a typical feature of Islamic legal reasoning from 
which one can infere that muslim Jurists will never reach 
consensus "Ijma" nor agree on an interpretation. That would 
certainly be a hasty conclusion because, as Sha'ttibi has shown. 
Sharia's aim is the preservation and bettermen~nt of sociability. 
Hence, the intention of the legislator can only be grasped within a 
whollistic vision of the sharia's goal. Within such a global frame, 
the Hadith cited above should be interpreted along similar Hadiths 
provided on the same subject, particularly that which precises that 
"My community will never agree upon an error". Thus, we end up 
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with a new understanding of the first Hadith which implies that 
divergence among Muslim jurists, on the validity claim of a rule, is 
a mercy because it is an indication of genuine pluralism and its 
allows the community to elaborate different interpretationS of the 
same rule so as to meet the socio-political context. That is why 
Shattibi has been so adament in his claim that the Sharia should be 
grasped as a whole: "it is well established evidence among Muslim 
jurists that Sharia is looked upon as an image whose details 
confirm its unity; its particularities its generality; its relativity 
its absolutness, etc ... in the same way as the different organs serve 
the hum~n body.,,(25) 
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Misery and Grandeur of 
International law 
Is there a crisis, whithin the field of international law? We 
have all over our work met with a number of scholars who have 
~sed serious doubts and suspicion in regard to international law. 
Some have gone further to challengej the proper existence of such a 
discipline(1) while others, though not denying it, have asserted 
that it is in a deep state of crisis, if not one of decay. (2) 
When nowadays, the student of international law attempts to 
gain insights on the issue and refers to recent litterature on the 
subject, He is bluntly deceived to find none. What particularly hits 
him is that astounding retreat of lawyers behind omnipresent 
power politics which is almost always disguised under the 
modernist plea of realism, or else, that legal formalism delivered 
insipidly under the eternal ex ,cuse of "the Jurist's humility".fhere 
are some more subtle technics, such as that which consists in 
elaborating on the infinite sub-branches of the discipline or in 
classifying data, etc ... Hence, what the student is left with is 
either sketchy theoretical outlines or else vague and abstract 
generalisations. It is all too true that ours is the era of the 
vanishing treatise.(3) 
In a recent edition, De Lepus offers us her definition of the 
concept of international law, ascertaining that international law 
theory is in a state of anarchy. (4) The author provides us with her 
midway concept which seeks to reconcile normativism with social 
process analysis. In the "preface" she urges for an inter-activism 
which will explain how international rules emerge in the 
international society. Yet, she fails to elaborate on the meaning of 
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"inter-activism" which a priori is an obscure divice. De Lepus 
sees (5) international law as a normative system, rules and 
obligationsy Which may be created and continuously revised by a 
process in the way suggested by the social process school. After 
this hazardous depiction of the dilemma of international law the 
reader has certainly a clearer idea of the anarchy ravaging the 
c 
disipline. De Lepus, despite noticeable efforts to trace the 
formation of international rules in form and substance, fails to 
tackle vital issue i; dividing the international community and her 
theoretical essay) as a reader has noted 1 raises more questions than 
it answers.(6) 
Professor Nguyen's new edition "Droit international public" is 
worthy of mention here.(7) It is a voluminous compilation of 
material (theory and states practice) it offers an elaborated 
outlook on what goes on in the field. The authors retrace the 
historical formation of the discipline and in this respect they 
follow the traditional historical route from the Greeks and Romans 
to the Middle Ages to the Renaissance, etc... Their historical 
survey is the mo-\§f Europeo-egocentric that one can get and this is 
very surprising coming from an Asian native. Not a hint is given to 
WA 
non-stern influences on the development of international law. 
Their exposition of the doctrinal debate is much more balanced and 
include "Ie militantisme juridique" in all its variants. Anglo-
Saxon, French and third-worldist. 1he authors conclude the 
doctrinal debate by stating that despite the emergence of a 
unifying doctrinal trend which they label as "neo-positivisme 
pragmatique".Yet, they observe that no preference should be given 
I 
to labels, for no theoretical refinement can replace the lucid 
observation of reality in its heterogenous diversity and infinity.(8) 
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The authors opt for a contextual understating of law. Their stance 
is almost somewhere in the middle of the French paradigm and the 
work as a whole presents a rather conservative and optimistic 
view of the international society-
A more promising theoretical enquiry is provided by the Italian 
scholar, A. Cassesse. Under a title which by now has become a 
classic, (9) Prof Cassesse undertakes to provide the students with 
a vivid picture of the present international society with all its 
vicissitudes and conflicting patterns. The international society 
which Cassesse depicts is divided horizontally "East-West" and 
vertically "North-South". Through a successful combination of 
positive vigour and analytical insight driven from political science 
and international relations, Cassesse provides us with a 
multifarious enquiry into the sources of division and the promises 
of future perspectives. Examining the present order, Cassesse 
notes that the old "Westphalian "order is still there, like the 
skeleton that can only be seen on x-ray(1 0). It constitutes the' 
frame work on which all the rest is based. The author also notes 
the general dislike of third world countries of intricate legal 
technicalities and their cultural lean toward more general 
principles of international law which by being loose and flexible 
provide the ideal ground for negotiation and the formation of 
i nte rna tio nal ru les. (11) I n his concluding epilog ue, Cassesse 
stresses that the competition will continue between the·, old and 
the new international orders. He adopts a realist position and 
contends that one cannot turn an apple tree into a fig tree just by 
putting a nominal tag on it. Yet, he expresses the hope that the 
international rule will find its way to the promotion of 
international co-existence and the protection of human rights. 
293 
What emerges from the recent literature on international law 
is on the whole hardly comforting. Franck's enthusiastic salute of 
O. Schachter's course at The Hague Academy as a brilliant treatise 
on international law is probably the exception which confirms the 
rule. 
Prof. Schachl-er adopts a teleological approach to the study of 
law(12). An approach which examines the values and ends served 
by the rule of law and enables us to grasp more clearly the 
purposive and instrumental role of law. 
Schachter contends that international lawyers do not and 
cannot limit their analysis to rules and obligations and ignore the 
facts and consequences that give those rules and obligations their 
full meaning. These and similar, Sharp notes, are typical to that 
theoritical "brio" which the author has shown throug!11 out his 
prolific literature. The rest of the course, unfortJaltely IS 
dedicated as an apolegy to American interventionism (Nicaragua, 
Iran). As someone has put it, Schachter's work can be read with 
profit but only if so read with skepticism. 
In concluding our review of the recent literature on the subject 
of international law. we cannot aford to reserve its due place to 
the contrubition of Arabo- islamic jurists to the devel~pment of 
the discipline. Yet, we will attempt to provide the reader with the 
latest in that domain. Two outstanding works edited by two 
outspoken Arab juristts are worth mentioning here. 
The first is Bedjaoui's latest "Droit international" : Bilan et 
perspectives.(13) A voliminous compilationof contributions by no 
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less than seventy jurists from all over the planet. The work 
according to Bedjaoui has three ambitions:( 14) 
1- To innovate in respect to editing and publishing. 
It is an attempt to create a new style which surpasses a 
collectif manual and is a forum, a lively club where jurists from 
all over the world can meet and talk at ease with each other. 
11- It is an initiation and an introduction aiming to provide 
pedagogical training specially designed to stimulate a g~enuine 
cultural pluralism. 
III-It is an attempt to set g rou nd and prepare a plat - form for 
reflexion and thought because very often, wars start in the mind of 
people. 
Examining past records of international law, the emminent 
judge recognises that some progress has been made in regard to 
such vital issues such as : human rights. developement and 
environment (15) . When tracing the future lines for the evolution 
of international law BedJaoui cannot refrain from expressing fear 
about that gloomy vision of the late R. Aron who openly mocked the 
idealism of jurists, and asserts strongly that unless the 
international community demonstrate its willingues to step over 
that naked and egocentric realism by mobilising its energy and 
unifying its ranks against the misery of our actual anarchy; 
International law will retreat and open~ wide the gates of war and 
anihilation. 
The second wor~k is that of the Egyptian international jurist 
EI-Ghun aimi, whom we have already met earlier. Under the 
eloquent litle " Islamic law of peace, a comparative study" the 
Egyptian sch olar under:....takes to provide the reader with an up to 
-date version of how Islam cohabitates and reinforces positif 
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international law (16) EI-Ghunaimi criticises those who like 
khadduri attempts to spread a negatilk image of islamic law by 
exagerating, Its antagonism vis-a.-vis modern law. He believes that 
the antinomy. is surmountable and both islamic and positive 
international law seek to reinforce and preserve international 
peace and they both aim at consolidating international cooperation 
and mutual understanding. Once this I') clearly and convincingly 
demonstrated) EI Ghunaimi moves on to examine islamic law's 
position in regard to the classical international agenda : territory, 
diplomacy state responsability-Iaw of the sea, etc... Every there 
and then, the author emphasizes islamic law's readiness and total 
agreement with positive law. Minimising disagreements whenever 
they occur and concluding his work by stating that islamic law is 
universal and that it will not fail in that respect to re,\nforce and 
enrich international law. 
AI Ghunaimi's treatise on islamic international law is almost 
the unique attempt in its genre through out the islamic world. 
Though I find it apolegetic in tone. I still believe that it 
constitutes the best and more accurate version of islamic 
internationl law. Of course AI Ghunaimi does not have that grasp 
of positive international law which a 8edjaoui has. Neither has the 
later that islamic culture which the former displays 
magnificiently,l the efforts of these two jurists mixed together 
would have been much profitable to the internationl community 
than neither of them has been separatly. To say this is by no mean (;, 
to deny the tremendous contribution that each of them is making to 
the development of a truly multicultural international law. 
The student is unable to understand the lethargic state of the 
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theory of internationl law if he does not turn to examine the 
reality of the internation~s(Jciety. Notwithstanding the all too 
obvious anarchical chaos which characterises the internatio~t 
scene and which Tucker has depicted so welL, What s trikes the 
observer is that deep dichotomy separating the reality from theory. 
Nations repeatedly and insistingly proclaim on every occasion their 
willingness and longing to be law-abiding while continuously and 
regularly behaving in ~n opposite way. The reflection of this 
parodox on the theory of international law has taken the form of a 
coupling between two contradictory principles which the doctrine 
has swiftly absorbed. These principles are : "Pacta sunt servanda" 
and "Rebus sic stantibus". In this bizarre antinomy is summarised 
the misery and grandeur of internationl law and that of the human 
condition all together . 
"Pacta sunt servanda" agreements are to be kept, and nations 
should abide by that to which they have committed themselves. 
This is the basis of the law of nations, the ultimate ground-norm 
without which international law is simply inconceivable. It is, 
Oppenheim tells us, the initial legal hypothesis, a sociological 
rather than a legal notion(17). Puffendorf describes it as the most 
refined expression of all the beUaty of human life(18). P .S.S is the 
cdnerstone on which rest the whole legal pyramid It is a 
sanctified notion whose origin is deeply religious(19). It offers a 
harmonious world view of order and stability and promotes the 
sanctity of contract as that essential of life in any social context. 
" Rebus Sic stantibus" nations have the right to get released 
from their commitments and treaties cease to be binding when 
there has been a fundamental change in circumstances. As a notion, 
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RSS is a two-edged sword(20). It can be invoked for defensive as 
well as for offensive reasons. The world view which stems from it, 
is one of perpetual changes, conflicts, turmoil. Hence, if P.S.S 
comforts the idealist aspiration for world peace and order 
advocated by Rousseau and Kant.; 'RSS' on the contrary supports the 
realist vision of Hobbes and Aron. Bismark believed R.S.S to be the 
privileged tool of the great powers with which they could maintain 
a workable balance of power at the international level. 
Bederman, in a stimulating recent stud/ 21 ), has provided us 
with a deep sighted analysis of the tension between these two 
principles and their historical roots. Conceived first as the 
keyboard for the game of power politics, RSS was later on to be 
adapted by the United Nations platform as a peaceful mean') for 
changes and adjustment,(22) The Vienna convention has attempted 
to reduce the tension produced by R.S.S, by specifying the conditions 
under which changes are to be invoked as justification for release 
from obligations. These are according to Article 60 of the 
convention: 
1- the existence of the circumstances invoked constituted an 
essential basis of the consent of the parties. 
11- the changes could not be foreseen at the time of negotiation. 
111- the changes would transform radically the obligations. 
IV- the changes should not be the result of a breach by the 
complaining state. 
V-the changes should not affect the establishment of boundaries. 
This has proved to be a vain attempt since, RSS, as 8ederman 
has concluded, continues to upset likewise the functionalist, the 
realist, and the critical jurist. Like the physical realities of 
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gravity and motion, It remains anchored to international law and 
despite all the zealous novelties of legal imagination., We cannot 
escape it.(23) 
In the Arabo-Islamic culture, the notion of P.S.S holds a central 
position. In Arab social life; The 'words given "EI-Kalima" is the 
mark of manhood. Coranic exhortation to honour the "Aath" and 
preserve the sanctity of promises are numerous and firm. The 
notion is so central in i~ the culture that no writer on Islamic law 
has ever omitted its omnipresence(24). Western tourists cannot 
fail to notice nowadays that merchants and businesmen in the 
Middle East continue until today to conclude their transactions 
verbally and very seldom resort to written contracts and that 
mainly because good faith and trust are dominant within the 
islamic cu Itu re. 
At the international level, mainly because of the absence of 
good faith, the Arab world as an effective force within the third 
world blo~ ~as recently ressorted to R.S.S and proclaim) the 
urgency to review the rules regulating the international society. 
This is the whole debate on N.I.E.O and development. 
In order to find the reasons for this preconceived standard 
western view of the Arabo-Islamic society, we may need to dig 
deep into the roots of orientalist philology. Yet, we feel that we 
have done enough of that already. What may help our understanding 
of the contemporary Arabo-Islamic international attitude IS 
perhaps to try and look at how the Arabs view 'RSS' today. As we 
have argued in Chapter One, there is a long haul between the era of 
colonialism and that of liberation, between the "Westphalian" order 
and NIEO. Within the new-emerging order, 'RSS' incarnates in 
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Arab's eye their right to self-determination, or, in other words, 
their right to a decent life, a life with dignity and honor, the right 
of a cultural personality to be treated as the equal of all other 
entities which compose the international community. It is 
probably a self-judgement and 'RSS' is to some extent a self-
attributed judgement. The whole question which remains, 
expecting an answer from the international community, is whether 
or not it is able to emancipate 'RSS' and convert it from that 
destructive and rebellious potential to a constructive and 
universally based legal right. 
In contemporary legal doctrine, the controversy has focussed on 
the issue of interpretation of international rules. We will examine 
the gulf crisis in the next section, right now, letl1s follow the 
controversy from the start. 
The editor of A.J.I.L has aroused the issue in 1970 when he 
loudly asked: Who killed articles 2(4) of the United Nations 
charter? (25) Franck imputed the death of that article to the great 
powers who have entertained the cult of power and drained small 
nations behind them. "It seems, he says, that it is not an age when 
men act out of principles, simply because that is what gentlemen 
ought to do. But living by power alone is nerve-racking and costly 
business. To do it, much must be surrendered· by the citizen, 
individual freedom, a large part of his national income, and the 
chance to live in that comparative tranquillity which comes from 
being liked by others and liking oneself".(26) 
Franck's thesis has been criticised. Henkin has argued that the 
point is greatly exaggerated and that we have not to judge law by 
),' 
(tJ 
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looking only its weaknesses. Henkin believes that article 2(4) does 
not mock us from the grave but still rules us(27). 
Reisman for his part has argued that coercion is necessary, 
though it should not be glorified. He openly states that what he has 
in mind is a virtuous sheriff entering an anarchical western town 
of old times and securing order and stability. If the sheriff fails in 
his task, then, self-help will prevail(28). Reisman suggests the 
notion of "an ongoing self-determination" as a criteria by which to 
distinguish legitimate self-defence from aggression.(29) 
Schachter replying to Reisman has observed that such a notion is 
vague and in fact does no more than promote the use of force as a 
mean for the settlement of disputes. Schachter marks a good point 
in observing that verbal condemnations at the U.N are costly and 
that the absence of sanctions in international law does not mean 
all along the validation of the condemned acts.(30) 
This is how the debate is going on between Americans 
international jurists. In practice, our decade the 1980's, is 
witnessing at the international level a western counter-offensive. 
It all started with the much mediatised styles of "Rambo politics" 
and "Iron Britannia". Combining strategical retreat with sudden 
strikes, that is deserting international institutions where you are 
vulnerable such as the United Nations general assembly and UNESCO 
and reinfor~ing it where your position is dominant like within IMF 
and BIRD, etc. Intervening here and there (Granada, .Malvinas, 
Nicaragua, .. Irak, etc .... ) to make everybody realise that the 
western sheriff, defensor of order and freedom, is still in control 
and that international law is a primitive system of norms with yet 
no meaning at all. (31 ) 
301 
So, is Ca:rty's claim about the decay of international law a 
valid one?(32) Gf course the answer to that question dependS' on 
how we conceive of international law. If we agree to the fact that 
there has been a golden age of international law; that of the 
colonial legacy,' for the western world, and NIEO for the third 
world1 then certainly what we are living today is a decay. However, 
we may also contend that since there has never been any golden age 
of international law. It is still only an aspiration, then, what we 
are witnessing now is that normal state of nature which Carty 
endorses so strongly(33). What in reality provokes disgust and a 
strong feeling of useles~~~ the international jurist is that 
passivity and submissivess of lawyers to harsh reality and their 
snobish retreat behind standardized formalities. 
If there is decay therefore, it is not one of law which Carty 
himself admits, "it is not the worst of literature,,(34), but rather 
a decay in world legal culture and civilisation. The human being is 
not an instrumental but a purposive being. His sociability should 
not be sought whether in the form of nation-states or otherwise as 
a means to obtain maximum power and wealth. It should be sought 
as a mean to freedom and dignity. The human being is endowed 
with a gift and entrusted with a mission. The gift is reason and 
his mission to cultivate human nobility. Only a good balance 
between his animosity and reasonableness can ensure to keep him 
within the right path. The belief that a man can be superior in his 
animosity to another is as much a myth as the belief that man can 
be more rational than his other fellow. If we are to agree with 
Habermas that the animosity in man's nature has so far triumphed 
over his reasonableness and that what is necessary today in order 
to complete the project of modernity and establish a 
302 
communicative action is our determined commitment to make the 
good and the just triumph over vice and evil . 
Franck has observed that there are signs which clearly 
indicates that a universal reassessment of the classical definition 
of national interest is taking form.(35) Indeed, in legal theory as 
well as in politics, a growing interest is taking place for moral 
reassertion. Kenan tells us "that of all the multitudinous celestial 
bodies of which we have knowledge, our own earth seems to be the 
only one even possible surrounded with so much natural beauty, 
heartfulness, and magnificence. Isn't there, whatever the nature of 
one's particular God, an element of sacrilege involved in the 
placing of all this at stake just for the sake of comfort, the fears 
and the national rivalries of a single generation? Isn't there a 
moral obligation to all of us to be the protectors and guardians of 
this gift instead of being its destroyers?,,(36) He then goes on to 
add that the renunciation of self-interest, which is what morality 
is all about, can never be rationalized by purely secular and 
materialistic considerations. A concept of national security that 
ignores the same legitimacy need for othernes's security, lays 
itself open to the same moral reproach.(37) 
Commenting on the need for security, Buzan applies it to 
Waltz's three levels (individual, state, international system) and 
ends up with a wholistic view which he labels "systemic security" 
thereby asserting that systemic security is the road toa mature 
a narc h y. (38) Mod esty put aside, the real achievment is to step 
over anarchy and not to fructify it. A mature anarchy may be more 
devastating than a benign one. In Buzan's mind, it refers to a 
noticeable progress towards peace and stability, yet, +..he aim is too 
modest. A universel consensus is an easy target at one condition, 
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belief in it. Nothing is impossible for a motivated and well inspired 
reasonable man. 
In legal theory as I elsewhere, the real solution to our 
perpetual fight is to establish trust and good faith among 
ourselves and our only source of inspiration is love and 
magnanimity. Unless we make a real effort in that direction, we 
will remain· what our instincts command us to be.; wolves. Our· 
wondering in the field of international law's theory is unlimited 
because of the urgency that we feel in establishing bounds among 
lawyers allover the world. A fruitful communicative action is 
possible only if international lawyers, start ~raising the walls 
which like that of "Berlin" have been separating them for so long. 
That is why~, I believe that my discussion with lawyers and 
scholars-from different parts of the world is not only productive 
but ({!Iso a necessary step to the initiation of a truly multicultural 
spirit which is indispensable to a universal pluralism .. 
Prof. Coil has made recently an attempt to save international 
law from its best friends(39) because as the saying goes; we only 
need protection from friends. Coil examines the current state of 
principles and terminology. Global consciousness which he links to 
the idea of global community and legal absolutism which he defines 
as that general tendency to interpret the U.N. charter against 
aggression and use of force in an extensive way. Here, he ·seems to 
be referring clearly to Franck's thesis examined above. 
Describing these two expressions as"grandiose idealism" Coil 
suggests instead as alternatives: Just war and prudence.(40) I find 
Coil's suggestion very promising and I shall attempt to provide .the 
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reasons why. The concept of the just war "Belum justum" is 
indeed a very useful concept. It has been dropped by positivism 
because of its obvious religious flavor. Nowadays, since primitive 
legal scholarship is regaining ground j the concept of the just war 
could turn out to be one of the most helpful that legal theory has 
produced. Indeed if we are destined to continue fighting each 
other, let us at least do it properly. The main problem which we 
will be facing in regard to the concept of "just war" is as Coil has 
pointed out : how to reach a consensus on its exact meaning? ihe 
concept itself is widely known. Every major cultural system in the 
world knows it in a form or another and there should be no major 
obstacle in reaching a common definition Of course, many would 
object that the international commission of jurists has spent 
almost a decade trying to reach agreement on a minimum 
definition of aggression without much result. But then, we may 
need to be reminded that we do not so badly need to reach a clear 
cut, precise scientistic definition because such a thing does not 
exist and has been allover a positivistic bias. If we combine in our 
approach to the concept of just war that of prudence as Coil 
suggests, we may end up with a surprising international agreement. 
In any case, lawyers have nothing to lose except their vanity. 
A prudential calculus would lead us to a universal 
interpretative process conscious of the fact that ours is not the 
era of certainty but that of moderation. This in turn, should 
increase our communicative receptivity and encourage us to meet 
our partner half the way. Coil's fear of rivalry and opportunism 
will fade away once he acceeds to the reality of otherness and its 
right to a decent and honourable existence. When he, in threatening 
tune, asserts firmly that his society will only support 
international law in so far as it will answer his society's need for 
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security and self-determination, he should realise that the same is 
tru0for all members of the international community and that unless 
our appetitQ~ is prudentially tempered we run the risk either of 
having an indigestion or a star ye ( 
What is so typical to American thought in general is that 
credulous provincialism whith which they tend to interpret social 
phenomenon. It is true that theirs is BJl open society and constitues 
an ideal platform for the construction of an everlasting pluralism. 
Yet, Toremain trapped within your own frontiers way hinders your 
vision of universal values and makes receptivity of otherness 
somehow defficient in some respects. This is the reprcfuh that one 
can cr~ress to that overlapping consensus which Raw~ has been 
trying so hardly to forge for his society. He has come now to 
realize that his consensus is more tied to serve the international 
commumity(41). Yet Rawl~ still holds to political liberalism as a 
platform on which he attempts to construct his plan though he 
warns that his theory of justice detes not aim at the cultivation of 
those values dear to liberalism such as individual autonomy or any 
other exhaustive doctrine. What really Rawls seems to be pursuing 
is an idealised form of sociability w~,h wiLL. ensure6 priority to 
justice and promotes values such as moderation, civility and 
tolerance. Exactly the same idealised form of the Islamic traditionr 
Rawls maintains open its flowing imagination and wait for times 
to be favorable(42). In the same way, we maintain hope in the 
future. The international order capable of reducing our divergences 
to a minimum is certainly something not very far away . It will 
bear the mark of every unit composing it and command their 
adhesion and support. 
306 
N 
(1) Austin for instanse, see ( chapter I , Infra). 
(2) Carty.A, the decay of International law, Melland Schill Monographs, 
Manchester 1986. 
(3) Franck. T.M, "The Case of the Vanishing Treatises" 
AJIL 1987/81 (p. 771). 
(4) De Lepus.I.D, "The Concept of Law" Stockholm 1987. 
(5) Ibid (p. 17) 
(6) Ajil, 1988, Review by Ch. Osakwe. 
(7) Nguyen, Ruoe 0, Patrick Daillier, Alain Pellet, Droit International public. 3 ed. 
LGDJ, 1987. 
(8) Ibid, (p. 100) 
(9) A. Cassesse, "International Law in a divided World" Clarendon press, 
1986. 
* That title was used before by R.Higgins and Jenking. 
(10) Ibid, (p.32) 
(11) Ibid, (p. 120). 
(12) Schachter. 0, "International Law in theory and practice", 
RCADI 1982, Vol n° 178 
oxford, 
(13) 8edjaouLM, " Droit International ( bilan et perspectives)". ed A f>€dane, 
UNESCO, 1991. 2vol. 
(14) Opcit, ( Avant propos). 
(15) Opcit, (p. 1317). 
(16) M.T. AIGhunaimi, "Kanoun Essalam fi AI-islam", Dar elmaarif, 1988. 
(17) Oppenheim.L, "a treatise of international law" ed . lauterpactlt, 
green, 8 ed, 1955, ( p.15). 
Longman 
(18) Puffendorf.S, "De jure nature and gentium" Book III, chap IV ,(p. 12). 
(19) Hans Webberg, "Pacta Sunt Servanda" AJIL: 1953, Vol. 53 (p. 782). 
307 
(20)Ting Young Huang,"The Doctrine of Rebus Sic Stantibus in International Law", 
Shanghai, 1935. See also A.R.ubin, AJIL 1987 . 81 (p.774) . 
(21) Bederman.D.J, "The 1971 London Declaration Rebus Sic Stantibus and a 
Primitivist View of the Law of Nations". AJIL, January 1988, VoI.82,(pp.1-47). 
(22) Opcit, (p.28) 
(23) Opcit, (pAO) 
(24) See, For instance, S. Sh. Pirzada, "Islam and International Law", in "The 
Gallenge ·of Islam" ed. A. Gouhar, ICE, 1978 (p. 196). 
(25) Franck, T.M, Who Killed Article 2 (4)? AJIL 1970 - 64. 
(26) Opcit, (.836) 
(27) Henkin. L, "The Reports of the Death of Article 2 (4) are greately 
exagerated. AJIL 1972-65 (p. 544) . 
(28) Reisman.H.M, "Construing Article 2 (4), Coercion and Self Determination", 
AJIL, 1984/78 (p. 643). 
(29) Opcit, 644. 
(30) Schachter. 0, AJIL 1984-78 (p. 647) 
(31) Y. Dinstein, "International Law as a primitive system" Journal of Int. Law and 
Politics: No.1 Vo1.19, Fall 1986. 
(32) Carty, opcit. 
(33) Carty stresses that nations are in a state of nature. 
(34) Carty, opcit. (p. 128). 
(35) Franck, AJIL 1970 
(36) Kenan.G.F, "Morality and Foreign Policy". Foreign affairs Review, Winter 
85/86 (p. 207). 
(37) Opcit, (p. 217) 
(38) Buzan.B, "People States and Fear". Harvester Press, 1983. (p. 252). 
(39) CoII.A.R, "The Limit of Global Consciousness and Legal Absolutism: Protecting 
International Law from its best friends". Harvard Law Review, Spring 1986, Vol. 
27, No.2. 
(40) Opcit, (p. 599) 
(41) Rawles. T, "L'idee d'un consensus par recoupement", Revue De Metaphysique et 
308 
de Morale, 1988,(p. 3). 
(42) Rawles. T, "La priorite du juste et les conceptions du bien". 
dans: Archives de philosophie de droit. Tome 33 - Sirey 1988. 
309 
Section three:Thr Gulf War 
Here is one of the most impressive outbreaks of peace never 
witnessed since world war two. It is the worst " natural" 
catastrophy ever planned and coldly executed by the big occidental 
I~~ 
powers with Y open aim of consolidating and reasserting their 
stronghold on Arab oil. 
Such a cataclysmic conclusion of the twentieth century has 
coincided with the international conference held in " Rio" as that 
utmost chance to rescue a suffocating planet. 
Some will tend to dampen their discomfort vis-a-vis this war 
by alleging that it has promoted international legality and has 
allowed the security council to recover all its "punch" which In 
turn has prompted the United Nations machinery to recover its 
rigor and play an active role in international life . Idle is all that, 
brutal force and destructive power has never cured nor solved any 
problem and will never do. The U.S.A may have a short historical 
memory but not Europe with all its records of bloody wars. Only 
talks and negociations are able to overcome human misery 
A. Juridical Aspects of the Crisis 
To try and decipher the juridical puzzle woven around the Gulf 
crisis is no doubt an interesting exerci~e which helps to sharpen 
the jurist's technic. So, we have judged opportun to go over that 
"colloque" held on the Gulf crisis at Nanterre University during the 
Sumer 91(1). Note_worthy is the presence at the "colloque" of the 
Algerian emminent jurist Bedjaoui whom we have quoted heavily in 
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our work and towards whom we are certainly in debt for his 
tremendous contribution to the promotion of a truly well balanced 
and multicultural international order. Bedjaoui was the single Arab 
scholar to attend the gathering which reassembled Occidental 
scholars. The debate was quiet tense and polemical and reached its 
climax between Gendrau and Eismann. 
/ 
The masterpiece of the "colloque" was that "expose" presented 
brilliantly by Ralph Zaklin(2) on the role of the United Nations 
organization in the Gulf crisis. Zacklin divided the (risis into three 
phases : the prelude, the heart of the crisis and the post- crisis 
period. Commentiing on the first phase, Zacklin noted that at the 
begining the security council stricf~y conformed with the 
dispositions of the charter in its interpretation of chapter II. 
It followed the gradual sequence from (article 39 : the 
ascertainment of aggression) to (article: 40 the provisory 
measures) then to (article 41 : Economic embargo). 
The juridical confusion starts with (article 42 : use of military 
force). When by August 25 th . 1990, resolution 665 was adopted? It 
indicated clearly that the security dJoncil intended to use chapter 
VII only as a framework for its action rather than as a rigid 
guide lin e. (3) Zacklin concludes as a result, that Resolution 665 is 
from a juridical and constitutional point of view ambiguous. It 
shows clearly the intent of the security council and its willingness 
to combine in an innovative manner the different dispositions of 
chapter VII. The innovation, asserts Zacklin is clear in the case of 
resolution 678 which definitely cuts the links wll1ith\l~the security 
c8'ncil and transfer; the whole issue within the hands of the five 
super powers. From then on, it was convenient for them to abandon 
the collective security basis for that of legitime defense. 
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Zacklin defines that opeJation as a contractual "renoncement" 
by the security council (9f8{ft~ prerogatives. During the late phase. 
Resolution 687 was adopted and that also, according to Zacklin is 
an ambi~'ous resolution which constitutes a historical instrument 
without precedent in the history of the United Nations. (4 ) 
In concluding his "expose", Jacklin openly admits that if the 
Gulf crisis is a victory for collective security it is also and 
unfortunately a defeat in regard to the principle of peaceful 
settlement of disputes. The principles of the U.N charter should be 
scrupulously and uniformly applied. It should not be the object of 
political manipulation. 
The debate which followed Zacklin's intervention was tense 
between Gendrau, who denonced the intent of the security council 
to seize the apportunity of the gulf crisis and proceed to a global 
revision of the U.N charter, in order to set the ground for a new 
international order. The era following 1945, asserts Gendrau, was 
meant to be that of peaceful coexistence and sought, through 
resructuration of the international community to prohibit the use 
of force and promote negociations as the mean for the settlement 
of disput~. The so called "subtle" interpretation of article 42, has 
done away with that generous hope and has left the international 
community facing an insolvent and explosive situation in the 
Middle-East(5). 
It was up to Eismann to try and balance somehow the juridical 
"mess" in favor of the promoters of the new international order. 
Eismann not without some "brio", mocked the tendency of some 
jurists to turn to the spectrum of legitimacy every time law is not 
in their favor(6). I:~e may be right in asserting that the charter does 
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not impose on regional organization to settle disputes peacefully. 
Thoughf1 it certainly does recommend that to them and solicitate 
their help for such an endevour. It is all auvious that in the gulf 
crisis, the members of the S.C have followed the U.S in cutting 
short all local and regional initatiatives for the peaceful 
settlement of the crisis.The one-sidedness of the security council 
in this crisis has been so ob{~vious that the Irakis labeled it " the 
bunker of imperialism", it is true that the Americans wanted to 
settle the issue in their own way. 8edjaoui presiding the debate 
could not prevent to express his fear that the leonine treaty 
imposed on Irak ( Res: 687) is a prelude to the next conflict in the 
region, He denouced the indiscriminated use of law. Why are the 
'<, /~Qf 
security council resolutions zealously applied only in y pa,;rticular 
case? What has the security council done to stop that bloody war 
which for eight long years has consumed no less than a million 
victirTG between Irak and Iran ? I leave e1ry one of you free with his 
own consc~u~ to answer the question (7). 
Pellet concluded flatly the " colloque" stating openly that the 
jurist should resignate to the fact that law is but the arm of the 
strong(8). Further on, he bluntly goes on to affirm that there is no 
antinomy between law and force while it is all too .rabvious that one 
is the negation of the other~wonder why some occidental jurists, 
not to say the majority of them believe that whatever they say is 
sound and scientific and deny to others "all others" what they 
unilateraly and exclusively attribut to themselves. I would like 
those jurists to try and seek to know what Arab jurists think on 
the issue involved. My colleagues, Algerian fellows, have all 
written plenty on the gulf crisis(9). They may diverge on some 
details here and there, but on the whole, they are unanimous to 
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comde mn the use of such an outrageous violence and mediatic tools 
as coat~ of arms for international legality. They denounce, the 
manipulation of international @rgans by the super powers and the 
discriminated use of law. Why are international lawyers so 
divided? Is it as Cassesse has just reminded us because we live In 
a divided world. Even if that is so and even if everybody else is 
divided)' We international jurists, are the last to be suspected of 
division. How can we seek to promote international law if we 
remain prisonners to territorial and local modes of thought? We 
must ijlnevitably move fast to strenghten our ties, we need to meet 
I 
and know each other, we need to exchange experiences, views and 
theories. Most importantly, we need to learn respect for each 
other~ and why not admiration and love. We must seek by all means 
and every where to put pressure on politicians to confirm to 
law. Without that necessary bo'Und unifying us, we will remain 
divided as we are and in total ignorance of each other. The most 
pious among us will console their consciousness with home prayers 
begging God to save us from our misfortunes and divisions. 
Qtt .. B. The Falls oo:wns of the cnsls. 
Arab intellectuals have lived the gulf crisis as one more Arab 
setback, another "Naksa". They have grown used to defeats and 
humiliation. They are sad and they have every reason to be ~ 
The gulf crisis has demonstrated to even the most 
suspicious among them, that international legality is invoked and 
to say the least efficiently applied only when "they" are 
incriminated. As if they were the only devils living on the planet. 
Occidental powers give that impression that,were they able to 
do so, they would not hesitate to send all Arabs to the farthest 
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planet; Pluton, not to hear of them again and this they will do just 
because Arabs happen to live in an Island of oil. 
Why are Arabs denied almost every thing in this world? 
freedom, unity, religion and what they cherish most eJDbove all 
their"dignity"? 'lhey have no right to claim and should be happy 
whith whatever Occident grant them. A poet of ours has resumed 
the state in which we live today as follow : 
"If you want to live long and be well fed. 
if you want peace 'of mind, wealth and comfort. 
never seek to be a free thinker, nor a patriot. 
never ask questions nor seek to know. 
live easy, lazy and cr~y.,,(1 0) 
What the occidental powers are seeking is "the barbarisation of 
the third world" asserts B. Ghalioun.(11) that will allow them to go 
back to that civilized law of theirs, the colonial legacy and so 
forth. The real aim of the actual confrontation is the definition of 
the substance of internationl I aWl)! Warns Ghalioun, indeed, 
following the Euphoria of the Gulf war; France launched a vast 
compaign calling for the consecration of the duty of intervention 
for humanitarian reasons, taking pretext on the massacres of the 
Kurds by Saddam's regime . It succeeded in convincing the security 
council to adopt on april 1991. Resolution 688 which stipulates 
that humanitarian assistance should be provided to the Kurds in 
North Iraq under the supervision of the United Nations. Arab jurists 
denounced henceforth what they perceived as the return of colonial 
legacy : "resolution 688 is incompatible with the norms of 
international law. It is a translation of power in action and 
constitutes the early signs anouncing the return of "I'ideologie de 
la canonniere".(12) 
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Times have changed. The era of colonization has gone for ever. 
Ours is the era of science, technology and emancipation. Arabs 
asserts the author of "Le Malaise Arabe" are like every body not 
irrational in their solidarity. They attempt to defend their own 
interests 2 they are not moved by any hatred against neither 
Occidentals nor Israelites. Yet, they oppose all hegemonical and 
irrationnal policies in their region. Ghalioun defines what are Arab 
interests, they can be resumed into three categories : 
I - Interests linked to Arab Economic integration 
11- Interests linked to the Palestine question. 
111- Interests linked to Arab development and the control of 
their natural ressources. 
Drawing conclusions from the Gulf Crisis, Ghalioun wonders if 
Arabs are so insensible to legality? They, who have been crying so 
long for justice. He w6nders also, why Occidentals seem so 
indifferent to Arab misfortunes, they who do not miss an 
@.pportunity to claim leadership for freedom and democracy? Arabs 
will never submit to an international order which promotes Israel 
military supremacy in the region. They will seek endlessly to 
acquire technology and overcome their unde<development. Their 
dream is to be an effective culture in the world, a shining 
civilisation cultivating values such as brotherhood, generosity, 
moderation and courage. They want to make due contribution in the 
struggle against hunger and malnutrition. They are eager to promote 
peace and cooperation, they have valuable jokers to play not only 
oil but also their inspiring poetry and fertiLQ imagination. For as 
long as the world accept them as they are; they are ready to forgive 
and show their gratitude. 
316 
Why is the world so afraid of a united Arab empire? Have the 
Chinese or the Indians threaten:yithe world once united? Why the 
Occidental mind is so afraid of an Arab state streching from the 
Atlantic to the Gulf? Europeans have been offered unity and some 
of them have turned it down through referumdums. Why Arabs are 
denied referumdums on this issue? Why nobody has ever dared to 
suggest it? The answer is simple, those who like Nasser have 
envisaged it have been disuaded abruptly. Ghalioun reports the 
champion of European unity, the French J. Delors saying shortly 
after the Gulf crisis : "We should help certain Arab states in order 
to prevent Arab unity". How can we humarl> be so arrogant? "The 
Arabs, affirms Djait, will propably never be able to duplicate the 
second century "H ij ra" but they will certainly be able to create a 
major alternative forrm of medernity"(13). 
The major.ty of Arab intellectuals today are in favor of 
democracy. Yet, they know democracy to be a difficult target for a 
society which refus~ to learn values such as work, creativity and 
solidarity. They knows also that democracy is not easy for elites 
and leaders who ignore the sense of responsibility. Nor is it for a 
population devastated by illet1~cy and fanaticism. They want their 
society to free itself from trivial quarrels and division between 
tradition and modernity, religion and science, etc ... 1hey want their 
culture to step over that nihilistic dialectic of mutual negation 
vis-a-vis otherness. But they qJso want that othe'rness to 
symphatise with them and meet them half the road. Democracy can 
only triumph when exclusivism is banned and when democracy 
itself becomes a common patrimony of all mankind instead of that 
ornement which occidentals want to keep jealously for themselves. 
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The dilemma as Ghalioun has resumed it, is that we do not 
dispose of an efficient measure of national interest. We lack the 
moral capacity to step over egocentrism and that reveals to us our 
tragedy and the need for a universal civism which remains to be 
invented(14). 
It is our OpiniOn, that unless real and living communities 
instead of artificial expedients are given a chance and a place in 
the international stratum,. ~rder and international Reace will 
remain illusions. The falls~~Wn'S of the Gu!f war may st~~~ require 
some times to come. Yet, it is already all too abvious that nothing 
is going to escape the long run effect. 
At the local level, the oily rich Arab Emirates governing the 
region seem condamned to fade away and give birth to a more 
viable form of government ill order to meet the peQple demands and 
ensure regional equilibrium. At the international level also, 
changes are inevitable. As Verhoeven has put it : "It has become 
clear after the Gulf war that a revision of the united nations 
charter is inevitable particularly in regard to key issues such as 
the composition of the security concil and its attributes. 
First : the composition of security council should be reviewed 
in a manner that enhances its "upto-date" representativity of the 
international community. 
Se con d : the action of the security council should obey to the 
control of the general assembly in the same manner that 
government obey in their action to the control of parliaments"( 15). 
A simplification of the international political map is as 
unavoidable as the recognition of the Arabo-Islamic nation as that 
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cultural entity which iscA closely integrated, indissoluble, quasi 
mythical fellowship profoundly conscious of having a single and 
common destiny. 
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Section Four Dialogue The Way out. 
During the 1970's, that glorious era which has given birth to a 
worldwide consciousness about the need for a new International 
tn~\ 
order; (A, new rethoric in the "Parelmanian sense", bursted ~ the 
international level setting the ground for a rich and promising 
literature on vital international issues such as, interdependency, 
international solidarity, common patrimony of mankind, etc .... A 
particular emphasis was given to dialogue and negociation as the 
most efficient means for the settlement of disputes. Hence, a 
whole ser~)of dialogical actions were launched vertically as well 
as horizontally. We talked then of a North/South dialogue. An 
Euro/Arab one etc .... In fact we all realise that there is only one 
dialogue and that it is a universal one . The aim is to allow the 
international community to step out from egocentrism, racism and 
discrimination and to promote humanitarian values, justice and 
friendship. Therefore, no matter how we may lable it> the 
diological action remains the only viable escape from brutal 
confrontation. 
Many have expressed doubts about the feasability of such an 
idealist communicative action. Some have pointed out to the 
tremendous ~abstacles which such action is required to surmount; 
antagonistic national interests, divergent ethical values etc .... 
these @bvious difficulties should not cut adrift our willingness to 
seek our mutual interests in the offshore of peace and talks, nor 
should it temper our eagerness to sustain a communication mood 
I: 
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and increase our eagerness. We have in reality no choice and we 
ought to listen to each other. 
A. Habermas Legal Theory.(1) 
Law asserts Habermas makes sense only when it is intersub-
jectively recognised and adopted by the citizen through socio-
cultural interaction. It is the task of culture to mediate 
between the structural forms of the lifeworld : society and 
personality. What has happened with the secularization of 
bourgeois culture is the dismantling of everyday consciousness 
and its fragmentation, opening hence the fence for the 
colonization of the lifeworld. This phenomenon which Habermas 
has labeled "juridification" has taken the form of a four-stages 
process:(2) 
/- The bourgeois state. 
1/- The constitutional state. 
11/- The democratic state. 
IV- The welfare state. 
Within the later stage, the substance of basic convictions that 
were culturally sanctioned begins to evaporate and legitimation 
becomes a matter of procedures. 
Habermas locates the distortion in Weber's misuse' of the 
selective process of rationalization which has led in turn 
Luhmann to elaborate a sociology of law based on formal 
rationality.(3) Hence, law was confined as a technic to 
reproduce legality and ensure order and stability without 
consideration for the moral and cultural implications. The 
321 
rationality of law has been sought in the procedural norms that 
control the production as well as the application and revision of 
legal norms. Habermas argues that the functional (positivness) 
of law must be combined with a reconstruction of the 
rationality structure garanteeing the legitimacy of law. 
We need to distinguish between law as an institution and law as 
a medium. The former refers to function of law as a mean for 
social i nteg ratio n th ro ug h no rma tive 0 rde ri ng wh i Ie the later 
refers to law as a medium for the distribution of power and money. 
As Eder has put it : "Habermas presents a conception of law that 
defends a moralistic law while simultaneausly criticizing the 
overmoralization of law in present day practice.(4) Law thus, in 
Habermasian term~s, becomes a mediator between the system and 
the lifeworld. Law presupposes a lifeworld in order to function; at 
the same time, it must restrict its regulative function to the 
sphere of systems. As soon as it crosses this border, it destroys 
its own communicative basis and begins to colonize the lifeworld. 
~ 
This colonization takes the form of an expansion of law 'vI/herby 
emerges a trend toward the juristic containement of social 
conflict. Here, we are reminded of that Weberian scheme where the 
occurence of every social problem is met by a bureaucratic 
t 
resolution, i.e. the setting of a comrJltitee or the establishment of a 
rule. 
As Habermas has observed, legislative regulation ought not to 
favor far reaching judicial intervention,' on the contrary, it must 
first and foremost do every~thing possible to "dejudicialize" the 
conflict and let the lifeworld absorbs it through cultural 
communicative action.(5) 
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If, as Habermas has pointed out, one studies the paradoxical 
structure of juridification in such areas as the family, the school, 
social welfare policy and the like, the meaning is to protect areas 
of life that are functionally dependent on social integration through 
values, norms and consensus formation; to preserve them from 
falling prey to systemic imperatives of economic and 
administrative subsystems and to defend them from becoming 
converted to dysfunctional sociations. It is the task of critical 
theory asserts Habermas, to reorient the reality of the developed 
societies toward the learning potential culturally available to them 
and to prevent their further submission to the uncontroled growth 
of complexity' To do that, Habermas proposes his theory of 
communicative action and the construction of a consensus based on 
universal pragmatism. 
In his latest work. Habermas distinguishes four "modes" of 
competing action: (6) 
(1) technological action an action through which an actor 
seeks to implement objectives by choosing means appropriate to 
his goal. This is instrumental action or purposive rational action. 
(2) Norm regulated action which refers to consensual 
activity among the members of a social group. 
(3) Dramaturgical action uncovers the domain of subjectivity 
where there is a self- disclosure of agents in front of each other or 
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of an audience. 
(4) Communicative action: which resides in the abiltity to 
correct the one-sidedness of alternative approaches through 
reliance on language and discourse and leads to mutual 
comprehensibility and thus, grants intersubjective recognition to 
reciprocally raised validity claims. 
The question is how to develop such a communicative action? 
Habermas answers through universal pragmatism which consists in 
the elaboration of a theory of communicative competence which 
will allow the construction of universal conditions of possible 
understanding. In other terms; Universal pragmatism investigates 
the validity basis of speech through the four following tests: 
comprehensibility - truth- co rrectn ess-si nce rity. (7) 
Through this i nvestiga tio n of speech, un ive rsal 
pragmatism directs attention to the infrastructure of speech 
situation in general which is held to involve a form of life in 
which truthfulness} freedom and social justice are possible. 
Critical theory within such a frame is granted therefore on a 
normative standard that is not arbitrary but inherent in the very 
structure of social action and language. 
Habermas pursuing his project hopes that : "the pursuit of 
happiness might one day mean something quite different ... for 
example, from the accumulation of material objects of which one 
disposes privately. It may consist~ in bringing about social 
relations in which mutuality predominates and satisfaction does 
not mean triumph of one over the repressed need of the other. ,,( 8) 
Haberma's dream will see the light only if we agree to restore 
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legitimacy and abid by its logic or in Franck's terms by its "pull 
powe r". (9) 
This index of legitimacy exerts its pull power on states and 
pushes them to obey the law even when it is not in favor of their 
crude national interest. 
What according to Franck makes legitimate rules 
distinguishable from "dead letters or scraps of papers" is that 
teleological substance on which rests the formation of 
communities. It is that substance which command:S'the communities 
adherence to rules.(10) 
1 
Habermas 5test , on the validity of speech situation combined 
with Franck's test on legimitacy could well produce a viable 
theoretical frame-work for communicative international action, 
Such a frame has for long been lacking to sustain practical efforts 
towards the promotion of international solidarity and cooperation. 
All that it requires is faith in the human potential for goodness. 
(f i g .1) 
"Universalism, as Wallerstein has put it, is dear to the western 
heart, it finds its roots in the three great monotheist religions 
we may therefore pursue our desired goals : the fulfillement of 
human potential as we can imagine it, a dialogue of civilizations 
provided that we are in the spirit of Senghor's" rendez-vous du 
don ner et du recevoir" .(11) 
Arkoun agrees with Wallerstein's arpeal for a universal 
communicative action. He believes the integration of the Arabo-
Islamic society to the universal consensusllb~ldung" requires 
three procedural reajustments:(12) 
, 
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1- a recognition of the religious perspective and its place in 
human existence. 
11- the rise of a historical perspective on the cultural domain 
specific to the societies of the book. 
111-1 nte rnational coope ration fo r th e pro motion of a new 
cultural, political and economic order and a new theory and 
practice of authority. 
To make such reajustments possible, "what is required in 
today's climate is not just a restructuring of the Sharia to fit 
western standards but some restructuring of those standards in 
)rder to meet the sharia half way. ,,( 13) 
PF 
The view that most occidental scholars have vthe Arabo-islamic 
:ulture remains trapped within the confirr~ of that orientalist 
3gacy. Binder, for instance, recognises the actual islamic upsurge 
lking place all over the world. Yet, he doubts its willingness to 
leet liberalism half the road. (14) 
The option of the formation of a larger community is possible 
lly if one admits the probability of a global conversation leading 
the emergence of a new cultural and ideological consensus and 
ring rise to a new international consciousness. Binder(1S) does 
Q 
t hide his scepticism toward the Habermasian sheme befor", even 
testing in the field of international affairs. It is note-worthy in 
~e to stress the necessity for scholars and academicians to 
~rcome that overwhelming wave of despair and scepticism which 
hilates before_ hand all efforts aiming to consolidate co-
3tence, trans-cultural interaction and international cooperation. 
, r~ign of terror and mutual destruction leaves us with no oihex 
, <: .. .1"1 <c', c <a • 
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B. The Euro-Arab dialogue. 
" L'incomprehension, consequence malheureuse 
d'une reserve excessive n'aura eu qu'un temps" 
A. Laroui. 
The Euro-Arab dialogue examined at the light of Habermas and 
Franc'k diological process would appear to be an illusion.Such a 
dialogue is defecH~Qin all levels: 
-Level one: there is enough evidence around the controversial 
debate on soft 1/ vs~ hard ru les in regard to such vital issues as the 
right to development, the legal value of UNGAR's etc ... to show that 
very little indeed has come out at the level of comprehensibility 
thus, altering the determinancy of legal rules. 
-Level two: is totally inoperative because of the stronghold of 
positivism on rules formation. 
-Level three: impartial treatment of international disputes such 
as the Palestinion question and the Gulf crisis have rendered this 
level obsolete. 
-Level four: because of the precedent defective attitudes, good 
faith and trust are cruelly lacking between both parties. 
So is there such a thing as an Euro-Arab dialogue? 
5.' Yes, such a dialogue does exist and has a concretCJ hltorical 
backing . Alongside the everlasting hostile relationship between 
I , 
the two worlds, There\have been some .short periods of peaceful J . 
coexistence and perhaps even some glimpses of a fructuous 
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cooperation 
Do we need to recall Harun Rachid's gift to Charlemagne Or that 
of AI-Idrissi to Roger of Palermo, or that generousity which pedro 
of Seville showed to Ibn Khaldun? or yet, that relaxed mood which 
allowed muslims, Jewish and spanish scholars to meet and talk 
under the moonlights of "AI-Hambra" and Cordou? Yes, there exist 
undoubtedly in both camps a persistent peaceful intention waiting 
for favorable circumstances. 
There exists also a certain complementarity between the Arab 
world and EUrope? and Itven if we are to conceed with Laroui that it 
is rather a negative one, there is hope that timet~ has come to turn 
it to a more positive one . B. Etienne, has openly asserted that the 
Arab world is an integral part of the Occidental world. This is so , 
not only geographically but also spiritually and culturally(16). 
No, there is not such a dialogue, since hostility and lack of trust 
have always characterised the relationship between the two 
worlds. From the crusades to the colonialist Legacy, it is 
continuously a history of hatred and bloodsheed. The recent call for 
such a dialogue amountS to no more than a "show-biz" which 
observers have remarked has a curious smell of oil and' will fade 
away as quickly as it has burst~ out(17) 
Flory, under an extravagant title(18), typical to the French 
mind, has provided us with a juristic appraisal of the Euro-Arab 
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dialogue. The first and obvious fact which he points out is the 
"meta-legal" nature of the concept. The jurist, he notes, is simply 
lost in the midst of extra legal terminology. Instead of the usual 
treaty, we have a dialogue and instead of the cherished notion of 
states, we have worlds or communities. " Faisant contre mauvaise 
for...).urne, bonne mine" Flory decides that it is better this way, 
since the absence of reference to states will perhaps make 
communication easier and enhance interaction(19). Flory notes 
interestingly that the Arabo-Islamic Community seems to enjoy a 
better position on the dialogical frame and believe that such a 
dialogue could well become an inspiring school for unity to both 
communities if it succeeds in preserving its openesses and fresh 
outlook. 
As Flory stresses it, the aim of such a dialogue is not so much 
to achieve grand objectives and treaties as it is to create a good 
atmosphere of trust and friendship which will be conducive to 
cooperation and understanding. To accept dialogue is to step out 
from old prejudices and express the desire for a genuine 
partnership between equals who believe in mutual respect. 
Of course, the implementation of such a communicative action 
between the two worlds is not an easy task. I n fact the notion of a 
Europe itself is still like that of the Arabo-Islamic Community ai1~ 
"Utopia". This was clearly demonstrated by the Gentlemen 
Agreement concluded by Kissinger with the Europeans in regard to 
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such vital issues as the Palestinian question and the energy 
iss u e (20). Now, if Europe is declared incompetent in regard to 
those vital issues, one has the right to wonder, what is left to talk 
about? 
Fruitful dialogue between the Arabo-Islamic world and Europe 
is not a matter which few meetings and refined rheltlorics will 
bring about{21 L It is a long term project which requires the 
deconstruction of past records charged with heavy prejudices on 
both sides. B. Lewis may invoke EI Messoudi as Arab scholars have 
done with Orientalists but that will not allow us to go far. --~hat for 
SUI(" is going to help us build a new relationship is the belief in the 
future and the common benefit that we derive from our 
understanding for our next generations . 
Now that the communist bloc has vanished, Europe avoiding the 
Mediteranean sphere after the Gulf crisis, turns over its attention 
toward East Europe; there, surprisingly, she found herself once more 
trapped with the spectre of Islam besieged in "Sarajevo". One 
cannot escape his fate, the only sound thing we can do is to learn 
live toghether as neighbours are required to. It is high time, to turn 
the page of history and by the same token to turn also that negative 
complementarity between us into some constructive and civilized 
achievments. 
Laroui invokes Gibbon's famous ulterance: "what would have 
happened if the Arabs were not stopped at "Poitiers" and how 
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would Europe be today if the Hadith is taught at Oxford"(22)? By 
Gibbon's times, the invocation sounded outrageous, I hope that 
today, postmodern Europe will find it less so. Hadith can be taught 
today at Oxford and Harvard .Iilthe same way that Shakespeare and 
Twain are tauMI21 at Arab universities. 
It is about time, to replace that selfish negation of otherness 
by a sense of constructive altruism. That economic 
complementarity between North and South which is often 
boastfully praised during summits and international meetings 
should find its way to concrete projects. 
In order that such complementarity may burst into real life, 
economic monopoly and excluvisim should be banned. Arabs like 
every other people, succumb to hedonistic impulses and' 'strive 
fiercely in order to protect and safeguard their interests. Yet, 
unlike others, they have learned from the desert self control, 
abstinence and even ascetism. This makes of them daring gamblers 
and for as long as the western world accept to hold them out a hand, 
they unequivocally will seize it. 
Ricoeur admits that so far western civilization has met other 
civilizations with the shocks of conquest and domination. "We have 
to admit that this encounter has not yet taken place at the level of 
an authentic dialogue and that is why we are in a kind of lull or 
inter-regnum in which we can no longer practice the dogmatism of 
a single truth and in which we are not yet capable of conquering the 
scepticism into which we have stepped.(23) 
1.Ve, 
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u--;J~-t. 
muslims, submit to religion within which we find salLtte 
and that which is good for all. As Pope Paul VI has argued: 
"e 0 m m 0 n consent among (Jnequals does not guarantee 
justice, equity in international activity is a long term 
project. Yet, it requires already a real equality in 
negotiations and talks". (24) 
We believe in dialogue and look upon religion as an inspiring 
source for all humans. The receuil of the Hague academy encloses 
an important contribution of religion to the development of 
international law. We believe it is worthwhile to deepen that 
contribution and carryon the task of deriving \"h ~r~ {r~(i\ a 
communicative action between all the people on earth.(25) 
-----------------------------------------------
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General Conclusions 
Our work comes to its end. What about our thesis? t~id we 
succeed in conveying a sound and coherent analysis of what the 
Arabo-Islamic community is? What are its international claims 
and the conditions under which this community will convert and 
becomes a prorP:ducer not of international tension and terrorism, 
but of international solidarity and humanitarianism'),,~ promoter 
not of religious fanaticism and fundamentalism but of tolerance, 
moderation and universalism. 
We have deliberately chosen to focus on the cultural dimension 
not only because this dimension has been neglected and excluded by 
dogmatic positivism but also because we firmly consider such a 
dimension a key-issue leading to a new international 
consciousness. 1he cultural awa4;kening which characterises this 
last two decades is an apportunity for the modern theory of 
international law to review its classical colonial roots. It ought to 
be as that Africa4n wiseman has put it" un rendez-vous du donner 
et du recevoir." It is also a chance for post modern thought to 
recover from nihilism and perceive the future under some fresh and 
promis~ing headlines. 
It has been ascertained that modern essays do not conclude, 
probably because gone are the times of certainty. We never-the-
less feel the need to draw some general conclusions from our 
study. It is not ou r inte ntio n to make a deal 0 ut of these 
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conclusions. We simply hope to sensibilize the reader toward a 
cultural potential which so far has been distorted and falsified to 
him. 
What the Arabo-islamic community expects from the 
international society may be resumed in the following items : 
1) An official recognition of the legitimacy of Arabo-islamic 
Unity and the need to facilitate its implementation through 
regional organization. 
2) The promation of Arabo- islamic culture as a cultural 
constituent of the international society through the integration of 
Arabic and Islam as parts of the international patrimony of 
mankind. 
3) The resolution of the Palestinian dilemma and the 
restitution to the Palestinians of their land as welli3.s the official 
international recognition of their right to self- determination. 
Needless to mention, such an agenda if i~is to be implemented 
will require changes at the international level, a more equitable 
distribution of wealth and power among nations requires a more 
balanced international system, where every cultural and 
civilizationnal unit will have a say. Nations should abide to the 
principle of leadership alternation. 
Nothing is ever to last but goods deeds. Nations should always 
stand ready to serve the international community in the best way 
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they can. The newer international order which every camp tenc:r:;to 
mirror as that everlasting and stable haven of peace, will come 
about only when nations realize their own limits and modestly and 
diligently recognize in that " otherness " a friendly partnership and 
a common destiny. The Arab-Islamic community has a lovely culture 
with which it could profusely enrich the international community. 
It is an oral culture which through words will make life sound 
better for the lot of mankind. " Give me the words and I will 
conquer the world"used to claim J. Conrad the British novelist. 
Alongside Oil and natural ressources, the Arabo-Islamic 
community could bring a touch of romanticism to our cynical 
international society. It could in a more important way rescue the 
power alienated international structure by injecting within it a 
glimpse of its natural freedom. What gift indeed could be more 
valuable to our stressed international life than a deep and intrinsic 
feeling of freedom which Arabo-muslims nurse up to its most 
refined eXEl:I$>ressions. Coolness, contentment, serenity wich are 
typical features of the Arabo-islamic nature could bring some 
relie~~' to our exhauted international society. Of course, Arabo-
(; 
muslims are neither na{t-~Jor credulous. Like everybody else, they 
perceive the international reality and what lies behind it, well 
aware of the devastating effect wh ich the lust of power exercises 
on nations. They will continue to seek their own way to glory and 
leadership and the more so when others deny it to them. 
Arabo-muslims have a peculiar notion of time, so, one of these 
336 
day':f some of them will make it through and history thus, will 
rehabilitate them to their due civilizationnal rank. That is how 
history works and no nation, however powerful can veto the road of 
history. We have raised a hope and o.rleged that dialogue and 
peaceful negotiations may pave the way for smooth changes and 
evolution. R. Khawam has recently edited a manuscript"Le livre des 
ruses" revealing a consumed art of diplomacy and negociations 
among Arabo-muslims. A similar urge for dialogue and 
communicative action animate scholars and international lawyers 
from the western world. We thus, ought to persevere in that ) 
direction no matter how tedious and precarious the way may seem. 
A. Malraux, has once observed that Occident and Orient seem to be 
heading in divergent directions. The former seeks to conquer the 
world while the later devoutly offers himself to the world. 
Would both worlds meet some where in between these two 
divergent directions or are they condemned each to his own fate? 
The history of ~knkind could terminate its course either in 
despair or with hope. It could be put to end violently as it could 
finish peacefully. That is for times to tell. 
Meanwihle, intenational law can either continue to hide behind 
power politics or lead nations in their conquest for peace. It can no 
longer hold to positivistic neutrality. 
The Arabo-islamic community stands to day ready to pass 
whichever test the international community will judge necessary. 
It is eager to engage in talks and dialogue with whomever is 
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willing to. It will with generosity make concessions and 
compromises in order to suit international harmony. 
Yet. Arabo-muslim people will support' international law o',ly in 
so far as it will guarantee their right to dignity and freedom. 
While visiting Arabia, R. Lacey passed one day near a group of 
bedouins praying in the open desert. He could not resist wondering 
what do these Arabs say to the desert? what does this communion 
with emptiness tell them? do they catch wind of some secrets as 
the desert breeze blows? the3e people will never give their 
friendship exept to those wAo beyond the sand and that which it 
r~covers will discern their dreams. 
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Glossary 
Following are definitions for some of the Arabic ter ms often used 
in the text: 
Ahl al kitab 
Allah 
Aman 
Amir al Mu'minin 
Assabyya 
Dar al-ahd 
Dar al-harb 
Dar al-sulh 
Ahl Dhimma 
Dhimmi 
=atwa 
:ikh 
:akih 
ladith 
lilf 
lilm 
udna 
The people of the book( primarily Christians 
and Jews) who are the tolerated respected and 
protected peaple allowed to live as minorities 
within the islamiccommunity. 
God,the creator and sustainer of the universe. 
Safe conduct or pledge of security 
Commander of the faithful, theCalif 
Social solidarity, esprit de corps social 
belonging etc 
called also (Dar al-sulh):non muslim territories 
involved in treaty agreement with a muslim state 
Non-muslim territories hostile to muslims. 
opposite of dar ai-islam 
see dar al-ahd. 
permanent constitutional agreement between 
muslim political authorities and non muslim 
subjects wherby subjects receive protection and 
peaceful relations in exchange foracceptance of 
muslim rule and payment of jizya 
non muslim subject of a muslim state.pl, 
dhimmiyy'un. 
legal or religious opinion or judgement. 
legal rules and injunctions deduced from the 
shariah (Quran and Sunna)sum of muslim legal 
ordinances, the corpus of muslim jurisprudence. 
Muslim doctor,one who exercises fikh.the pi, is 
Fukaha. 
saying,a tradition of the prophet.pl, a hadith. 
alliance. 
Magnimity and forgiveness. 
truce. 
Ijma 
Ijtihad 
Imam 
Istihsan 
Jihad 
Jizya 
Khalif 
Khilafa 
Kharaj 
Maslaha 
Mua'hada 
Muruw'a 
Muwa'ama 
Mu'tasilism 
Maal 
Oiyas 
Ouran 
Riddah 
Shari'a 
Sira 
Siyar 
Sunna 
Sufism 
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consensus.third source of islamic law. 
use of human reason (a'ql) in the elaboration 
and interpretation of the" sharia,juristic opinion. 
Caliph,or a muslim leading congregational 
prayer;or a pious intell~ctual authority. 
juristic preference. 
Holly war,struggle,a muslim's striving to fulfill his 
islamic responsability both in outward and in 
ward action. 
Tax paid by non muslim subjects in an islamic 
state in returnfor state public services 
or Caliph,head of the islamic community. 
orCaliphat;vicegerancy and custodianship of 
man on earth.the supreme islamic authority.the 
first four well guided caliphs are called 
Ra'shiddun. 
land tax. 
pl,masalih el-mursala:public interest. 
treaty. 
courage and bavery marque of manhood 
concordance. 
Means seccession , seceerders or those who 
isolate themselves from the community . It is a 
school which developed during the third century 
( 9a d) It flourised in Bghdad under the Abassid 
rule. Among its advocates were: Wasi ibn Atta , 
Hudell, Nadham etc they were known olso as Ahl 
al adl wa tawhid. 
objectif,aim. 
analogy. 
the holly book of muslims. 
apostacy. 
the will of god for human conduct revealed 
through the prophet Mohammed(pbuh)the sum 
of muslim law. 
biography,way of conduct. 
rules of the islamic international code of conduct. 
the prophet's ordinances wether in the for m of 
oral sayings or of practices. 
derives from " souf" , wool , gamment which 
distinguished the suffti . This social phenomenon 
developed almost at the sametime than 
Mutawilism. Musticism flourished in Baghdad. 
Ta'alif 
Talfiq 
Taqlid 
Ulama 
Umma 
Unwa 
Urf 
Usul al-fikh 
Zakat 
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AI-Hallaj is the most prominent figure among the 
suffi.sufism teaches the love of God, purification 
of the soul, etc 
( el kulub) appaisement and kindness shwed 
towards eemies in order to gain them over. 
piecing together. 
imitation. 
muslim doctors and scientists. 
the islamic commuity. 
(bllad) territory taken by cheer force 
custom. 
the sources of islamic law. Quran, Sunna, Ijma , 
Qiyas .etc 
alms tax paid by muslims. 
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